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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Robert Allan Vogel for the Master
of Arts in Speech Communication presented May 19, 1986.
Title:

Richard Whately's Theory of Argument and Its Influence
on the Homiletic Theory and Practice of John Albert
Broadus.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

In his Treatise On the Preparation and Delivery of
Sermons, the Southern Baptist preacher and educator of the
latter nineteenth century, John A. Broadus, acknowledged the
influence of classical and contemporary theorists upon his
work.

Among those named, particularly with regard to notions

of argument, was Richard Whately, the Anglican Archbishop and
rhetorical theorist of the early nineteenth century.

The

research task involved in this thesis was to determine whether
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and to what extent Whately's theory of argument was employed in
Broadus's homiletic theory and practice.
The writer gathered his data using methods of documentary
research.

Most of the sources were available at local

libraries.

Others, however, were obtained from the Univer-

sities of Kansas,

Iowa, and Michigan.

Materials by and con-

cerning Broadus were obtained from various Baptist historical
agencies.
Both primary and secondary sources were consulted.

The

study of the respective theories of argument and the analysis
of Broadus's discourses were done using primary sources.
Secondary sources provided much helpful background and
evaluation.
The writer examined Whately's theory of argument, as
presented in his Elements of Rhetoric, in detail.

He did the

same with Broadus's theory as presented in his Treatise.
two theories were then compared.

The

It was assumed that Broadus

was influenced by Whately when either a direct reference to
Whately was made or when there existed a similarity of ideas
which could not be attributed to a common source.

Differences

between the theories of the two men were also noted.
From the ideas discovered in the study of Whately's
theory, a paradigm for rhetorical analysis was constructed.
The model for the paradigm was take·n from Lawrence W. Rosenf ield's essay, "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse."

The ele-

ments of argument included in the paradigm were presumption and
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burden of proof, arguments from testimony, analogy, and progressive approach, and refutation.

These were chosen because,

in the opinion of experts, Whately either created or significantly developed them.
The paradigm was used as a standard of analysis for three
of Broadus's discourses, namely, "The Duty of Baptists to Teach
Their Distinctive Views," "Should Women Speak in the Mixed
Public Assemblies?" and "Immersion Essential to Christian
Baptism."
The analysis of Broadus's theory and practice, done by
this writer, confirms the notion that Whately's ideas influenced Broadus significantly.

Broadus's concepts of argument

from testimony, analogy, and progressive approach and his principles of refutation bear the unmistakable influence of the
Archbishop.

Concerning the important matters of presumption

and burden of proof, Broadus pointedly disagreed with Whately
in theory.

In one of the discourses analyzed, however, the

writer concluded that Broadus followed Whately's notions of
burden of proof rather than his own.
The writer concluded that Broadus's use of Whately's
ideas demonstrated their usefulness in the task of preaching.
The findings of this study confirm the opinions of others who
hold Whately's theory in high regard.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The study of argument as a rhetorical process is
nothing new.

Aristotle and others of his day recognized

and described the process as it was employed in the establishing of propositions in various speaking contexts.
The study of rhetorical process in preaching is
nothing new, either.

St. Augustine in his treatise On

Christian Doctrine, Book IV, established the propriety of
applying classical rhetorical concepts to the practice of
preaching.

Therefore, it is to be expected that argument

theory, though in the minds of some a secular notion,
could be applied to preaching.
Various homileticians have discussed the application
of argument theory in preaching.

Among these were Richard

Whately, an Anglican archbishop of the early nineteenth
century, and John Broadus, a Southern Baptist educator and
preacher of the latter nineteenth century.

This thesis

involves the joining of the work of these two men and
their ideas concerning the use of argument in preaching.

-,
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The Significance of Broadus and Whately
Background Concerning John Broadus

,

One of the most significant men in the history of
Baptists in America is John Albert Broadus, scholar, educator, and pulpit orator.

During his lifetime {1827-

1895), Broadus made significant contributions to the work
of Baptists in the south.

Some of these accomplishments

are presented below.
His participation in the founding and developing of
the Southern Baptist Seminary was his primary life's work.
Although he taught in several disciplines at the Seminary
with scholarly credibility, he is probably most widely
known as a teacher of preaching.

Broadus has left his

mark both as a theorist and practitioner of homiletics
upon the students he taught as a professor at the Seminary, and in succeeding generations through his Treatise on

.

the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons.

Concerning the

excellence of his homiletic theory and practice, Professor
W. C. Wilkinson of the University of Chicago wrote:
Every characteristic I have now pointed out as
found with Doctor Broadus in the teacher of
preaching is found also with him, and more rather
than less, in the preacher. His practice well
comports with his theory--comments and commends
it.
To the thoughtful student of both the theory
and practice of the man, it becomes evident that
in Doctor Broadus's case the practice preceded the
theory. But it becomes equally evident that also

3

the theory following reacted, as it should do,
confirming the practice • • • • 1
E. Y. Mullins, who was one of Broadus's successors as
president of Southern Baptist Seminary noted the extent of
Broadus's influence when he wrote:
It may be said without exaggeration that Dr. John
A. Broadus, the first teacher of Homiletics in the
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, did more
than any other man of his generation in the South
to create pulpit ideals for the Baptist ministry.
Indeed, his influence was felt in all parts of the
country and the world. •
2
Broadus was a popular preacher and speaker.

A sur-

vey of his engagement book reveals that he was in great
demand among the churches of both the south and the
north--no small matter in the years surrounding the Civil
War.

His reputation as a scholar of preaching was such

that he was invited to deliver the 1888-89 Lyman Beecher
Lectures on Preaching at Yale, the only Southern Baptist
ever accorded the honor.3
1 An Eminent Professor of Homiletics, "Criticisms of
Some of the Ablest Representative Preachers of the Day:
Rev. John A. Broadus, D.D.," Homiletic Review XVI
(August, 1888).
In Life and Letters of John A. Broadus,
p. 367, the "eminent professor" is identified as W. c.
Wilkinson, who served at the University of Chicago.
2 E. Y. Mullins, "The Seminary and Preaching," The
Baptist Argus, VI (May 1, 1902), p. 5, cited by James-Roland Barron, "The Contributions of John A. Broadus to
Southern Baptists" (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
Southern Baptist Seminary, 1972), p. 180.
3vernon L. Stanfield, Favorite Sermons of John A.
Broadus (New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1959),
p.

5.
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Besides teaching at the seminary and preaching in
the churches, Broadus frequently addressed meetings of
local Southern Baptist associations as well as those of
the Southern Baptist Convention at large.

His speaking

gave him national prominence and significant influence
during the first fifty years of the Convention's
existence.
These accomplishments make Broadus a man worthy of
study for students of preaching in general and students of
evangelical Baptist preaching in particular.
The Influence of Richard Whately on Broadus
One of the major aspects of Broadus's homiletic
theory involved the use of argument in preaching.

The

importance of this subject to Broadus is expressed in the
preface to his Treatise, where he wrote:
The subject of Argument is thought by some to be
out of place in a treatise on Homiletics or on
Rhetoric in general. But preaching and all public
speaking ought to be largely composed of argument,
for even the most ignorant people constantly practice it themselves, and always feel its force when
properly presented; and yet in many pulpits the
place of argument is mainly filled by mere assertion and exhortation, and the arguments employed
are often carelessly stated, or even gravely
erroneous.4
4John A. Broadus, A Treatise on the Preparation and
Delivery of Sermons, Fourteenth ed.
(New York:
A. C.
Armstrong, 1889), p. x.
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No doubt, the importance of good argument (as well as
other elements of homiletic theory) was impressed upon
Broadus by other theorists whom he read.

In his Treatise

he freely admits the influence of others on his work.
Among those he mentioned are Aristotle, Cicero, Quintillian, Alexandre Vinet, James

w.

Alexander,

w.

G. T. Shedd,

and James M. Hoppin.s
In his section on argument, he asserted that Richard
Whately, the Anglican Archbishop whose Elements of Rhetoric was published in 1828, had the greatest influence.
Broadus expressed his interest in Whately's theory of
argument most specifically in his discussion of homiletic
1 i terature.

He wrote, "Whately' s Rhetoric is believed to

be the best treatise for practical use that has appeared.
Especially valuable are the portions on Argument and on
Style. 11 6

This opinion is again affirmed in a footnote

5 Ibid., p. x. Vinet, a French homileticican, wrote
Homilet~ or the Theory of Preaching.
The work was
published after his death in 1847.
It was translated into
English by Thomas H. Skinner, Professor of Sacred Rhetoric
and Pastoral Theology at Union Theological Seminary, New
York, in 1854. Alexander taught homiletics at Princeton
Theological Seminary.
His book, Thoughts on Preaching,
was published posthumously in 1860. Shedd, a professor at
Union Theological Seminary in New York, wrote Homiletics
and Pastoral Theology in 1867.
Hoppin filled the Chair of
Homiletics in the Divinity School of Yale University when,
in 1869, his Off ice and Work of the Christian Ministry was
published. For further information, see E. c. Dargan, The
Art of Preaching in the Light of Its History (New York:~
George H. Doran Company, 1922), pp. 184, 220-222.
6Ibid., p. 32.
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{appearing early in his chapter on argument) in which he
said, "In this chapter much use is made of Whately, whose
discussion on Arguments is the most valuable part of his
work on Rhetoric, and unequalled by other treatises."7
Broadus's opinion of the excellence of Whately's
work is widely shared.
work was Sir Richard

c.

One whO---highly praised Whately's
Jebb, the English classical scho-

lar of the nineteenth century.

Comparing Whately to Blair

and Campbell, Jebb wrote,

.undoubtedly the best

"

modern book on the subject is Richard Whately's Elements
of Rhetoric.a

Orville Pence quoted twelve different

writers who testified to the excellence of Whately's ideas
set forth in his Elements of Rhetoric and its companion,
his Elements of Logic.9

Golden, et al., more contemporary

writers, note the significance of the Elements of Rhetoric
"as a historical document and as a moulder of contemporary
argumentation theory. 11 10

Ehninger made the following

7 Ibid., p. 162.
8 Encyclopedia Britannica,
by R. C. Jebb.

11th ed.,

s.v. "Rhetoric,"

9 orville Pence, "The Concept and Function of Logical
Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately" (Ph. D.
dissertation, University of Iowa, 1946), pp. 13-15.
lOJames L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William
E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 2nd ed.
(Dubuque:
Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1978), p. 136.
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statement regarding Whately's work:
Because Whately's decisions on some of the major
questions in rhetoric have proved sound and fruitful through many years of practice, the Elements,
while not to be numbered among the great creative
works on the subject, is certainly to be ranked
among the most influential. For the same reason,
though now a century and a third old, it has much
to say to the student of rhetoric yet today.11
The value of Whately's work to Broadus was no doubt
enhanced by their mutual interest in the application of
the theory of argumentation to preaching.

Being a clergy-

man, Whately oriented his theory specifically toward religious discourse.

Golden states that Whately's extreme

devotion to Christianity so shaped his system of argumentation that his approach could well be called an ecclesiastical

rhetoric.12

Although Broadus respected Whately's theory, he did
not merely copy it.

While admitting that he freely

employed Whately's work, he developed the subject of argument "with very large additions, and with the attempt to
correct some important errors"l3 in Whately's work.
llRichard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. Douglas
Ehninger (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press,
1963), p. xxx.
12rbid., p. 137. Ehninger, in the introduction to
his critical edition of Whately's Elements of Rhetoric
makes a similar statement.
13Broadus, p. ix.
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Purpose and Rationale
The purpose of this study is to trace the influence
of Richard Whately's theory of argument on John Broadus's
theory and practice of preaching.

Such a study is desir-

able because both of these men are widely recognized for
their influence on the rhetoric of preaching.

The extent

of their influence and reasons for their fame have been
briefly cited above.
Sublevels of purpose and rationale are related to
specific directions the study is taking.

One goal of the

study is to expound and compare the theories of argument
of both men.

The exposition provides a brief but useful

synopsis of two similar theories of argument.

The discus-

sion of Whately's influence and Broadus's criticisms of
Whately's theory provide a comparative evaluation of both
theories.

The description and evaluation of models of

argumentation. should be useful in the ongoing development
of rhetorical theory.
Another goal of the study is to describe and evaluate the practical application of Whately's theory by
applying procedures of rhetorical criticism to a select
few of Broadus's discourses.
this kind of analysis:

Three have been chosen for

"Duty of Baptists to Teach Their

Distinctive Views," "Immersion Essential to Christian
Baptism," and "Should Women Speak in Mixed Public
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Assemblies?" These particular addresses were chosen
according to criteria which are stated subsequently in

this chapter.
Review of the Literature
Works Concerning Whately
The work of prime importance for analyzing Whately's
theory in this study is his own Elements of Rhetoric.
Part I, sections 1-3, contains his statement concerning
argument.

Helpful commentary is included in the Douglas

Ehninger edition of this work (1963.)
Numerous works have been written about Whately's
theory.

Maxfield Parrish discussed that theory, as

influenced particularly by Coplestone and Aristotle, in
"Whately and His Rhetoric" (Quarterly Journal of Speech,
February,

1929.)

Parrish's doctoral dissertation (Cornell

University, 1929) also concerned Whately, but treated his
Oxford background, his college reading, the various editions of his works, and his sources rather than his
notions regarding logical proof .14

Ehninger's article,

"Campbell, Blair, and Whately Revisited" (Southern Speech
Journal, Spring,

1963) traces the influence of classical

models upon Whately.
14pence, p. 4 •

(This article is a refinement of an

10
article by Ehninger in the Southern Speech Journal,
October,

1955.)

Pomeroy's article,

Doubts':

Argument and Origin"

"Whately's 'Historic

(Quarterly Journal of

Speech, February, 1963) includes some useful personal
background on Whately, although most of the article does
not deal with his rhetoric.

James Golden's The Rhetoric

of Blair, Campbell, and Whately (1968) includes an edited
version of the Elements of Rhetoric.

Golden's

collabora-

tion with Berquist and Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western
Thought (1976) includes a synopsis and brief analysis of
Whately's notions of presumption and burden of proof.
Some other works concentrate on the narrower aspects
of argument in Whately.

A definitive examination and

evaluation of logical proof in Whately's rhetoric, particularly as compared with Aristotle's Rhetoric, was undertaken by Orville Pence in his dissertation entitled, "The
Concept and Function of Logical Proof in the Rhetorical
System of Richard Whately" (unpublished dissertation,
University of Iowa, 1946).

Pence in a subsequent journal

article ("The Concept and Function of Logical Proof in _the
Rhetorical System of Richard Whately," Quarterly Journal
of Speech, March, 1953) analyzed the Archbishop's view of
conviction.

Anderson and Hayes (Quarterly Journal of

Speech, June, 1967) summarize Whately's idea of burden of
proof and demonstrate how he applied it in one of his
speeches.

Leathers (Southern Speech Journal, Winter,
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1969), comparing Whately to John Stuart Mill, asserted
that Whately was anti-empirical in his approach to proof.
Works Concerning Broadus
The primary source for examining Broadus's theory is
his own Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons.

Of specific interest is Part I, Chapter VI,

entitled "Argument."

This book originally appeared in

1870, which was early in Broadus's career.

Through subse-

quent years, he made several notations of revisions which
he wished to incorporate in a new edition of the book.
Broadus died before he could publish a revision, but
within two years of his death his associate at Southern
Baptist Seminary, E. C. Dargan, prepared a revision based
primarily upon Dr. Broadus's notes and incorporating his
verbal ideas.15

A comparison of the two volumes on the

subject of argument discloses changes in organization, but
none in substance.
Among the literature concerning Broadus's life and
work are The Seminary Magazine, Broadus Memorial Edition
(April, 1895), C. L. Cocke's "An Address on the Character
of John Albert Broadus, before the Baptist General Assoc15John A. Broadus, A Treatise on the Preparation and
Delivery of Sermons, rev. E. C. Dargan (New York:
Hodder
and Stoughton, 1898), pp. vi, vii.
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iation of Virginia" (November 17, 1895), and A. T.
Robertson's Life and Letters of John Albert Broadus
(1901).

Among more recent works is James Roland Barron's

dissertation, "The Contributions of John A. Broadus to
Southern Baptists" (Southern Baptist s"eminary,

1972.)

Barron described Broadus's accomplishments during his
career and thus provides useful personal background concerning the man.
Probably the major work on Broadus's homiletical
theory has been "A Study of the Rhetorical Theories of
John A. Broadus" by Paul Huber (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1956).

Huber's work

summarized Broadus's theory and identified the influence
of writers Broadus quoted in his treatise.

In the four-

teen pages devoted to his theory of argument, Whately's
influence, among others, is discussed.
("John Albert Broadus:

Jerry Paxton Ashby

The Theory and the Practice of His

Preaching," New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary,
1968) determined to compare Broadus's theory with his
practice.

Using the Weatherspoon revision of Broadus's

treatise as a basis, he studied 250 of Broadus's manuscripts to determine the extent to which Broadus applied
various aspects of his theory.

The work advanced Huber's

study by considering the sermons of Broadus, but the
analysis of so many speeches resulted in superficial

13
treatment.

The statistical nature of the report was

accompanied by only minimal analysis of sermon content.
For purposes of the present study, Broadus's sermons, addresses, and writings are also relevant literature.

Broadus himself published his favorites in Sermons

and Addresses (1886).

v.

L. Stanfield edited a collection

of twenty-four sermons entitled Favorite Sermons of John
A. Broadus (1959).

Several addresses and written dis-

courses were published in pamphlet form.
"Denominational Sermon:

Among these are

The Duty of Baptists to Teach

Their Distinctive Views" (1881), "The Study of the Bible
by Books,

its Advantages" (1881), "Three Questions as to

the Bible" (1883), "Should Women Speak in Mixed Public
Assemblies?" (1890),16
Baptism" (1892),

"Immersion Essential to Christian

and "Christianity Essentially Missionary"

(1893).
Methodology
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the influence
of Whately's theory of argument on the theory and practice
of Broadus.

The methods selected, therefore, had to

enable the achievement of two goals.

First, they had to

expose the theories of the two men, covering their
16He said that they should not.
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similarities and differences.

Second, they had to provide

a vehicle for rhetorical criticism of Broadus's sermons
and addresses.
The achievement of the first objective was essential
to the accomplishment of the second.

The first procedure

produced a model for argumentation, which became the standard for the criticism of Broadus's practice.
Of first priority was the description of Whately's
theory of argument as set forth in his work, Elements of
Rhetoric.

Elaboration from secondary sources named in the

literature review enhanced this description.

The theory

has been summarized to identify the major elements of
argument and their relationships to one another.
The second procedure was to describe Broadus's
theory, drawn from his chapter on argument in his treatise
and elaborated through research in secondary sources.
Significant in this description was the comparison of
Broadus's ideas concerning argument with those of Whately.
It has been assumed that Broadus was influenced by Whately
when either a direct reference to Whately is made or when
there exists a similarity of ideas which cannot be attributed to a common source.

Differences between Whately and

Broadus have also been noted.
This procedure accomplished two objectives.

First,

it provided a summary model of argument, which could be
used as Broadus's own standard for rhetorical analysis of

15
his sermons and addresses.

Second, it traced the influ-

ence of Whately on Broadus's theory.
Having described the theories of both men, the
writer then turned to the second goal, using methods of
rhetorical analysis to assess whether and how Broadus
applied his theory of argument.

Specifically, three

addresses and written discourses, selected for diversity
of occasion and purpose yet all dealing with controversial
subjects, were analyzed.
The criteria used for selecting the addresses and
discourses were as follows.
had to be available.

First, the addresses chosen

Although this criterion is obvious,

it is not as insignificant as it might appear.

Because

Broadus generally preached extemporaneously rather than
from a manuscript, only a relatively small number of his
sermons and addresses were ever available in print.
Furthermore, it is likely that with the passing of time
many of the records have been lost.

Although the number

of available sermons, addresses, and discourses is somewhat limited, there is a sufficient number for purposes of
analysis.
Second, the addresses were chosen for either their
controversial content or their persuasive intent.

It is

self-evident that one would argue to establish a viewpoint
that is disputed.

The titles, introductory comments,

16
and central propositions of twol7 of the three chosen
clearly indicate divided opinion concerning their topics.
It is also self-evident that argument is naturally a part
of persuasion.

In onel8 of the three it is evident that

Broadus desired to move his audience to adopt a course of
action, which required some argument to persuade.

It is,

therefore, reasonable to expect that Broadus would employ
his theory and skills of argument to establish his viewpoint regarding each of the subjects at hand.
Implied by the second criterion is the third,
namely, that the development of those discourses chosen
must involve at least some argument.

Argumentation would

naturally be expected by the nature of the propositions
involved, but if Broadus had not met the natural expectation, little analysis essential to this study could be
done.
The fourth criterion was that the address could be
one originally either spoken or written.

This is not to

deny the significant differences between oral and written
discourse.

Rather,

it is to suggest that these differ-·

ences, such as style, are irrelevant to the interest in
argument involved in this study.

Whether written or

17 11 rmmersion Essential to Christian Baptism" and
"Should Women Speak in Mixed Public Assemblies?"
18"The Duty of Baptists to Teach Their Distinctive
Views"
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spoken, the arguments presented were directed toward an
identifiable audience, were relative to a stated proposition, and involved a clear purpose, either expressed or
implied.
The rhetorical analysis followed the eclectic model
of Lawrence

w.

Rosenfield, set forth in his essay, "The

Anatomy of Critical Discourse."19
field,

According to Rosen-

in critical discourse verdicts (i.e., judgments or

evaluations) are pronounced, and reasons justifying the
verdicts are offered.20

Because such is the nature of

critical discourse, it is like forensic reasoning, in
which observations are juxtaposed with normative standards
in some fashion.21

In short, Rosenfield proposes that one

evaluates what he's criticizing by comparing the criticized entity to a standard.
Rosenfield further suggests procedures for relating
the norm and the observation.
"model modality."

One means he describes is a

In this approach the critic begins by

generating a paradigm (an "exemplar of a kind") which will
19Lawrence Rosenfield, "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse," in Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A.Twentieth
Century Perspective, second ed., revised, eds. Bernard L.
Brock and Robert L. Scott (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1980), pp. 148-74.
20Ibid., pp. 153-55.
21Ibid., pp. 156ff.
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be his basis for comparison.22

From the comparison

follows
a kind of diagnosis; if the model conforms
to the critic's rhetorical theory (as we must
assume it does if it is to be regarded as a paradigm), then disparity between the norm-discourse
and the actual one should provide some insight
into both the aesthetic excellence and the rhetorical we~knesses evident in the discourse being
inspected. 3
The analysis can, in turn, become a critique of the standard as well.

The critic may search for reasons to

account for deviation from the model in the criticized
entity.

The explanation for the extent and character of

deviation constitutes the invention of critical reasons.24
The application of Rosenfield's procedure,
begins with the construction of a model.

then,

The model, or

paradigm used in this study was that of Whately.

The

rhetorical analysis of Broadus's addresses required juxtaposing them against Whately's paradigm.

The analysis

describes the phenomenon, evaluating how well Broadus's
practice conforms to Whately's theory.

In turn, explana-

tions for deviation have been suggested in order to judge
the paradigm itself.
Background information for each address or discourse
was examined when possible.
22Ibid., p. 170.
23Ibid.
24rbid., p. 171.

It was expected that the
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occasion of each and the audience's opinions concerning
the subject would determine the argument employed.
Plan of Organization
The thesis consists of five chapters.

The first

introduces the subject, presenting its purpose and
rationale, reviewing the pertinent literature, and describing the methodology employed in the study.
Chapter Two provides personal background of Richard
Whately and selectively develops his theory of argument.
Chapter Three includes background information concerning John Broadus, and selectively presents his theory
of argument.

Through comparison, the influence of

Whately's theory is traced.
Chapter Four consists of the rhetorical analysis of
three addresses or written discourses based upon a model
derived from Whately's theory of argument as presented in
the second chapter.

Description and evaluation are

included.
Chapter Five includes a summary analysis of the findings of the study.

Conclusions are drawn respecting the

extent to which Broadus followed Whately's model, and how
he may have veered from it.

Judgments are offered con-

cerning the value of the paradigm itself.
are suggestions for further study.

Also included
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As Broadus pointed out, even the most ignorant of
men practice argument, and feel its force when it is
properly done.25

However,

in pulpits and other public

forums argument is regularly abused.

It is the author's

hope that this thesis will strengthen the abilities of its
readers to argue a point in an excellent manner, not only
for the sake of contemporary rhetoric, but also for the
sake of truth.
25Broadus, 14th ed., p. ix.

CHAPTER II
RICHARD WHATELY'S THEORY OF ARGUMENT
As stated in the previous chapter, the inquiry of
this thesis concerns the influence of Richard Whately's
theory of argument on the homiletic theory and practice of
John Broadus.

It is, therefore, logical to begin the

investigation with a description of Richard Whately's
theory of argument.

In this chapter, the writer will

provide a brief sketch of Archbishop Whately's life, an
overview of his theory, an exposition of selected elements
of argument he set forth in his Elements of Rhetoric, and
an assessment of his contributions to the study of
rhetoric.
Background of Richard Whately
Richard Whately was born in London, England on
February 1, 1787, the son of Joseph Whately, prebendary of
Bristol.l

As a child confined to the indoors due to

delicate health, he developed an interest in books early
in life.

His reading even as a child piqued his interest

in mathematics, ethics, and politics.
1 New Catholic Encyclopedia,
Richard."

These disciplines

1967 ed.,

s.v. "Whately,
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proved to be foundational to his later interests in logic,
the Church,

and political economy.2

In 1805, Whately was admitted to Oriel College,
Oxford.

He completed his B. A. degree in 1808, was

elected Fellow of Oriel, and earned his M. A. in 1812.
Soon after his degree was conferred, he was ordained an
Anglican clergyman.

In 1825, after spending four years in

a pastorate at Halesworth in Suffolk, Whately became principal of St. Alban Hall, Oxford.3

In 1829, he was

appointed Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, a
position which suited his "lucid, practical intellect." 4
In 1831, Whately resigned his position at Oxford to
accept the call to become Archbishop of St. Patrick's
Cathedral in Dublin.
1853.5

He served in this position until

From this office, he became involved in the poli-

2 James L. Golden and Ed ward P. J. Corbett, The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell, and Whately (New York:
Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 273.
3 Ibid.
4Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Whately,
Richard." However, Parrish notes that his interest in.
political economy was largely underdeveloped due to his
greater concern for theological matters. Wayland Maxfield
Parrish, "Whately and His Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal
of Speech 15 (February 1929): 68.
5Kenneth s. Latourette, Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, vol. 1: The Nineteenth Century in Europe
(New York:
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1959), p.
397.
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tical, social, and religious ferment of his day.

Although

he supported Catholic emancipation and reforms intended to
help the Irish poor, he was not popular in Dublin,6 for he
was an Englishman and a Protestant.7
In his later years, Whately's health failed.

For

this reason he spent most of his time in his study.

After

an extended illness, he died on October 1, 1863, and was
buried in St.

Patrick's Cathedral.8
Whately the Controversialist

His years as a student and tutor at Oxford were
extremely important in shaping the ideas and personal
traits for which Whately would become known.
the· University was Ed ward Coples tone.

His tutor at

Coples tone, who

himself wrote satirical and argumentative works, sharpened
Whately's taste for controversy.9

Whately's emerging

interest in theological issues, coupled with his flair for
controversy,

is evident in his satiric pamphlet, "Historic

Doubts Relative to Napoleon Bonaparte," written in 1819.
6 Golden and Corbett, p. 274.
7F. R. Webber, A History of Preaching in Britain and
America, 3 vols.
(Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing
House, 1952-57), 1:533.
8 Golden and Corbett,
9parrish, p. 59.

p.

275.
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Although he regularly disclaimed controversial intent,
this particular tract was quite provocative.10
The purpose of the pamphlet was to show that the
conclusions of sceptical criticism, as advocated by Hume,
were based upon fallacies.

Hume had argued that the

miracles recorded in the Bible cannot be accepted on the
basis of human testimony.

Heavily employing the reductio

ad absurdum argument, and using Hume's critical procedures, Whately argued that the existence of Napoleon Bonaparte could not be admitted as a "well-authenticated
fact."11

In other words, applying "the same methods used

to cast doubt on Biblical miracles would also leave open
to question the existence of Napoleon Bonaparte."12
Whately and the Noetic School
Whately's penchant for controversy extended not only
to the sceptics of his day.

The Archbishop regularly

found himself at odds with churchmen as well.

During his

years at Oxford, Whately witnessed the birth and growth of
the Tractarian movement.

In the early years he was a

lORalph s. Pomeroy, "Whately's 'Historic Doubts:'
Argument and Origin," Quarterly Journal of Speech 49
(February, 1963): 62.
llibid., p.

62.

12Encyclopedia Britannica,
Richard."

15th ed.,

s.v. "Whately,
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close friend of most of the Tractarians.

In time however,

because he could not comprehend the beliefs of the Tractarians and the Low Church party, he came to hold those
groups in comtempt.

Their doctrines, he believed, were

tinged with superstition.13

While at Oriel,

therefore,

Whately was among those who formed the so-called "Noetic"
School.

Being less inclined toward a mystical view of

religion than the Tractariansl4 were, the Noetics called
everything into question.

This inquisitive environment

prompted the development of natural independence and
originality of thinking which would later be expressed in
his works on logic and rhetoric.15
To both the High Churchmen and the Evangelicals, his
view of Christianity seemed to be little better than
13Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed.,
Richard."

s.v. "Whately,

14 The inclination of the Tractarians was toward many
of the religious practices of the Roman Catholic Church.
Among these were the historic episcopacy and apostolic
succession, emphasis upon the Eucharist, and many preReformation practices of the Anglican Church. These
included such things as auricular confession, the use of
vestments, incense, candles, the eastward position of the
altar, and intoned services. Whately's opposition to the
movement culminated in a break with his friends when Tract
XC, which would have made possible for Anglicans the
Catholic practices of the invocation of Saints, belief in
purgatory, and the use of images. For further discussion
of the movement, see Latourette, pp. 264-270.
15parrish, pp. 62, 63.
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rationalism.16

However, in fundamental matters, he was

considered to be orthodox and conservative.17

Concerning

his theological attitude, Golden and Corbett wrote:
Although he was a close friend of most of the
Tractarians in the early days of the Oxford Movement, he gradually drifted away from them ideologically and finally broke with them over the
affair of the famous Tract XC • • • • Part of his
disaffection with the whole Oxford Movement was
due to his congenital antipathy for metaphysical
and theological speculations.
The principle that
governed the stand he took in all religious controversies was Chillingworth's premise that "the
Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of
Protestants." And it was this allegiance to the
Scriptures that accounts for the emphasis ~e puts
on testimony in his Elements of Rhetoric. 1
A similar perspective on his theological method and the
genuineness of his religion is expressed below.

He may be

said to have continued the typical Christianity of the
18th century--that of the theologians who went out to
fight the Rationalists with their own weapons.

It was to

Whately essentially a belief in certain matters of fact,
to be

accepte~

dences."

or rejected after an examination of "evi-

Hence his endeavor always is to convince the

logical faculty, and his Christianity inevitably appears
as a thing of the intellect rather than of the heart.19
16Britannica,

11th ed.,

s.v. "Whately,

Richard."

17parrish, p. 66.
18Golden and Corbett,
19Britannica,

p.

11th ed.,

274.
s.v.

"Whately,

Richard."
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Perhaps some of the conflict in which he was
involved can be attributed to a trait of his character.
Despite his liberal orientation, Whately was rather
intolerant of those with whom he disagreed in religious
matters.20

This intolerance, coupled with his incisive

skills of argument, alienated many.
Whately was a great talker, much addicted in
early life to argument, in which he used others as
instruments on which to hammer out his own views •
• • • He had a keen wit, whose sharp edge often
inflicted wounds never deliberately intended by
the speaker • • • • With a remarkably fair and
lucid mind, his sympathies were narrow, and by his
blunt outspokenniss on points of difference he
alienated many.2
Whately's Strengths and Weaknesses
Regularly, Whately is described as an intelligent
man, and his accomplishments, especially the works on
logic and rhetoric, receive high praise.22

It may be,

therefore, surprising to some that, despite his excellent
grasp of argumentation and delivery in pulpit discourse,
he was not the popular preacher that Hugh Blair had been.23
20Golden and Corbett, p.
21Britannica,

11th ed.,

275.
s.v.

22Encyclopedia Britannica,
by R. C. Jebb.

"Whately,
11th ed.,

Richard."
s.v. "Rhetoric,"

23Blair is considered by some to have been the most
popular Scottish preacher of the latter eighteenth cen-

28
His sermons were dry, systematic, and unimpassioned. 24
Despite the acuity of his intellect, apparently he
was not as wide a reader as some other theorists were.
John Stuart Mill said of Whately:
• • • • of all persons in modern times, entitled
to the name of philosophers, the two, probably,
whose reading was the scantiest, in proportion to
their intellectual capacity, were Archbishop
Whately and Dr. Brown. But though indolent
readers they were both of them active and fertile
thinkers.2 5
Mill's opinion not withstanding, Whately did read.

His

favorite authors, and those who influenced him most
signf icantly, were Aristotle, Thucydides, Bacon, Bishop
Butler, Warburton, and Adam Smith.

His writings contain

many ideas and illustrations drawn from these and other
writers.26
Whately's Works
According to Lowndes Bibilographical Manual, Whately
had ninety-seven published works.27

His writings covered a

tury. His sermons even today are considered to be models
of literary excellence, being concise, clear, and beau~
tiful. F. R. Webber, vol. 2, p. 205.
24Golden and Corbett, p.

274.

25John Stuart Mill, quoted by Parrish, p. 79.
26parrish, p. 76.
27 rbid., p. 78.
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broad range of topics from theology to economics to the
political and social issues of his day.

He is best known,

however, for his works on logic and rhetoric.
After his return to Oxford in 1825, Whately wrote
rather lengthy articles on logic and rhetoric for Coleridge's Encyclopaedia Metropolitana.

These articles

formed the basis for his best-known writings, Elements of
Logic which appeared in 1826 and Elements of Rhetoric
which appeared in 1828.28

Each successive edition of the

Rhetoric was enlarged and revised, so that by its seventh
edition, published in 1846, Parts I and II were more

tha~M

two and one half times as large as the original article
had been.29

Both of these works achieved considerable

popularity, but the better known of the two is the
Elements of Rhetoric.
An Overview of the Elements of Rhetoric
As indicated above, Whately's most famous and
influential work is his Elements of Rhetoric.30

If one

wishes to understand his theory of argument in discourse
in particular, the study of Whately's Rhetoric is essen28Golden and Corbett, p. 273.
29Ibid., p. 274.
30Ibid., p. 273.

30

tial.31

Its particular significance for this thesis is in

the fact that it is this work which Broadus credited for
several of his ideas concerning argument.

Therefore, a

consideration of the Rhetoric is required for this study.
Certain elements will be explained below.

First, however,

some general observations are in order.
Influences Upon Whately's Elements of Rhetoric
The primary influence upon Whately's theory was the
classicist, Aristotle.

He also reacted clearly to the

theory of his own day, however.

That theory included the

belletristic notions of Hugh Blair, the elocutionary movement of John Mason, Thomas Sheridan, et al., and the
"psychological-epistemological" rhetoric of George Campbell.

Ehninger described Whately's negative and positive

reaction:
The belletristic, with its tendency to make
rhetoric a criticism of written discourse, he
rejected out of hand, strongly declaring the proper function of rhetoric to be the supervision of
oral composition and in general observing the
traditional distinction between the offices of
rhetoric and poetry. The elocutionary, with its
proclivity toward the prescriptive or "mechanical," he chastened and corrected. Calling elocu3 1 It should be noted that the term "theory" is used
loosely in regard to Whately's work.
As Ehninger points
out, the Elements is not intended as a theoretical inquiry
into the nature of communication. Rather it serves a
pedagogical purpose for the instruction of the unpracticed. See Douglas Ehninger, Introduction to Elements of
Rhetoric, by Richard Whately (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), p. xv.
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tionism back from the excesses into which it had
fallen, he settled it firmly upon a foundation of
unqualified "naturalism," with the tones and manners of earnest conversation as its guiding ideal.
The psychological-epistemological trend Whately
not only endorsed but, as his major contribution,
carried to its logical completion. For while in
denying rhetoric an investigatory method of its
own Campbell and Priestly had made it exclusively
a managerial science, these writers had left
unformulated the principles and methods of "management" as they apply in the crucial area of
invention.
Accepting the challenge thus posed, Whately
developed an inventional system aimed at systematizing the selection and application of cogent
"reasons," just as the ancients had systematized
the process of choosing an appropriate argumentative position and discerning the proofs inherent
in it.32
Whately, then, extended Campbell's ideas concerning
logical theory to the discipline of rhetoric.

Because,

however, he believed that Campbell misunderstood logic he
turned often to Aristotle for source materials for both
logic and rhetoric.33
The Scope of Rhetoric
In Whately's view, rhetoric included both written
and oral argumentative discourse.34

Ehninger noted, how-

32Ehninger, Introduction, p. xxviii.
33orville L. Pence, "The Concept and Function of
Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard
Whately," Speech Monographs, March, 1953, p. 23.
In further citations, this source is called "monograph."
34orville L. Pence, "The Concept and Function of
Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately"
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1946), p. 366. In
further citations, this source is called "dissertation."
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ever, that while his system provides for written and oral
discourse, the latter is the more prominent.
A second characteristic of the Elements, hardly
less important than its theological orientation,
is its persistent focus upon the problems and
methods of oral argumentation • • • • The Elements,
therefore, is not simply to be described as a
rhetoric of argumentation. More correctly, it is
a rhetoric of oral argumentation--a rhetoric concerned with argument as it occurs either in the
formal speaker-audience situation or in the give
and take of face-to-face dispute.35
Important in Whately's work is the view that argument is the primary element of rhetoric.36

Although the

archbishop discussed style and delivery in his work, the
section on argument receives the greatest emphasis.

This

is undoubtedly the case because Whately viewed the finding
and arranging or arguments as the only exclusive province
of rhetoric.
The finding of suitable ARGUMENTS to prove a given
point, and the skilful arrangement of them, may be
considered as the immediate and proper province of
Rhetoric, and of that alone • • • • The art of
inventing, and arranging Arguments is, as has been
said, the only province that Rhetoric can claim
entirely and exclusively.37
Ehninger noted the general consensus that Whately's emphasis is upon argument.
35Ehninger, Introduction, pp. xii, xv.
36pence, dissertation, p. 366.
37Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, with an
Introduction by Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale:
Southern
Illinois University Press, 1963), pp. 39, 40.
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In spirit as in doctrine he holds so consistently
to his announced purpose of treating rhetoric as
"Argumentative Composition" that even today his
work is almost universally--indeed, almost aut~~a
tically--thought of as a treatise on argument.
So pronounced was his view that rhetoric embraces exclusively the whole of oral and written argument that Whately
is regarded as "the first English rhetorician to treat
argument as a separate discipline."39
In believing that the scope of rhetoric is limited
primarily to argument, Whately's views coincide with those
of the modern authorities Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman. 40

Thus, as Golden asserted, Whately's work" ••• is

significant both as a historical document and as a moulder
of contemporary argumentation theory."41
38Ehninger, Introduction, p.

xiv.

39pence, monograph, p. 37.
4 0James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William
E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 2nd ed.
(Dubuque:
Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1978), p. 136;
cf. Dearin, p. 262-264.
It should also be observed that
Perelman embraced Whately's notions of presumption and
burden of proof, writing, "Only change requires justification, presumption playing in favor of what exists, just as
the burden of proof falls upon him who wants to change an
established state of affairs. Perelman, Justice (New
York, 1967), p. 104. Quoted by Ray D. Dearin, "The Philosophical Basis of Chaim Pereleman's Theory of Rhetoric,"
in Philosophers on Rhetoric, ed. Donald G. Douglas
(Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1973), p. 262.
41Ibid., p. 136.
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The Relationship of Logic and Rhetoric
Whately's view of the prominence of argument in
rhetoric follows from his acceptance of the Aristotelian
notion that rhetoric is an offshoot of logic.42

Rhetoric

in Whately's view is the art of reasoned discourse,

in

which "conclusions are inferred from premises according to
the laws of logic."43

In rhetoric, the task is to find or

invent and arrange suitable arguments to prove a point.
In logic, the task is to judge the validity of the arguments.44

As Pence observed:

The function of logic in Whately's rhetoric was
(1) to provide the speaker with a means of evaluating his own thinking to avoid self-deception, and
(2) to establish the probability that those ends
recommended by the speaker might be reasonably
anticipated through the means he proposed. 45
Logic further serves rhetoric both as a means of
ascertaining the truth of rhetorical propositions through
investigation and as a means of establishing the truth to
the satisfaction of another.

In the ascertainment of

truth, logic judges whether or not the rhetorical conclu42Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. "Rhetoric."
Ehninger's Introduction, p. xii.
4 3Ehninger, Introduction, p. xiii.
44whately, p. 40.
45Pence, dissertation, p. 366.

See also
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sion reached properly follows the premises given.

In

other words, it protects one from fallacious argument.46
In considering the interrelationship of logic and
rhetoric, one

must not blur the distinctions which

Whately observed between the two.

As Ehninger points out:

Conceiving of logic as the methodology of proof,
he consistently treats rhetoric as the application
of that methodology in actual attempts to influence, so that while logic is the process of establishing truth by reasoning, rhetoric becomes the
process of conveying truth to others by
reasoning.47
The Purpose or Object of Rhetoric
Rhetoric, in Whately's view, functions both to
instruct and to convince.

Both of these functions are

subsumed under his term "Conviction," used in its widest
sense.

Defining these terms, Whately wrote:

• under that term [Conviction] are comprehended, first, what is strictly called Instruction; and, secondly, Conviction in the narrower
sense;
i.e. the Conviction of those who are
either or-a-contrary opinion to the one maintained, or who are in doubt whether to admit or
deny it. By instruction, on the other hand, is
commonly meant the conviction of those who have
neither formed an opinion on the subject, nor are
deliberating whether to adopt or reject the proposition in question, but are merely desirous of
46 Pence, monograph, p. 24.
Pence gathered these
notions from his study of Whately's Elements of Logic.
47 Ehninger, Introduction, p. xiv; emphasis mine.
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ascertaining what is the truth in respect of the
case before them.48
The methods to be used to instruct or to convince
are generally the same, although some differences can be
noted.
The distinction between these two objects gives
rise in some points to corresponding differences
in the mode of procedure •••• these differences
however are not sufficient to require that Rhetoric should on that account be divided into two
distinct branches;
since, generally speaking,
though not universally, the same rules will be
serviceable for attaining each of these objects. 4 9
The Ecclesiastical Character of
Whately's Rhetoric
As a further consideration of overview, it must be
recognized that the Elements is an ecclesiastical rhetoric .SO

The theological illustrations he used, partic-

ularly in his treatment of presumption and burden of
proof, reflect the fact that Whately was a Christian
minister, extremely devoted to his Christianity.51
Following the example of St. Augustine, Whately
borrowed from the secular to benefit the sacred.

Taking

from law the notions of presumption and burden of proof,
the Archbishop gave the Christian apologist argumentative
48whately, p. 36.
49rbid., p. 37.
SOEhninger, Introduction, p. xix.
SlGolden, Berquist, and Coleman, p. 137.
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tools to employ in theological controversy.

His elements

of progressive approach and testimony are particularly

useful as arguments for propagating doctrine.52
Ehninger concisely stated the ecclesiastical usefulness of the work, noting also that the work has limited
value for forensic and deliberative purposes.
Throughout the Elements forensic address is
scanted, while legislative address is not only
ignored but in spirit derogated by Whately's
class-conscious interpretation of the speakeraudience relationship.
From his pages, therefore,
rhetoric emerges neither as a method for probing
judgments nor as an instrument for arriving at
collective choices and decisions. While within
limits its services to exegesis are recognized
(36-37), its chief business is the justification
and propagation of a priori truth;
its more particular purposes are (1) to arm the pulpit orator
for his task of conveying to an unlettered congregation the indisputable doctrines of the Christian
faith, and (2) to arm the Christian controversialist who is called upon to defend the evidences
of religion against the onslaughts of the
sceptic.53
Particulars of Whately's Theory
Having discussed Whately's personal background,

and

having given general description and comments concerning
Whately's ideas, the writer turns to the specific elements
52Ehninger, Introduction, p. x, q.v. for other ecclesiastical applications of rhetorical elements. As Golden
and Corbett (p. 274) point out, Whately's views of the
utility of testimony in ecclesiastical discourse are based
in his belief in the authority of the Bible.
53Ehninger,

Introduction, p.

xi.
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of his rhetoric.

A comprehensive review of Whately's

theory is beyond the scope of this study.

Furthermore,

others such as Orville Pence have ably discussed the
whole.

This writer, therefore, will review only those

elements which were original with Whately or those common
notions which he developed in a significant way.
Arguments from Sign
Two of the major forms of argument from sign which
Whately discussed were argument from testimony and progressive approach.

Both of these subjects will be

addressed in turn.
Testimony
One kind of sign argument which Whately identified
is argument from testimony.

He considered it to be a sign

not from which a cause could be inferred, but one from
which one

co~ld

infer a condition. In this he was unlike

Aristotle, who considered testimony to be an existent
rather than an inferred proof.54

Whately justified his

difference from Aristotle by describing testimony in terms
of premise, conclusion, and condition.
Of these last, [i.e., signs which infer a
condition which is not a cause] one species is the
Argument from Testimony: the premiss [sic] being
the existence of the Testimony;
the Conclusion,
54Pence, dissertation, p. 138.
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the truth of what is attested; which is considered as a "Condition" of the Testimony having
been given:
since it is evident.that so far only
a s th i s i s a 11 owed , ( i.e • , so fa r on 1 y a s i t i s
allowed, that the Testimony would not have been
given, had it not been true,) can this Argument
have any force.SS
Testimony, then, is a sign argument because it reasons from consequence (the testimony) to a condition (that
which is testified to).S6

If, for example, an individual

testified that a particular person robbed a store (this
testimony being a consequence), one would conclude that
that person robbed the store (that which was alleged in
the testimony constituting the prior condition).
The force of such argument is, of course, varied.
Testimony does not conclusively prove anything, since it
can be falsified.

Its own intrinsic character as well as

the kinds of conclusions it can support must be considered
in weighing its force.S7

However, the relative force of

such arguments can be determined along lines Whately
proposed.
Testimony may concern matters of fact or matters of
opinion, a great distinction to Whately.
between the two is this:
SS Wh ately, p. S8.
56pence, dissertation, p. 139.
57 Whately, p. S8.

The difference
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• • • • by a "Matter of Fact" is meant, something
which might, conceivably, be submitted to the
senses; and about which it is supposed there
could be no disagreement among persons who should
be present, and to whose senses it should be
submitted:
and by a "Matter (or question) of
Opinion" is understood, anything respecting which
an exercise of judgment would be called for on the
part of those who should have certain objects
before them, and who might conceivably disagree in
their judgment thereupon.SS
A question of fact must only conceivably be presented to the senses.

For a matter to be a fact does not

require that it has been presented to the senses.
Whately's example explains this notion weli, although his
moral certainty that no one would ever bear testimony
concerning the absence of inhabitants of the moon is today
rather humorous.
Whether there is a lake in the centre of New
Holland,--whether there is land at the South
Pole--whether the Moon in inhabited,--would
generally be admitted to be questions of fact;
although no one has been able to bear testimony
concerning them;
and, in the last case~ we are
morally certain that no one ever will.s
Often there will be difference of opinion concerning
things which are themselves matters of fact.60

For exam-

ple, that a witness testified that he saw a particular
individual commit a robbery is a fact.

Whether or not

that witness is a credible source is a matter of opinion.
ssrbid., pp. ss, 59.
59rbid., p.
60rbid.

59.
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Conversely, there may be questions of fact relative
to opinions.

For example, that some economic theorists

believe that lower taxes will stimulate the national economy is a well-known fact.
To determine the worth of testimony in a specific
case, certain characteristics must be considered.

Concer-

ning questions of fact, the honesty of the witness, his
accuracy, and his means of gaining information are significant.

When an opinion is involved, it is the ability of

the witness to form a judgment, or his expertise concerning the subject at hand, that matters.61
The intellectual character of a witness must be
considered in both kinds of cases, and a degree of suspicion must surround any testimony of fact or opinion if the
testimony is on the same side as the witness's prejudice.
On the other hand, if the testimony runs directly counter
to the witness's prejudice, it may be regarded as a
stronger testimony.62
Another factor which will tend to strengthen the
force of testimony, assuming other points are equal, is a
large number of witnesses.

A common mistake in this

regard, however, is to think that all witnesses bearing
apparently concurrent testimony are actually attesting to
6l1bid., pp. 60, 61.
621bid., p.

62.
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the same thing.63

One person may be attesting to that

which he has seen, while one hundred others bear the same
testimony based upon hearsay.
These last may indeed have very good ground for
their belief: for no one would say that a man who
is not versed in Astronomy is not justified in
believing the Earth's motion;
or that the many
millions of persons who have never seen the sea,
are credulous in believing, on testimony, its
existence:
but still it is to be remembered that
they are not, in reality, bearing witness to the
same thing as the others. 64
Concurrent testimony, however, in cases where the
conclusions have been independently derived bears great
weight.

Such testimony is even more compelling if there

is rivalry or hostility among the witnesses.

The reason

is that if the conclusions are reached separately and if
there are rivalries among the witnesses there is far less
likelihood of collaboration in a falsehood.65
Concurrence on similar conditions, though leading
not to one but rather to similar conclusions, may be
significant in establishing a generalization and increasing the probability that a single testimony is accurate.
Whately's illustration clarifies his point.
63 Ibid.
641bid.' p. 63.
651bid., p. 66.
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Before the reality of aerolites (meteoric stones)
was established as it now is, we should have been
justified in not giving at once full credit to
some report, resting on ordinary evidence, of an
occurrence so antecedently improbable as that of a
stone's falling from the sky.
But if twenty distinct accounts had reached us, from various parts
of the globe, of a like phenomenon, though no two
of the accounts related to the same individual
stone, still, we should have judged his a decisive
concurrence; • • • because each testimony, though
given to an individual case, has a tendency
towards the general conclusion in which all
concur; • • • • 66
Testimony is also more credible when it is undesigned.

The reason, said Whately,

is that in such cases

the suspicion of fabrication is precluded.

His example

involves the account of Xerxes's cutting of a canal
through the isthmus of Athos.
ridiculed by Juvenal.
by Thucydides,

Herodotus's account was

But the fact is strongly attested

who made an incidental reference to a place

"near which some remains of the canal might be seen."67
Whately attributed great force to the testimony of
adversaries, that is, to "all who would be unwilling to
admit the conclusion to which their testimony tends."68
Testimony of this type is often incidentally implied due
to the reluctance of the witness to bear it.69
66rbid., p.

7 5.

67rbid., p.

6 3.

68rbid., p. 64.
69rbid

o I

P• 65 °
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In his unwillingness to confirm the truth of a
proposition he opposes, an adversary may resort to various

forms of evasion.

Whately asserts that such tactics serve

only to confirm the opposed proposition.
Misrepresentation, again, of argument,--attempts
to suppress evidence, or to silence a speaker by
clamour,--reviling and personality, and false
charges--all these are presumptions of the same
kind; that the cause against which they are
brought, is,--in the opinion of adversaries at
least,--unassailable on the side of truth.70
Another matter to consider in evaluating the force
of testimony is the probability of that which is asserted.
Whately believed that if that which is proposed is
unlikely to occur, testimony to its occurrence may be more
credible, since it is less likely to have been feigned or
fancied.71

A witness gains credibility, further,

if he

does not appear to believe or understand something he is
reporting, if it is something the evaluator of the testimony accepts as true, since one is unlikely to fabricate a
statement which he himself cannot comprehend.7 2
Whately noted that it is generally believed that
testimony on oath is more reliable than unsworn witness.
He asserted, however, that this is only true of "certain
intermediate characters between the truly respectable and
70rbid., p.

68.

7lrbid.
72rbid., p.

69.
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the worthless."73

An oath bears significance for the

"intermediate" because the worthless sort will sense no

constraint against lying, whether he has sworn an oath or
not.

The truly respectable, on the other hand, "considers

himself as, virtually, on his Oath, whenever he makes a
deliberate solemn assertion • • •• "7 4
In his concluding remarks concerning testimony,
Whately made the following statement concerning the signif icance which can be attached to arguments of this type.
It might seem superfluous to remark that none but
very general rules, such as the above, can be
profitably laid down;
and that to attempt to
supersede the discretion to be exercised in each
individual case, by fixing precisely what degree
of weight is to be allowed to the testimony of
such and such persons, would be, at least, useless
and trifling, and, if introduced in practice, a
most mischievous hindrance of a right decision.75
Progressive Approach
Another aspect of argument from sign which Whately
discussed was that of progressive approach.

This notion

somewhat parallels his idea of concurrent testimony.76
notion is that
several Testimonies or other Signs, singly
perhaps of little weight, produce jointly, and by
73 ..!._2_.,
b'd
p. 72 •
74!_2_.,
b'd
p.

7 3.

75..!._2_.
b'd , p.

7 2•

76Pence, dissertation, p. 155.
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their coincidence, a degree of probability far
exceeding the sum of their several forces, taken
separately: ••• • 77
The effectiveness of a series of arguments, according to
this idea then, "stems from the order in which they are
presented and from their progressive tendency to establish
a certain conclusion. 11 78

The procedure is to remove

objections encountered in a gradual approach to an inevitable conclusion.79
Arguments from Example
Having examined two forms of argument from sign, the
writer turns to Whately's category of argument from example.

In this category, Whately included, among others,

induction, experience, and analogy.

The nature of these

arguments is to infer a conclusion about one or more
individuals of that class.

Whately described it as

fol lows:
we consider one or more, known, individual
objects or instances, of a certain Class, as a
fair sample, in respect of some point or other, of
that Class; and consequently draw an inference
77whately, p. 82.
78rbid.
79Pence, dissertation, p. 155.
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from them respecting either the whole Class, or
other, less known, individuals of it.80
Whately recognized both the inference from the particular to the general, and from the particular to another
particular.

The former is obviously inductive; the latter

he identified as such because the generalization is
implicit •
• • • • [in that] which is the most usually called
the Argument from Example, we generally omit, for
the sake of brevity, the intermediate step, and
pass at once, in the expression of the Argument,
from the known to the unknown, individual. This
ellipsis however does not, as some seem to suppose, make any essential difference in the mode of
Reasoning;
the reference to a common Class being
always, in such a case, understood, though not
81
expressed;.
With this general overview of Whately's approach to
argument from example in mind, the writer turns to one
specific type of such argument, namely, argument by
analogy.
Analogy

Whate~y, influenced by Campbel1,82 defined an analogy
"in which the instance adduced is somewhat

more remote from that to which i t is applied."83
80 Whately, p. 86.
8l1bid.
82Pence, dissertation, p.
83whately, p. 90.
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case of example (in the Aristotelian sense of reasoning
from particular to particular), one draws an inference
concerning another individual of like kind.

In the case

of analogy, the second individual resembles the first to a
lesser degree.

For instance,

if one noticed that a parti-

cular drug would poison a man, he might reason from analogy that that drug would also poison a dog.

The argument

is from analogy in that the dog resembles a man to a
lesser degree than another man does.

By comparison, an

argument from example could only conclude that the drug
would poison another man.84
Whately further defined analogy as a "resemblance of
ratios," to use Aristotle's terms.BS

The likeness of two

individuals compared in an Analogy is not in their
essence, but in their relation to some other thing or
things.

Their commonality consists in a relation.86

illustrated his point as follows:
• • • the fact that from birth different persons
have different bodily constitutions, in respect of
complexion, stature, strength, shape, liability to
particular disorders, etc. which constitutions,
however, are capable of being, to a certain
degree, modified by regimen, medicine, etc.
affords an Analogy by which we may form a presumption, that the like takes place in respect of
84rbid.
BSrbid.
86rbid.' p. 91.
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mental qualities also; though it is plain that
there can be no direct resemblance either betwg7n
body and mind, or their respective attributes.
The analogy given above is in the relation between inborn
traits and the possibility of modifying them.

In the

first particular the traits are physical; in the second
they are mental.

In the first particular the modifying

regimen might be an exercise program;

in the second it

would probably involve a reading program (or something
similar).

The analogy is in the relation in both cases of

inborn traits and modifying regimens.
Certain errors readily attend this form of reasoning.

One common one is that of concluding that the

compared individuals are alike because they have a common
relation, "to resemble each other in themselves, because
there is a resemblance in the relation they bear to certain other things • • • • "88
A related, though separate error is to extend
the Analogy further than it was intended. Correctly, Whately cautioned against this error in
the interpreting of Biblical parables.
In the Parable of the unjust Steward, an Argument is drawn from Analogy, to recommend prudence
and foresight to Christians in spiritual concerns;
but it would be absurd to conclude that fraud was
recommended to our imitation; •••• 89
As Whately pointed out in reflecting upon the genius of
87Ibid.
88Ibid.
89Ibid., p. 92.
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the Parables of Jesus as analogical arguments, one may
protect his analogies by using images very remote from the

thing to be illustrated, except in the single point of
intended comparison.

One is also wise to use a variety of

analogies in making the single comparison, for the thing
to be thus illustrated certainly could bear direct resemblance in several points to many diverse analogies.

The

ultimate test of the validity of an Analogy is to consider
in each case not which differences or similarities are the
greatest, but which are the ones which do or do not affect
the argument. 90
Selection and Use of Arguments
Part I, Chapter III of the Elements of Rhetoric is a
discussion of the selection and use of various kinds of
arguments.

It is in this chapter that Whately presents

his well-known views concerning presumption and burden of
proof.
Major attention is also given to arrangement of
arguments,

including those used in refuting objections.

General notions governing the task of refutation are
included, as are observations respecting the problem of
excessive proof.

90Ibi~., p. 102.
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Other matters discussed in the chapter are matters
of fact and opinion and the illustrative use of examples.
Because these items receive incidental treatment by
Whately, and are irrelevant to the larger purpose of this
thesis, they will be omitted from this discussion.
The Aim of an Argument
The first rule governing the selection and use of
arguments is to determine the aim or object of the discourse.

The possible objects suggested by Whately are:

••• to give satisfaction to a candid mind, and
convey instruction to those who are ready to
receive it, or to compel the assent, or silence
the objections, of an opponent.91
When the chief object is to instruct the learner, the a
priori argument will be principally employed.

When the

object is to refute an opponent, the other class of arguments will be more effective.92
Presumption and Burden of Proof
Pence, quoting Sandford, asserted that Whately's
discussion of burden of proof and of presumption appears
to be the first in the history of English rhetoric.93

Not

9lwhately, p. 108.
921bid., p. 109.
93w. P. Sandford, English Theories of Public Address
1530-1828 (doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University,
1938), p. 123, cited by Orville Pence, dissertation,
p. 175.
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on 1 y was i t the first attempt, i t was one of the most
complete until the twentieth century.94

Although the

notion was not unknown in the courts of law, Whately
pioneered its application in rhetoric.

Particularly evi-

dent is his interest in ecclesiastical rhetoric, for in
this section of the book he makes several applications to
the Christian faith.

His ideas on the subject are pro-

bably among his greatest contribution to the field of
rhetoric at large, for, as Golden asserted, his theory is
largely upheld by modern textbooks on argumentation and
debate. 95
Determining Presumption and Burden of Proof
At the outset of a case, Whately asserted, after one
has determined his aim, he must decide and point out to
the hearer on which side the presumption lies and to whom
belongs the burden of proof .96

While this might seem to be

difficult to determine, Whately noted that "a moderate
portion of common-sense" will usually suffice in deciding.
94Pence, dissertation, p. 175.
95Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, p. 137.
Golden et.
al. have prepared an excellent abstraction of Presumption
and Burden of Proof.
On pages 177 and 178 of his dissertation, Pence included quotations from nine different
relatively contemporary authors, including Cairns and A.
Craig Baird, who adopted Whately's notions in their works
on argument and debate.
96whately, p. 112.
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The greater problem is that the need to determine the
issue is often overlookea.97
Presumption, said Whately, has been erroneously been
understood by some as referring to a preponderance of
probability in favor of the supposition.

The Archbishop

was careful to point out that, rather, presumption
involves:
••• such a pre-occupation of the ground, as
implies that it must stand good till some sufficient reason is adduced against it;
in short,
that the Burden of Proof lies on the side of him
who would dispute it.gs
Given this definition, a prisoner at his trial is presumed
innocent.

This does not mean that it is probable that he

did not commit the crime, but rather that he pre-occupies
the ground of innocence.

Those who allege his guilt must

displace him from the ground he occupies by proving his
guilt.

The burden of proof, then, lies with the one who

opposes the side which presumption favors.
The presence of presumption on one's side gives him
a decided advantage.

One in such a position must only

refute the arguments brought against him to gain a victory. 99

To surrender his pre-occupation of ground is to

97rbid., p. 113.
98rbid., p. 112.
99~.,
b'd
p. 113.
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abandon that which is perhaps one of his strongest
arguments.100
Examples of Presumption
Whately asserted that there is a presumption in
favor of any existing institution, and if one would propose a change in the status quo, the burden of proof lies
with him.

This does not mean one should assume that

existing institutions are perfect;

rather, it assumes

that change is not a good in itself, and therefore he who
demands a change must show cause for it.

Furthermore, no

one is called upon to defend an existing institution
(although it may be advisable to do so) until some argument is adduced against it.101
There

is

a presumption against the paradoxical,

i.e., anything contrary to the prevailing opinion.

To

identify a statement as a paradox is not to imply that it
is false or absurd.
statement
opinion.

Rather,

it means that it is a new

challenging ground pre-occupied by a

prior

The burden of proof rests with he who would

maintain the paradox, since men are not expected to abanlOOrbid., pp. 113, 114.
lOlrbid., p. 114.
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don their present beliefs in favor of new ones without
reason to do so.102
Whately illustrated presumption against a paradox
from the history of Christianity.

Before Christianity was

established, the burden of proof rested upon those who
affirmed it.

After the faith was established, the burden

of proof shifted to those who attack it.
It is indeed highly expedient to bring forward
evidences to establish the divine origin of Christianity: but it ought to be more carefully kept
in mind than is done by most writers, that all
this is an argument "ex abundanti," as the phrase
is,--over and above what can fairly be called for,
till some hypothesis should be framed, to account
for the origin of Christianity by human means.103
He selected a second illustration from a period of church
history, namely the Reformation.

He pointed out that the

Reformers bore the burden of proof for the changes in
church doctrine they proposed, but were not bound to show
cause for maintaining the doctrines they left unaltered.
To these latte.r doctrines they were obligated only to
answer objections.104
Whately also pointed out that regarding any one
question, the presumption may lie on different sides,
depending upon the biases of the different parties
102rbid., p. 115.
103rbid., p. 116.
104rbid., pp. 116, 117.
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involved.105

For example, at a gathering of the bishops of

the Church of England, the

presumpti~n

concerning a ques-

tion of infant baptism would be quite different than that
at a gathering of Baptist clergy.
Presumption and Deference
Habitual presumption in favor of the decisions or
opinions of an individual, a Body, or a book is called
"authority."

A recognition of authority is called

"deference. 11 106

Deference, he said, must be distinguished

from admiration, concurrence of opinion, and esteem. One
may show deference apart from these three attitudes;

and,

conversely, one may display the attitudes without
deference. 107
Deference ought to be, and usually is, shown selectively.

"

One ought show deference to those who have a

reasonable ground for having authority, but only in matters in which they have appropriate expertise.

Whately

illustrated the point as follows:
One has a deference for his physician, in questions of medicine; and for his bailiff, in questions of farming;
but not vice versa. And accordingly, Deference may be misplaced in respect of
the subject, as well as of the person.
It is conceivable that one may have a due degree of
105rbid., p. 118.
106rbid., pp. 118, 119.
107rbid., pp. 119, 120.
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Deference, and an excess of it, and a deficiency
of it, all towards thn same person, but in respect
of different points.l 8
It is natural, and not unreasonable, to show more
deference to the decisions of a group than to those of an
individual.10 9

However, a credible individual's opinion

should not be lightly dismissed in favor of a group opinion, for group opinions are often the product of compromise, concession, and exceptions rather than expertise.
Transferring the Burden of Proof
A presumption may be rebutted by an opposite, or
counter presumption, thus shifting the burden of proof to
the side which had previously enjoyed the presumption.
Whately explained how such an exchange takes place.

.

Again there is ••• a presumption, (and a fair
one,) in respect of each question, in favour of
the judgment of the most eminent men in the
department if pertains to;--of eminent physicians,
e. g., in respect of medical questions,--of theologians, in theological, etc • • • •
But there is a counter-presumption, arising from
the circumstance that men eminent in any department are likely to regard with jealousy any one
who professes to bring to light something unknown
to themselves;
especially if it promise to supersede, if established, much of what they have been
accustomed to learn, and teach, and practise
[sic] • • • •
There is also this additional counter-presumption against the judgment of the proficients in
108rbid., p. 121.
109Ibid., p. 123.

,,

58

any department; that they are prone to a bias in
favour of everything that gives the most palpable
superiority to themselves over the uninitiated,
• • • and affords the greatest scope for the
employment and display of their own peculiar
acquirements.110
In short, the preceding illustration shows that presumption in favor of the learned may be challenged on the
grounds of their vain and jealous human character.
Presumption and Advantage
One would naturally expect that it is always an
advantage to have presumption in one's favor, and the
burden of proof upon the adversary.
opposite is often the case.111

Surprisingly,

the

The reason is that if one

enjoys the favor of presumption, he may begin to take a
truth for granted.

In so doing, he may grow apathetic

toward inquiry concerning the subject.

In such a state of

complacency, he may be jarred by objections raised against
his viewpoint.

Unable to answer the objections because he

has stopped thinking about the issue, he will lose the
advantage of presumption, if not the entire argument.
The situation described above finds an analogy in
sports.

It is often disadvantageous to be favored to win

an athletic contest.

The favorite may tend to underesti-

llOrbid., pp. 128, 129.
lllibid., p. 129.

,•
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mate the opposition, and therefore fail to prepare for the
contest properly.

Entering the contest with a degree of

complacency, the team may be shocked to awareness as the
underdog builds a lead.

The so-called "momentum" of the

contest then favors the challenger, who may hang on to win
the contest.
Refutation
Refutation in Whately's schema is treated as a matter of arrangement of arguments, because he believed that
the refutation of objections should generally be placed in
the midst of the argument.112

The opening of the subject,

however, led him a bit afield from arrangement, into a
discussion of the conduct of refutation.

He knew what he

was doing, for he admitted:
Though I am at present treating principally of the
proper collocation of Refutation, some remarks on
the conduct of it will not be unsuitable in this
place.113
Agreeing with his classical predecessors, Aristotle,
Cicero, and Quintilian, Whately stated that there is no
distinct class of refutatory argument.
In the first place, it is to be observed that
there is no distinct class of refutatory Argument;
112rbid., p. 146.
113rbid., p. 148 •
•

""
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since they become such merely bi the circumstances
under which they are employed.l 4
As noted above, Whately believed that refutation of
objections should be interspersed in the midst of argument, but that it should be done nearer the beginning than
the end.115

Particularly if the opponent has advanced many

strong proofs so that one's own proposition would be
likely to be regarded as paradoxical, one should even
begin with a refutation.116

If the previous is not the

case, however, one should not begin with a refutation,
because that causes him to appear to be on the defensive.
To address an objection at the outset, if it is not necessary to do so, implies a consciousness that much can be
said against one's assertion, creating an undesirable
sense of paradox.117
Mention of objections should not all be deferred to
the end of the discourse, however.
If again all mention of Objections be deferred
till the last, the other arguments will often be
listened to with prejudice by those who may suppose us to be overlooking what may be urged on the
other side.118
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Therefore, because to address all objections at the outset
will create an impression of paradox and to save them
until the end will diminish the hearing one will receive,
objections normally should be addressed in the midst of
the discourse.
Sometimes,

it is difficult to refute objections

sufficiently until one has established through argument
his own propositions.

In such cases, Whately urged that

at least brief notice of the objections be taken early in
the discourse, carefully including a promise to refute
them later.119

Such a promise, however, should not be

used as sophistical evasion of objections difficult to
answer.

The Sophist will promise to refute the objec-

tions, but will in the presentation of his own case draw
the listener's attention away from .the objections.

Con-

veniently, he will forget to answer the objections, which
will then not be given their due weight.120

.

Whately asserted that any proposition may be refuted
by proving its opposite or by overthrowing the arguments
by which it has been supported.121
he said,

The first of these two,

is less strictly to be considered refutation,

119rbid.
120rbid.
12lrbid., p. 148.
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because it can exist apart from one's awareness of a
proposition counter to his own.
The former of these is less strictly and properly
called Refutation;
being only accidentally such,
since it might have been employed equally well had
the opposite Argument never existed; and in fact
it will often happen that a Proposition maintained
by one author, may be in this way refuted by
another, who had never heard of the Arguments •
• • • In fact, every one who argues in favour of
any Conclusion is virtuall2 refuting, in this way,
the opposite Conclusion.12
Following the pattern of Aristotle and Cicero,123
Whately said that refutation in its strict sense involves
a reference made and an answer given to some specific
arguments in favour of the opposite conclusion.

This

refutation may consist in the denial of the premises
(either the stated or implied premise in an informal
syllogism) or in an objection against the conclusiveness
of the reasoning.124
Whately distinguished between direct and indirect
arguments in refutation.

The direct approach proves the

truth of the contradictory by handling the objections from
the opposite perspective.

With the indirect method, one

attempts to prove the absurdity or falsity of another's
proposition using his own premises.125
1221bid.
123Pence, dissertation, p. 208.
124whately, p. 149.
125Ibid., p. 150.

This form of refuta-
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tion could also be called reductio ad absurdum.

Whately

described the approach and its usefulness as follows:
••• in Controversy, the Indirect is often adopted by choice, as it affords an opportunity for
holding up an opponent to scorn and ridicule, by
deducing some very absurd conclusion from the
principles he maintains, or according to the mode
of arguing he employs. Nor indeed can a fallacy
be so clearly exposed to the unlearned reader in
any other way. For it is no easy matter to
explain, to one ignorant of Logic, the grounds on
which you object to an inconclusive argument;
though he will be able to perceive its correspondence with another, brought forward to illustrate
it, in which an absurd conclusion mar be introduced, as drawn from true premises.! 6
Whately, with his bent toward satire, said more in favor
of this form of refutation, citing as an illustration of
it his attack on scepticism in "Historic Doubts."
The dangers of this kind of "irony," as he called
it, are two.

First, many listeners fail to differentiate

between the form and the substance of the argument.

Con-

sequently, when they hear one using ridicule with a
serious (or in the case of an ecclesiastical application,
a sacred) subject, they believe that he is profaning the
subject.

The second danger is that when one applies a

good title, for example, to someone in bitter scorn, he
may appropriate the title to himself in a serious sense,
and thus diffuse the irony.127
126rbid., pp. 150, 151.
127rbid., pp. 154, 155.
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labeled as "orthodox" in scorn,

the label implying that

his views are anything but orthodox.

He may ignore the

satire intended and appropriate the label seriously, creating the impression that his adversary has conceded that
his views are orthodox.
Whately continued his section on refutation by
explaining its limitations.
It may be observed generally, that too much stress
is often laid, especially by unpractised reasoners, on Refutation; ••• I mean, that they are
apt both to expect a Refutation where none can
fairly be expected, and to attribute to it, when
satisfactorill made out, more than it really
accomplishes. 28
The first limitation is that, when the propositions
with which one works are matters of probability, irrefutable arguments may be advanced against a proposition that
is nevertheless true.

He described the problem and its

solution as follows:
In what is called moral or probable Reasoning,
there may be sound arguments, and valid objections, on both sides • • • • The real question in
such cases is, which event is the more probable;-on which side the evidence preponderates • • • •
The objection perhaps may be unanswerable, and yet
may safely be allowed, if it can be shown that
more and weightier objections lie against every
other supposi tion.129
The preceding assumes that the counter-arguments are
valid.

Of course, all are not.
128Ibid., pp. 155, 156.
129Ibid., p. 156.
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Secondly, men may believe that successful refutation
of all the arguments offered in support of a conclusion
disprove the conclusion.
true.

The conclusion, however, may be

The false assumption operative in this case is that

all the possible arguments in favor of the conclusion have
been presented

(and subsequently refuted).130

That all

possible arguments were not advanced may be the unfortunate failure of a weak advocate.

In such a case, it is

regrettable that the whole argument falls for want of a
competent advocate.131

On the other hand, however, the

advocate may purposefully have reserved certain arguments
as Whately recommended subsequently.
Because a weak argument is "positively hurtful,"
Whately urged that objections be stated with their full
force when refuting them.132

The reason is this:

• • • • otherwise, those who hear them stated more
strongly than by the uncandid advocate who had
undertaken to repel them, will naturally enough
conclude that they are unanswerable.133
To state the objection weakly is to appear to be avoiding
its difficulty.
130rbid., p. 158.
13lrbid.
132rbid., p. 159.
133rbid., p. 160.
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When objections raised are not only unanswerable,
but also are decisive, Whately urged that an advocate

confess the fact and abandon his argument.

To refuse to

retract an untenable position is unwise, for such refusal
is likely to cast suspicion on that which is sound in the
advocate's position.134

At stake in such a situation is the

advocate's credibility.
Whately also warned against elaborately refuting
insignificant arguments.

To pay great heed to an inconse-

quential argument will frequently have the effect of elevating its importance.

The Archbishop explained and

illustrated his point as follows:
Whatever is slightly noticed, and afterwards
passed by with contempt, many readers and hearers
will very often conclude {sometimes for no other
reason) to be really contemptible. But if they
are assured of this again and again with great
earnestness, they often begin to doubt it.
They
see the respondent plying artillery and musketry,--bringing up horse and foot to the charge;
and conceive that what is so vehemently assailed
must possess great strength. One of his refutations might perhaps have left them perfectly convinced: all of them together, leave them in
doubt. 1 3 5
Refutation is directed toward fallacious premises or
reasoning processes.

Therefore, a complete study of refu-

tation includes a discussion of logical fallacies.
134rbid.
135rbid., p. 161.
,
~
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Whately acknowledged the need for consideration of the
subject, but did not include such a discussion in his
Rhetoric.

Instead, he referred his readers to Book iii of

his Elements of Logic.136
The possibility of excess in refutation led Whately
to warn regarding the danger of excess in proof as well.
Others, again, perhaps comparatively strangers to
the question, and not prejudiced, or not strongly
prejudiced, against your conclusion, but ready to
admit it if supported by sufficient arguments,
will sometimes, if your arguments are very much
beyond what is sufficient, have their suspicions
roused by this very circumstance. "Can it be
possible," they will say,
"that a conclusion so
very obvious as this is made to appear, should not
have been admitted 1 ong ago?" • • • • Hence they
are apt to infer, either that the author has
mistaken the opinions of those he imagines opposed
to him, or else, lhat there is some subtle fallacy
in his arguments. 37
In situations, however, in which forcible proofs are
desired, one may find it necessary to caution the hearers
against thinking that a point is difficult to establish,
simply becaus~ its importance led one to dwell upon it. 13 8
Whately supported his point with an example and an
analogy.
Some ~ are apt to suppose, from the copious and
elaborate arguments which have been urged in
defence of the authenticity of the Christian
136Ibid., p.

150.

137Ibid., p. 163.
138Ibid., p. 162.
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Scriptures, that these are books whose authenticity is harder to be established than that of
other supposed-ancient works;
whereas the fact is
very much the reverse ••• We bar· the doors carefully, not merely when we expect an unusually
formidable attack, but ~hen we have an unusua 1
treasure in the house.l 9
Whately concluded his discussion of refutation by
noting the difference between simply disproving an error
and showing how it arose.

While the former should be

sufficient to dislodge an argument, he said, the latter
will effect greater satisfaction and a more lasting
result. 1 40
Whately's Contributions to Rhetoric
The purpose of this chapter has not been to critique
Whately's theory of argument, but rather to expound
selected portions of it.

It would be presumptious for

this writer to attempt independently an assessment of the
Archbishop's work.

The opinions of a few individuals,

qualified by their formal study of rhetoric in general and
Whately in particular, will suffice to summarize Whately's
contributions.
Perhaps his most significant contribution was that
of introducing the notions of presumption and burden of
139rbid.
140rbid., p.

167.
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proof, known in both Roman and English law,141 into the
world of rhetoric.

As Golden, Berquist, and Coleman

wrote:
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of
Whately's pioneering analysis of presumption and
burden of proof. What makes his discussion a
significant landmark in the rhetoric of Western
thought is the reminder that presumption rests not
on the side where a "preponderance of probability"
exists, but on that side which consists of a
"preoccupation of the ground."
(i.e. that side
which the majority of a given audience favors at
the outset of a speech.) And he was also on
target in reminding his students that no meaningful debate on a controversial question can proceed
intelligently unless it is first determined where
the presumption lies. Finally, Whately contributed vitally to argumentation theory when he
pointed out that, in most circumstances, there is
a presumption in favor of "existing institutions,"
"innocence," "tradition," and people who command
"deference. 11 142
These same authors noted a second major contribution
made by Whately and others of his day, namely, a psychological, audience-centered rhetoric grounded in the nature
of man.143

Much of the Archbishop's practical advice,

par-

ticularly that relating to refutation, is conditioned by
his analysis of the way an audience can be expected to
perceive one's argument.

Clearly his interest was not

only in establishing the truth of a proposition, but also
in making it convincing to the hearer.

Pence developed

141Pence, monograph, p. 38.
142Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, p. 142.
143 rbid., p. 143.
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this contribution nicely as follows:
But his originality is best seen in his perceptive
analyses of the techniques of refutation and in
his intensive study of fallacies.
These are
characterized by a useful integration of the logical with the psychological elements of persuasion.
He was most aware that an argument must be credible as well as logical. ••• His special skill
lay in his ability to clarify obscurities in
intricate argument--to conduct a searching exploration of the open ground between the purely formal logical 44rors and the psychological errors of
perception. 1
Pence asserted that Whately's "careful distinction
between arguments from example and arguments from analogy
is unmatched in English rhetoric."145

Besides noting that

analogies compare relationships whereas examples compare
concrete qualities, Whately established helpful criteria
for judging the validity of these two types of argument. 14 6
His explanation of the nature of arguments from probability and from sign removed much of the obscurity of
Aristotle's discussion of these elements.147
Pence, writing in 1946, reached the following conclusion concerning the contemporary usefulness of
Whately's work:
• • • Whately was not a learned logician, in a philosophical sense. But few, if any, figures in the
144Pence, monograph, p. 38.
1451bid., p. 37.
146Ibid., p. 38.
1471bid.
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history of English rhetoric to his time matched
his application of the principles of sound reasoning and hard common sense to argument.
His
practical application of probability as a rationale for action in human affairs, his introduction
of burden of proof into rhetoric, his insistence
on precision in the use of terms, and his comprehensive treatment of fallacies in general are
reflected in virtually all treatises argument
since his time.148
Ehninger observed that when the modern field of Speech was
born near the turn of the twentieth century, Whately's
ideas were embraced by the leaders in the new discipline.
He also noted its continuing influence when he wrote in
1963:
••• for many years the instruction given in
courses and textbooks in public address has been,
and remains today, strongly Whatelian, while only
rece.ntly have such theorists as Kenneth Burke and
I. A. Richards begun to envision new functions and
boundaries for rhetoric as a discipline.
Because Whately's decisions on some of the major
questions in rhetoric have proved sound and fruitful through many years of practice, the Elements,
while not to be numbered among the great creative
works on the subject, is certainly to be ranked
among the most influential. For the same reason,
though now a century and a third old, it has ~~ch
to say to the student of rhetoric yet today. 1
Nearly a century earlier, John Broadus had recognized the worth of Whately's theory.

It is to Whately' s

influence upon this American homiletician that the next
chapter is addressed.
148Pence, dissertation, pp. 380, 381.
149Ehninger, Introduction, p. xxx.

CHAPTER III
JOHN BROADUS'S THEORY OF ARGUMENT
The preceding chapter provided some personal background of Richard Whately, together with an exposition of
his theory of argument.

In this chapter, the same kind of

information will be presented regarding John Broadus.
First the writer will develop a brief survey of his life.
Then an overview of his theory of argument will be presented, followed by a more particular analysis of
Broadus's ideas and the influence of Richard Whately upon
them.
Background of John Broadus
w. O. Carver, a younger contemporary of John A.
Broadus, stated that in his opinion, "no Baptist of his
generation surpassed Broadus in his influence among
Southern Baptists."l Broadus wielded such influence not
because he occupied positions of power within the denomilw. o. Carver, "Recollections and Information from
Other Sources Concerning The Southern Baptist Theological
Seminary," unpublished typescript, p. 21, cited by James
Roland Barron, "The Contributions of John A. Broadus to
Southern Baptists (doctoral dissertation, Southern Baptist
Seminary, 1972), p. 1.
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nation, but because his scholarly learning, his compelling
preaching, and his personal charm commanded broad popular
respect.
One has only to read briefly concerning the life of
Broadus to discover how highly he was regarded, and why he
was held in such esteem.

A brief chronology of Broadus's

life will enable the reader to understand Broadus's impact
upon American preaching.
A Chronology of His Life
The Broadus family was prominent in the early history of the "Old Dominion," Virginia.2
were, for the most part, farmers.

The Broaduses

However, there were

physicians, lawyers, many teachers, and ministers, some of
them men of great distinction.

They were profoundly reli-

gious, almost all members of country Baptist churches in
Virginia.3

Into this family, John Albert Broadus was born

in Culpeper C~unty on January 24, 1827.4
John's father was Major Edmund Broadus, said to be a
2A. T. Robertson, Life and Letters of John A.
Broadus (Philadelphia:
American Baptist Publication
Society, 1901), p. 1.
3w. J. McGlothlin, "John Albert Broadus," The
Review and Expositor 27 (April, 1930): 141; cf.
Robertson, p. 3.
4Robert N. Barrett, "Dr. John A. Broadus," The
Seminary Magazine 8 (April, 1895): 339.
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man of high character, ability, and independence of judgment.5

Edmund was a farmer, miller,_ teacher, major in the

Culpeper militia, a member of the Virginia legislature for
eighteen years, and a leader of the Whig party in the
state.6

He was an ardent supporter of Thomas Jefferson in

the founding of the University of Virginia in 1819.7
John's mother was Nancy Simms, a woman of many
excellent qualities.

She was gentle and quiet in manner,

yet firm and energetic in the management of her home. 8
Her husband's frequent absence due to his political
activity made it necessary for her to run the family farm,
which she did with great efficiency.

With her children,

she was a firm but gentle disciplinarian, teaching them
habits of neatness and order.9
Because there were no public schools, as we know
them, John received his preparatory schooling privately.
He undertook his secondary school studies with his uncle,
Albert Simms.

Simms was reputedly one of the best

teachers in the area, and as a result, young Broadus
SMcGlothlin, p. 142.
6rbid.
7Ibid., p. 143.
8Robertson, p. 17.
9Ibid., p. 18.
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received an excellent secondary education.10

John was an

excellent student, particularly in Latin and mathematics.

During his last year at his uncle's school,

John assisted

in the instruction.11
At the age of seventeen, Broadus became a country
school teacher.

Although the experience was difficult and

discouraging for him, due to his youth,12 he persisted in
the endeavor, developing in the process the teaching
skills and habits of hard and independent work which
characterized his later life.13

Broadus's success in life,

according to Robert Barrett, was not due to brilliant
achievement, but to "patient, quiet, humble industry." 14
In the fall of 1846, Broadus enrolled at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, where he was profoundly influenced by Gessner Harrison, professor of
Greek,

w.

H. McGuffey, professor of moral philosophy, and

H. H. Courtenay, professor of mathematics.15

His irregu-

lar course of study kept him at the university two years
longer than most students.

However, Dr.

101bid., p. 25.
llMcGlothlin, p. 145.
12Robertson, p. 37.
13McGlothlin, pp. 145, 147.
14 Barrett, p. 339.
15Robertson, p. 61.

w.

J. McGlothlin,
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a former president of Furman University and a colleague of
Broadus at Southern Seminary,

noted that by the time he

graduated in 1850, Broadus was regarded as the leading
student scholar there.16
Within a year of his graduation from the University
at the age of twenty three, Broadus was ordained to the
ministry, married to the daughter of Gessner Harrison,
appointed an assistant professor of Latin and Greek at his
alma mater, and called to the pulpit of the Charlottesville Baptist Church.17

In 1853 he resigned from the

University to devote his full attention to the church, but
in 1855 he was persuaded to return as chaplain to the
University.

He remained in this role until 1857 when once

again he returned to his pastorate.18

While serving the

church he also served the University indirectly, for his
preaching attracted both students and professors, as the
following statement by a student, George B. Taylor,
indicates.
Pressed as he was with double duty, his preaching
reached high water mark, and the little Baptist
church at Charlottesville was always crowded, the
l6McGlothlin, p. 152. Robertson made similar comments, citing the opinions of Prof. F. H. Smith and Hon.
W. W. Henry who was a fellow student, on pp. 65 and 74 of
Life and Letters of John Albert Broadus.
17clyde E. Fant, Jr., and William M. Pinson, Jr.,
Twenty Centuries of Great Preaching, vol. 5:
MacLaren
to Talmadge (Waco:
Word Books, Publisher, 1971), p. 43.
1 8rbid.
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congregation including numbers of the students and
often professors as well. Never can I forget how
I would sit enwrapped in his eloquence which was
scarcely sul~assed afterwards, however much he may
have grown.
In the mid-SOs the Southern Baptist Convention began
seriously to consider forming a seminary in the south.
Broadus was among the five young men to whom the Convention turned for leadership in the venture.20

To him fell

the lot of developing a plan of organization and instruction.

That which he devised was heavily patterned after

the model he had learned at the University of Virginia.
The plan was described and assessed by McGlothlin as
follows:
When the committee reported at Greenville in 1857,
they proposed a new type of theological seminary,
based largely on the plan of the University of
Virginia, one with emphasis upon the English
Bible, with freedom for the student in the selection and pursuit of studies, with the highest
scholarship for the able and prepared students and
with something worth while for all. The plan
proposed by the committee was adopted and while it
has had some drawbacks, it has justified itself
and has exercised a profound influence upon theological education throughout America. It was half
a century and more in advance of most of ihe
theological institutions of the country.2
In 1859 Broadus was persuaded to give up his church
and join the founding faculty of the Southern Baptist
19George B. Taylor, "Virginia Baptist Ministers,"
unpublished manuscript, cited by Robertson, p. 106.
20McGlothlin, p. 156.
2lrbid., p. 157.
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Seminary in Greenville, South Carolina.22

It was to the

work of the Seminary that he devoted the remainder of his
life.
The Seminary's small beginning, with four faculty
members and twenty-six students, was soon to be tested by
the advent of the Civil War.

Enrollment declined to the

point that, in the fall of 1862, the school had too few
students to open.23

The closure of the school was a dis-

appointment to Broadus, but it also provided for him the
opportunity to preach in various churches and to begin
labor on one of his finest works, his commentary on the
Gospel of Matthew.24
The Civil War also presented Broadus with the opportunity to serve as a chaplain in the Confederate armies.
J. William Jones, D. D., related the following story,
recounting how the opportunity arose.
In the early spring of 1863 I was walking one
day from our camp at Hamilton's Crossing, near
Fredericksburg, Virginia, to old "Round Oak" Baptist Church, some eight miles off, when, hearing
the clatter of horses' hoofs behind me, I turned
and saw the familiar form and face of "Stonewall"
Jackson mounted on his famous "Little Sorrell."
As he drew near he recognized me, asked if I was
going to the meeting of the Chaplains' Association, and dismounting walked with me for several
miles, talking about the religious interests of
his men, and the best means of reaching them.
22Barrett, p. 340.
23Robertson, p. 196.

24 Ibid.
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Among other things he said that he would like to
see some of the ablest preachers of all the denominations come to the army, if not as permanent
chaplains, at least as missionaries for a time.
He mentioned the names of a number of leading men
whom he would be especially glad to have come, and
among them Dr. J. A. Broadus, saying very earnestly:
"Write to him by all means and beg him
to come. Tell him for me that he never had a
better opportunity of preaching the gospel than he
would have right now in these camps" • • • •
When I met General Jackson a few days after the
reception of Dr. Broadus's letter, and told him
that he would come, the great soldier said, in his
characteristic phrase:
"That is good--very good.
I am so glad of that.
And when Dr. Broadus comes
you must bring him to see me. I want him to
preach at my headquarters and I wish to help him
in his work all I can." Alas!
the battle of
Chancellorsville came on a few days afterward, and
before the great preacher could see the great
soldier Stonewall Jackson had "crossed over 5ge
river to rest under the shade of the trees."
Following the Battle of Gettysburg, Broadus maintained an
active preaching schedule, drawing large crowds of soldiers from the hospitals and camps.wherever he went.26

One

high point of his war-time preaching occurred on Confederate Fast Day, when he spoke at General Gordon's headquarters.

An immense crowd--probably 5,000 in number--

gathered to hear Broadus preach.

Several Confederate

generals attended the meeting, among them Robert E. Lee,
A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Early.27
25J. William Jones, "As Evangelist in Lee's Army,"
The Seminary Magazine 8 (April, 1895): 353, 354.
26 Ibid.
27rbid., p. 357.
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After the war, the Seminary reopened, but times were
difficult in the impoverished south.

Determined to see

the institution succeed if at all possible, Broadus and
his colleagues reopened the school on November 1, 1865,
with seven students. Broadus had only one student in
homiletics, and that student was blind.

But so careful

was he to prepare thoroughly to teach his single student
that his lectures became the basis for his Treatise on the
Preparation and Delivery of Sermons. 2 8
The Seminary continued to struggle financially,
unable to raise an adequate endowment due to the state of
the southern economy.

Broadus and his colleagues regu-

larly visited churches and individuals to solicit funds to
stabilize the institution.

Broadus had several oppor-

tunities which would have offered greater financial security,29 but he refused them, determined to honor his
commitment to Southern.30
Broadus continued in his duties during the seventies
and eighties, teaching Greek and Homiletics.

During this

28Robertson, p. 214.
29rbid., p. 306. Brown University, Crozer
Seminary, Richmond College, the First Church, Richmond and
Eutaw Place, Baltimore all sought Doctor Broadus's
services at a time when there was not enough money to pay
the salaries of the professors.
30rbid., pp. 281, 282. In 1877 the school was
moved to Louisville, Kentucky where it eventually was to
become more secure financially.
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period his reputation as a preacher increased so that he
was in demand in churches of many denominations, in many
cities, and for various types of meetings.31

Bothered by

frail health and exhaustion, he found it necessary at
times during this period of his life to reduce his responsibilities so that he could recover.

One such occasion

occurred in 1870, at which time he received the following
note from none other than Robert E. Lee.
LEXINGTON, VA., June 21, 1870:
I am glad to learn
that you have decided to visit Europe, and trust
complete relaxation from duty and the objects of
interest that will at all points attract your
attention, may entirely restore your health, and
that you will return renovated in strength and
vigor, to gladden the hearts of your many
friends.32
In 1889, upon the death of his colleague and friend
of over thirty years, President J. P. Boyce, Broadus was
appointed president of Southern Baptist Seminary.33

As

president, Broadus gathered a faculty of young men to
assist his aging faculty and to ensure the future of the
seminary at the turn of the century.34

He also worked

31Ibid., p. 316. Among these speaking engagements
were several addresses to the Southern Baptist Convention,
the 1889 Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale, speeches at
universities, church dedications, .etc.
32Ibid., pp. 403, 404.
33Fant and Pinson, p. 43.
34Robertson, pp. 402, 420.
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to increase the endowment35 and built buildings to house
the institution.36

He reduced some of his teaching and

speaking responsibilities as well so that he could devote
significant time to writing projects he hoped to complete
in his sunset years.37
For the last year of his life he suffered ill
hea 1th.
1894.

He preached his 1 as t sermon in the sum mer of

That fall he taught as he was able, but it was

obvious that his strength was failing.
16th,

He died on March

1895.38
Characteristics of the Man
The preceding chronology has hinted at some of

Broadus's characteristics, because they were so manifestly
intertwined with the events of his life.

Those charac-

teristics and others will now be discussed briefly.
One of Broadus's outstanding qualities was his pleasantness and charm.39

This characteristic enhanced his

stature with people throughout his life.40
351bid., p. 406.
36rbid., pp. 398, 414.
371bid., pp. 403, 404.
38Robertson, p. 422.
39McGlothlin, p. 159.
40 Robertson, pp. 17, 18.
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this quality which contributed to his persuasive power in
the southern Baptist Convention, although he held no formal denominational office.41

It also, no doubt, accounts

for his popularity in the North, although he was a loyal
southerner.

or.

w.

H. Whitsitt wrote:

He was loyal to his section. He kept his feet
always firmly planted on Southern sod.
He was the
idol of the Confederate Veterans who have come to
stand with sad pride in the order of his funeral.
Yet he was as much loved in New York as in Virginia. Whatever he spoke from any platform on
either side of the line was applauded to the echo
on both sides of the line. Other men have endeavored to accomplish a feat of that sort and have
often failed ingloriously.42
Broadus's charm was attested to by many, but perhaps the
most eloquent statement was made at his funeral by Rabbi
Adolph Moses.
He was the most charming and brilliant conversationalist I have known. He touched on no subject
but he adorned and illumined it. Whatever the
subject of conversation, he opened large and new
vistas to the surprise and delight of his admiring
friends.
However trite and stale the topic, he
lifted it to a higher plane. There was a play of
fine humor and wit in his talk. But he never
employed the weapon of sarcasm or irony. He never
abused his great intellectual powers in debate •
• • • There was such touching gentleness in his
voice, such noble modesty in his demeanor that it
was a pleasure to bow to his superiority. He was
an excellent listener. He was all attention and
41 w. H. Whitsitt, "Remarks Made at the Funeral," The
Seminary Ma~azine 8 (April, 1895): p. 413. Whitsitt
~
called him ' ••• for thirty years the leading force in
our Southern Baptist Convention.
"
42rbid., p. 412.
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eagerness to hear what one had to say • • • • He
greeted the most ordinary persons with gracious
cordiality and utmost respect • • • • Broadus was
an ideal American gentleman. He was perhaps the
most amiable and lovable Southerner of his time. 4 3
Broadus's scholarly interests have been noted above,
in part.

He was a wide reader, with interests in history,

biography, poetry, and fiction.

Concerning languages he

was a scholar of Greek and Latin, he knew Anglo-Saxon,
Hebrew, and Coptic well, was at home with French and
German, and had some knowledge of Italian, Gothic, and
Sanskrit.44

In addition to his seven books, he wrote many

tracts, pamphlets, and magazine and journal articles for
publications such as the Homiletic Review.45
As a popular preacher, Broadus had few peers.

Over

the course of his life, he preached at least 2,187 sermons,

1,274 of them itinerantly.46

He served as pastor

for seven churches over the course of his career, and also
spent several summers preaching in the churches.47

He

preached at the Southern Baptist Convention at least
43Rabbi Adolph Moses, "As a Conversationalist," The
Seminary Magazine 8 (April, 1895): pp. 382, 383.
44A. T. Robertson, "As a Teacher," The Seminary
Magazine 8 (April, 1895): 360.
45Ibid., pp. 364-366.
46Jerry Paxton Ashby, "John Albert Broadus: The
Theory and the Practice of Hi~ Preaching" (doctoral
dissertation, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary,
1968), p. 17.
47 Barron, p. 167.
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eleven times between 1863 and 1891.48

His preaching was

popular, although his substance was disarmingly simple and
his delivery reserved by the standards of the day.4 9
One critic, a prominent pastor in Virginia who preferred a grandiloquent delivery to Broadus's conversational style, charged him with ruining Southern Baptist
preaching.SO

Although Broadus was not without his critics,

the majority of them commended him very highly.

His

excellence is affirmed by Dr. w. C. Wilkinson of the
University of Chicago, a man not much given to superlative
praise. 51
I have named in my title a man with every
natural endowment, every acquired accomplishment,
except, perhaps, plenitude of physical power, to
have become, had he been only a preacher, a
preacher hardly second to any in the world.
A conjectural judgment like the foregoing, it
is, to be sure, almost always unwisely bold and
hazardous to put forth.
I simply record the
impression which, after some familiarity acquired
with the man himself, seen and heard both in
public and in private, and after no little conversance wi~h his productions in print, I find fixed
and deepening in my mind concerning Dr. Broadus.52
48Ibid., p. 177.
49Edgar E. Folk, "As a Preacher," The Seminary
Magazine 8 (April, 1895): 374.
50w. o. Carver, "Recollections and Information from
Other Sources Concerning the Southern Baptist Theological
Seminary," cited by Barron, p. 181.
51Edgar DeWitt Jones, The Royalty of the Pulpit
(New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1951), p. 51.
52w. c. Wilkinson, Modern Masters of Pulpit
Discourse, p. 344, cited by Jones, p. 51.
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Vernon L. Stanfield, himself a professor of preaching and
the man who undertook the 1979 revision of Broadus's

Treatise, wrote:
During the last half of the nineteenth century in
America, no Baptist preacher enjoyed greater popular fame than did John Albert Broadus. By his
Seminary colleagues, by denominational leaders, by
competent critics of preaching, and by appreciative congregations, he was ranked as one of the
leading preachers of his time.53
Other characteristics could be noted concerning
Broadus, but perhaps the most striking of all was the
depth of his Christian character and fervor.

Perhaps the

best attestation to Broadus's Christianity came from his
Jewish friend, Rabbi Moses.
Before I became familiar with Dr. Broadus I knew
Christianity only as a creed which seemed absolutely incomprehensible to me. I judged it mainly
from the untold, unmerited misery, the agony of
ages which Christian rulers and nations had
entailed upon poor Israel under the impulse given
by Christian priests and teachers. But when I
learned to know and revere in Broadus a Christian
[sic], my conception of Christianity and my attitude toward it underwent a complete change.
Broadus was the precious fruit by which I learned
to judge of the truth of Christianity.54
53vernon L. Stanfield, Favorite Sermons of John A.
Broadus (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers,
1959), p. 1.
54Rabbi Adolph Moses, quoted by McGlothlin, p. 160.
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An Overview of Broadus's Theory
Broadus's Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery
of Sermons has long been recognized as a fine textbook for
the training of preachers.

W.

c.

Wilkinson, whose follow-

ing statement may be considered as typical of the opinion
of many, affirmed the excellence of the work.
The individual opinion of the present writer is
that, fairly judged in view of the whole round of
its comparative merits, the volume of which I now
speak is not only one of the best works, but by
eminence quite the best work of its kind in existence for the use of the average English reader
and student. There may be writers on homiletics
who surpass Dr. Broadus in suggestive originality
of view, there may be those who surpass him in
profoundness of formal philosophy, there may be
those who surpass him in elegance of exposition;
but if I were asked to name a writer on homiletics
who, equalling him in the union and harmony of
these different traits, moreover equalled him in
alert sagacity of insight, in sure sobriety of
judgment and of taste, in breadth and comprehension of treatment, in sympathetic and penetrative
Christian tone and spirit--and it has been my duty
to read somewhat widely in the literature of homilectics [sic]--I should be obliged to confess
myself unable to do it.55
Broadus's View of the Relation
of Rhetoric and Preaching
Historically, preaching was distinguished from the
secular discourse of such men as Demosthenes and Cicero.
55An Eminent Professor of Homiletics, "Criticisms on
Some of the Ablest Representative Preachers of the Day,"
The Homiletic Review 16 {August, 1888): 100. This eminent professor is identified as w. C. Wilkinson by A. T.
Robertson in Life and Letters of John A. Broadus,
p. 3 6 7.
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While the secular followed a certain formal arrangement,
the homily was considered to be a talk, or a familiar
discourse.56

St. Augustine was probably the first to bring

the secular and sacred together in his book, On Christian
Doctrine, Book IV.

In this fifth century work, Augustine

pressed many Classical rhetorical notions into the service
of preaching.

Perhaps more significantly, however, he

prepared the way for viewing preaching as a kindred art,
if not a branch, of rhetoric.57
Broadus believed that preaching is a kindred art of
rhetoric insofar as the fundamental principles of both
relate to common human nature.

To the extent that this

commonality exists, then, homiletics may be regarded as
rhetoric applied to a particular kind of speaking.
Preaching differs from secular discourse, according to
Broadus, in the primary source of its materials, its
directness and simplicity of style, and the unworldly
motives which should influence the preacher and his presentation .58
56John A. Broadus, Treatise on the Preparation and
Delivery of Sermons, ed. E. C. Dargan (New York:
Hodder
and Stoughton, 1898), p. 15.
57rbid.
58rbid., p. 16. For Broadus, the primary source of
preaching material was the Bible. Preaching style should
be clear to any listener, motivated by a compulsion to
speak a message from God for the good of the hearer.
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Because he accepted the overlap of preaching and
rhetoric, it is not surprising that Broadus urged his

readers to study works on rhetoric.

Included in his list

of such works are Aristotle's Rhetoric as well as the
writings of Cicero and Quintillian.
the reading of

He also recommended

several more contemporary works, among

them Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric.

Of particular

significance for the present study is his commendation of
Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric.

Concerning

Whately's volume he wrote:
Nor has Whately's admirable "Rhetoric" been rendered valueless by more recent discussions.
Its
treatment of Argument and Style is particularly
good. 59
Broadus's View Concerning the Place of
Argument in Preaching
The assumptions regarding the rational nature of the
Christian faith which undergird Whately's use of argument
in preaching comport well with Broadus's views on the
subject.

Broadus the scholar certainly knew that mere

assertion was insufficient to convince a doubter that
59Broadus, p. 544.
In the 1870 edition of his
Treatise, p. 32, Broadus said, "Whately's Rhetoric is
believed to be the best treatise for practical use that
has appeared.
Especially valuable are the portions on
Argument and on Style." In Dargan's revision, this comment was revised as quoted and placed in a bibliography at
the end of the book. At the end of his life, Broadus
maintained that more recent discussions had not rendered
Whately's "admirable work" valueless.
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one's proposition is true.

His opinion of the importance

of the subject is evident in the extent to which he dis-

cussed it in his Treatise.

In his preface, Broadus felt

compelled to explain his extensive treatment of argument.
He wrote:
The subject of Argument is thought by some to be
out of place in a treatise on Homiletics or on
Rhetoric in general. But preaching and all public
speaking ought to be largely composed of argument,
for even the most ignorant of people constantly
practice it themselves, and always feel its force
when properly presented;
and yet in many pulpits
the place of argument is mainly filled by mere
assertion and exhortation, and the arguments
employed are often carelessly stated, or even
gravely erroneous. 60
Although he regarded argument in preaching highly,
he realized that a good thing can be overdone.

In his

chapter on explanation, he cautioned against the overuse
of argument.

He stated that preachers often belabor argu-

ments when the need is for practical and simple
explanations.6 1
In his materials on argument, the influence of
Whately is unmistakable.

While some notions are elabo-

rated from other sources, almost every element of argument
Broadus proposed is also found in Whately's Rhetoric.
Broadus accounted for the influence of Whately as follows:
The author's chief indebtedness for help has been
to Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, and to
60Broadus, p. xi.
6lrbid., p. 153.

--1
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Whately and Vinet. The two last (together with
Ripley) had been his text-books,--and copious
extracts are made from them on certain subjects.62
One of the subjects to which Broadus undoubtedly referred
was argument, for he confessed:
The well-known chapters of Whately have been here
freely employed, but with very large additions,
and with the attempt to correct some important
errors.63
Considering the substance of Broadus's confession,
quoted above, an investigation should disclose many similarities in their respective approaches to argument.

It

should also reveal some differences between the two men.
It is to the relationship of the two theories that the
writer will turn below.
A Summary of Broadus's Materials
Concerning Argument
Before developing the comparison of Whately and
Broadus, the writer will preview Broadus's chapter on
argument.

The basis of the preview and the analysis to

follow, organizationally, will be the 1898 revision of the
Treatise, done by Broadus's associate and successor, Dr.
E. C. Dargan.

The revision was chosen instead of the

original because while the substance remained essentially
62Ibid., p. xii·
63Ibid., p. xi.
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unaltered, the organization of thought is easier to follow
in the later work.64
Chapter VII of Broadus's Treatise is entitled
"Special Materials--Argument."
into seven sections.

The chapter is divided

Section One deals with the impor-

tance of argument in preaching.

Section Two concerns

questions preliminary to argument, including the matters
of presumption and burden of proof.

Sections Three and

Four are a treatment of principal varieties and forms of
argument.

Section Five is a discussion of refutation.

The sixth section involves the subject of arrangement, and
the seventh includes some general suggestions governing
argument.
All of the elements of argument named above will not
be reviewed here.
this study unduly.

To consider all of them would lengthen
However, those elements of Broadus's

64 This choice will not compromise the necessity of
studying a primary source, even though it is a revision.
By revising the book, Dargan was carrying to completion
Broadus's own plan to revise it.
Prior to his death,
Broadus had discussed the revision with Dargan, who had
become his associate at the Seminary in 1892. Certain
revisions Broadus had penciled into his notes, others he
and Dargan specifically discussed, and a few were made by
Dargan with the consent of Broadus's family. See E. c.
Dargan, Preface to the Revised Edition of Treatise on the
Preparation and Delivery of Sermons {New York: Hodder
and Stoughton, 1898), p. vii. The 1870 and the 1898 texts
have been compared and no differences bearing upon this
study were discovered.
It seems reasonable to assume that
any changes recorded in the 1898 edition reflect changes
in Broadus's ideas during the mature years of his career.
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theory which clearly reflect Whately's major contributions, as discussed in the second chapter, are treated
below.
A Comparison of the Theories of
Whately and Broadus
The purpose of this section is to outline and
expound selected ideas concerning argument set forth in
Broadus's Treatise, and to compare them to those of
Richard Whately, whose theories were explained in the
previous chapter.

As indicated above, the ideas discussed

are those which reflect Whately's influence in the areas
of the his most significant contribution to the understanding of rhetoric.

The assumption that direct refer-

ence to Whately or the inclusion of similar ideas constitutes influence was stated in the first chapter.

It must

be admitted that similar ideas might be attributed to a
source common to both men rather than to Whately.

If

Broadus's wording is similar to Whately's, however, it is
reasonable to assume that Whately was his source.
It should also be noted at the outset that Broadus's
section on argument is not nearly as complex as Whately's.
It is therefore assumed that Broadus included what he
considered to be the most important of Whately's elements,
together with ideas from other theorists, as they related
to his purpose of writing a homiletics textbook.

Although
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he borrowed ideas from others as well, Broadus relied most
heavily upon Whately, "whose discussion on Arguments," he
said, "is the most valuable part of his work on Rhetoric,
and unequalled by other treatises."

Besides including a

number of Whately's principles, in some places Broadus
also used his illustrations.GS
It should be noted, finally, that in those elements
which Broadus borrowed from Whately, he was in substantial
agreement with the Archbishop.

Only in the matters of

presumption and burden of proof did Broadus take exception
to the Englishman's views.
Questions Preliminary to Argument
As matters preliminary to the framing of an argument, Broadus identified three questions, all of which
reflect the influence of Whately.

These involve the

placement of the proposition, the determination of the
burden of proof, and the value of presumption in argument.
For purposes of this study, the latter two subjects will
be discussed.
Burden of Proof
Concerning burden of proof, Broadus both agreed and
disagreed with Whately.
65Broadus, p. 172.

Although some matters of agree-
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ment may be found, Broadus pointedly emphasized the
areas of disagreement.66
First, Whately said that it is important to determine at the outset where the burden of proof lies.67
Unlike the Archbishop, Broadus said that the preacher is
only indirectly concerned with the burden of proof.

The

notion is more useful in legal proceedings and in debate.
Regarding controversial sermons, however, Broadus conceded
that placement of the burden of proof is essential.

At

such times, he said, it is wise to make formally clear to
the hearers where the burden lies.68
Second, Broadus accepted the Roman legal formula for
determining the burden of proof, which he paraphrased,
"He who alleges anything must prove his allegation; and,
conversely, no man is required to prove the negative of
another man's assertion."69

If, however, one asserts a

66In what is probably a veiled reference to the
Archbishop, Broadus said, "On this subject, certain very
erroneous views have lately obtained currency, from a
confusion of two different senses of an ambiguous term."
John Broadus, Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of
Sermons, 14th ed. (New York:
A. c. Armstrong & Son,
1889), p. 163. Curiously, this statement is omitted in
the Dargan revision, although Broadus's ideas on the subject remained unchanged.
67Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed.
Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale:
University of Southern
Illinois Press, 1963), p. 112.
68Broadus, p. 174.
69 Ibid.
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negative, he is obligated to prove it, for the burden of
proof always rests with the one who alleges.

Because it

is difficult to prove a negative proposition, seldom are
assertions made in negative form.70. Contrary to the Roman
notion which Broadus adopted, Whately asserted that the
burden of proof rests upon the side opposite the one
favored by presumption.71

To Whately, then, the placement

of the burden of proof depended upon the determination of
presumption in each given case, a matter which will be
discussed more fully below.

To Broadus, presumption and

burden of proof were separate matters, the former being
irrelevant to the determination of the latter.
Presumption
Broadus did not consider presumption to be particularly pertinent in preaching, although he advocated a
clear understanding and fair use of the principles
involved. 72

This fact is due in part to his views on the

related matter of burden of proof, which he believed was
pertinent only in controversial speaking.

It is also, no

doubt, the consequence of his views concerning the nature
of presumption.
70rbid., pp. 174, 175.
7lwhately, p. 112.
72aroadus, p. 175.

..

.
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Broadus distinguished three different meanings of
the notion of presumption.

These he called the common

meaning, the legal usage, and Whately's definition.73

The

common meaning, as he understood it, is this:
A presumption in favor of any proposition is, in
the most general statement, something which
inclines us to believe it true before examining
the proof, or independently of any formal process
of reasoning.
In other words, it is that part of
the evidence which lies upon the surface and leads
to the belief in advance of further investigation •
• • • in itself, strictly and etymologically
speaking, a presumption is that which we take
hold of before we inter formally into investigation or argument.7
It is evident that the strength of presumption will
vary from person to person.

One may confront a proposi-

tion with a strong presumption, while an opponent has
little or no disposition in its favor.

For example, a

person who attends church regularly would probably confront a proposition asserting the existence of God with a
strong presumption favoring the proposition.

An atheist,

on the other hand, would consider the same proposition
with no disposition in its favor.

The speaker, therefore,

must be aware of his audience's viewpoint in each case,
for presumption is situationa1.75
73Ibid., p. 176.
74Ibid.
75Ibid.
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The legal sense of presumption is an arbitrary
determination framed in the interest of justice.

Its best

known expression is that an individual accused of a crime
is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty.
As a matter of fact,

the actual logical presumption is

often the exact opposite, as demonstrated in the lawful
arrest of a suspect.

A warrant is issued on the practi-

cal, logical presumption of guilt, but the trial proceeds
on the legal, arbitrary presumption of innocence.

Broadus

asserted that legal presumptions should not confuse the
issue in moral reasoning where the arbitrary, benevolent
principles of law are not in question.76
Broadus observed that Whately defined presumption in
a way which departs from both the common and the legal
uses of the term.

He quoted Whately's definition, which

rejects the notion of preponderance of probability in
favor of a proposition, considering presumption instead to
be the preoccupation of ground.77

Actually, as he

developed his notion of preoccupation, Whately embraced
both the legal and common meanings which Broadus preferred
to distinguish.

The Archbishop's examples of preoccupa-

tion included presumption of innocence in courts of law,
one aspect of the legal meaning.

He also believed that

76rbid. p. 177.
77Ibid.

Cf. Whately, p. 112.
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presumption can be a function of audience prejudice,
remarking

that in any one question the presumption will

often be found to lie on different sides in respect of
different parties.78

This notion is clearly like unto the

common meaning endorsed by Broadus.
For Whately, presumption and burden of proof were
inextricably linked.

If a proposition is favored by pre-

sumption, the burden of proof rests with the other side.
Broadus separated the two elements, noting that they
depend on different principles.

Broadus conceded that

presumption in one's favor might strengthen his argument,
but it doesn't transfer the burden of proof to the opponent as Whately asserted.

Burden of proof, Broadus

affirmed, always rests upon the one who alleges.79
To clarify the difference of viewpoint, we may consider as an example the matter of baptism.

The proposi-

tion to be argued is that the church should practice
infant baptism.

Whately would say that presumption favors

the proposition, because historically in the Church
infants have been baptized.

Broadus would deny the

validity of presumption upon the basis of institutional
precedent.

He would say that, apart from the context of

an audience, presumption cannot be determined.
78whately, p. 118.
79 Broadus, pp. 177, 178.

Whately
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would assert that the burden of proof rests upon the one
opposing infant baptism, for the burden rests upon one who
disputes the position favored by presumption.

Broadus

would argue that the burden of proof rests upon the one
asserting the proposition that infants should be baptized,
for to place the burden upon the opponent would require
him to prove a negative, namely, that infants should not
be baptized.

If the proposition were made to an Anglican

audience, Broadus would say presumption strengthens the
argument, but it would not determine the placement of the
burden of proof.
If the proposition were that the church should baptize only those who profess faith,

both theorists would

say that the burden of proof rests with the one asserting
the proposition.

Their reasons, however, are different.

Whately would say that the burden rests upon the one
making the assertion, because his proposition is contrary
to the view enjoying the advantage of presumption.
Broadus, on the other hand would place the burden on the
same individual, reasoning that he who alleges must prove.
If the audience were Anglican, Broadus would concede
that presumption is against the proposition, and this fact
should be considered in the development of argument.

The

burden of proof would rest upon the proponent, not because
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the pedobaptist80 viewpoint preoccupies the ground,
although it would with the given audience, but because the
one who alleges must prove.
If the audience were a Baptist audience, Broadus
would probably acknowledge the benefit of presumption in
favor of the proposition, but would still place the burden
of proof upon the one asserting the proposition.
would face a dilemma in this situation.

Whately

On one hand, his

view that presumption favors existing institutions would
lead him to conclude that presumption opposes the proposition at hand and that the burden rests with its proponent.

On the other hand, his statement that audience

prejudice may determine presumption would lead him to
conclude that presumption favors the proposition, since
the audience bias of Baptists is toward baptism of only
those who profess faith.

The burden of proof would then

rest with the opponent of the proposition.
It is evident that Broadus preferred the common
meaning of presumption when the application was to pulpit
rhetoric.

The legal use he confined to courts of law,

insisting upon a distinction between the law and moral
reasoning.

Whately's meaning did not distinguish legal

and common uses.
conditions,

Furthermore, it included some other

such as the favoring of existing institutions,

80 Pedobaptism is the baptism of infants.
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which the Archbishop believed established preoccupation of
ground.

Broadus rejected Whately's approach as unproven

and unreasonable. 81
Principal Varieties of Argument
Of five principal varieties of argument presented by
Broadus, four reflect the influence of Whately.

Those

four types are argument a priori, argument from induction,
argument from analogy, and argument from testimony.

The

latter two will be, discussed below.
Argument from Analogy
The influence of Whately is evident and extensive in
Broadus's treatment of argument from analogy.

Mill and

Campbell are each cited once, but clearly Whately was the
predominant influence as far as this variety of argument
is concerned.82

Except as noted, each of the ideas dis-

cussed below clearly follows Whately's theory.
Broadus cited Whately's notion that analogy is not
to be confused with resemblance, but rather refers to
81Ibid., pp. 174-178.
This discussion of Whately's
line of reasoning is the basis for the inference that
Broadus found Whately's views unreasonable.
82rn fact, in the reference to Mill, Broadus takes
exception to the former's notion that arguments from
analogy are invalid because objects called analogous are
similar in some respects but dissimilar in others. See
Broadus, p. 193.
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proportion.83

Noting the confusion of many concerning the

nature of this form of argument, he wrote:
Analogy is still too often confounded with resemblance, notwithstanding the earnest efforts of
Whately and some other writers to confine the term
to its original and proper sense.84
He illustrated the notion of proportion, using three
examples.

One of these examples was that of the likeness

between an egg and a seed as the 1 ink between a parent
bird and its nestling in the one case and the old plant
and the seedling in the other.

This illustration was

taken directly from Whately.85
Because two objects may be analogous in one relationship, it must not be presumed that the analogy extends
to all of their relationships.

When reasoning by analogy,

one must be careful not to extend the analogy beyond its
proper limits.

Broadus employed Whately's illustration of

this rule as he wrote:
Thus, bec?use a just analogy has been discerned
between the metropolis of a country, and the heart
of the animal body, it has been sometimes contended that its increased size is a disease,--that
it may impede some of its most important functions, or even be the cause of its dissolution.86
83Broadus, p. 192; cf. Whately, pp. 90, 91.
84 Ibid.
85rbid., pp. 192, 193;

cf. Whately, p. 91.

86rbid., p. 194; cf. Whately, p. 92.
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In the example above,

the diseased enlargement of the

animal heart is improperly used to

a~lege

that it is

undesirable for a city to become large, and that the fatal
consequences of an enlarged heart will also occur in the
case of a large city.
One difficulty with argument from analogy is the
frequent similarity of analogous objects.

Such similarity

often results in erroneous comparison of the resemblance
rather than the corresponding ratios.

Because of this

difficulty, the proper points of analogy are often clearer
when the objects do not resemble each other.87

Although

Whately had not stated this notion explicitly, it is very
evident in his work.

Based upon this premise, he

explained that several of Jesus' parables are very remote
from the point to be illustrated, except in the one essential to his message.88

This remoteness prevents an inter-

preter of the parables from making unintended analogies
from details of the story involved.
Broadus wrote concerning the usefulness of examples
invented to furnish argument, considering such to be arguments from analogy.89

Aristotle had written of the dis-

tinction between real and invented examples, so that one
87rbid., pp. 192, 193.
88Whately, pp. 92, 93.
89Broadus, p. 197.

105
might conclude that Broadus was in this case influenced
more by the Greek than by the Englishman.
does not appear to be the case.

This, however,

Whately, citing Aris-

totle, referred to real and invented examples.

However,

unlike Aristotle who believed that the real example was
the more convincing, Whately asserted that a supposed
case, if it is probable, will often be no less convincing
than the rea1.90

Broadus apparently adopted Whately's

view, for he said that merely probable cases may provide
an analogy which will be highly convincing.

With this

idea he credited Whately in a footnote.91
Finally, Broadus observed that real and invented
examples, used as analogical arguments, are sometimes used
not as proof, but rather to explain or make an argument
interesting.92

In this he clearly followed Whately, who

had said that this variety of argument may be used at
times not to prove anything, but either to illustrate and
explain one's meaning or to amuse the fancy with the
ornament of language.93
Broadus included a few other ideas, such as the .
usefulness of arguments from analogy to refute objections,
90whately, p. 103.
91Broadus, p. 197;
92rbid.
93 Whately, p. 108.

cf. Whately, pp. 103, 104.
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which do not appear in Whately's text.

However, the major

elements he discussed reflect the unmistakable imprint of

Whately.
Argument from Testimony
The next principal variety of argument Broadus discussed is that of argument from testimony.

Departing from

Whately, he pointed out that the words "testimony" and
"authority" are often confused.

The former, he believed,

should be applied only in matters of fact.

The latter

should be used concerning matters of judgment or opinion. 94
At the same time, he cited Whately's premise that men are
inclined to confuse facts with their judgments concerning
them.95
As had Whately, Broadus stated that in testimony to
matters of fact,

the character and number of witnesses

will either strengthen or weaken the argument.96

A wit-

9 4 Broadus, pp. 197, 198. See also Whately, p. 61,
where, in a footnote, the Archbishop acknowledged that
testimony to matters of opinion usually was designated
"authority." In his Elements of Logic he confirmed this
as the primary sense of the term, calling it a claim to
deference.
Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (London:
Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1864), p.
194. However, in his discussion of argument from testimony in his Rhetoric he preferred to speak of testimony
regarding matters of fact and regarding matters of
opinion.
95rbid., p. 198;
96Broadus, p. 199;

cf. Whately, pp. 58-61.
cf. Whately, p. 61.
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ness's truthfulness,

intelligence, and opportunity to know

the facts are primary considerations.

Whately's develop-

ment of these notions is far more thorough.

It is evident

from a footnote that Broadus expected his readers to refer
to Whately for a more complete discussion of the subject.9 7
A large number of witnesses to a common fact will
strengthen an argument from testimony if the witnesses'
knowledge was gained first-hand, rather than from what
others have told them.98

Details of individual testimonies

may differ, but will not invalidate the testimony as long
as these details are non-contradictory.

In fact,

non-

contradictory discrepancies among their accounts serve to
authenticate the independence of the witnesses and to
strengthen their combined testimony to the substantial
facts.99

Broadus used this notion as an argument to defend

the authenticity of the Gospel accounts of the life of
Christ.
The unintentional testimony of adversaries is a
compelling argument.

Broadus barely mentions this,

apparently assuming that his readers would consult Whately
97Ibid., p. 202.
Broadus referred his readers to
pp. 78-104 in Whately, which corresponds to pp. 58-76 in
the Ehninger edition.
98Ibid., p. 199;
99Ibid.

cf. Whately, pp. 61, 62.
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for a thorough treatment.

His illustration, that the

miracles of Jesus were acknowledged by unbelievers, makes
the allusion to Whately unmistakable.100
Concerning the character of things attested, Broadus
noted that the improbable requires more testimony to gain
credence than does the probable.

In this regard, he

discussed the miracles of Jesus as examples.

Miracles are

improbable and therefore can be expected to require more
testimony to establish their credence.

The testimony of

Jesus, strengthened by arguments for his sterling character, and the witness of others are offered by the Gospel
writers as arguments affirming the actual occurrence of
the miracles. lOl
It has been demonstrated that Broadus closely
followed Whately in relating testimony to matters of fact.
His dependence upon the Archbishop is evident not only in
the similarity of ideas, but also in the footnote mentioned above.

However, he related authority rather than

testimony to matters of opinion.
Broadus made a distinction between testimony and
authority.

The early Church Fathers, for example, offered

testimony concerning the apostolic origin of the New
lOOibid., p. 200;

cf. Whately, pp. 64-66.

101Ibid., pp. 200, 201;

cf. Whately, p. 68ff.
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Testament documents.

Their interpretations of the meaning

of those documents, however, is a matter of authority.102
Broadus also believed that the Bible should be considered in a discussion of testimony and authority.

His

views concerning the authority of the Bible are essential
to understanding his approach to establishing the proof of
a proposition.

For Broadus, a Biblical affirmation was

the supreme argument, as the following statement
indicates:
The Scriptures themselves are an authority indeed.
All that they testify to be fact is thereby fully
proven, all that they teach as true and right is
thereby established and made obligatory. There
are some subjects on which the Bible is our sole
authority, such as the Trinity, justification by
faith, the conditions of the future life, and the
positive ordinances of Christianity; namely, baptism and the Lord's supper. The Christian
reasoner should seek fully to appreciate this
unparalleled authority, and shquld heedfully
observe its proper relation to all other means of
proof .103
Although this notion is not developed in Whately's discussion of argument from testimony, it is consistent with
that which he said concerning the presumption and deference established in favor of the decisions or opinions of
"an individual, a body, or a book."104

It also is consis-

tent with the Archbishop's view that the Bible alone is
102rbid., pp. 202, 203.
103 rbid., p. 203.
104whately, p. 118, emphasis mine.
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the religion of Protestants.
it was his allegiance to the

As Golden and Corbett noted,
Scriptu~es

that accounts for

Whately's emphasis on testimony in his Elements of
Rhetoric.105
To summarize, Broadus identified five principal
varieties of argument.
were conventional.

His ideas were not original, but

Although other theorists were quoted,

Whately was the predominant influence upon Broadus's
ideas.

Accurately summarizing this section of Broadus's

Treatise and assessing Whately's influence, Paul Huber
wrote:
Broadus presents no unusual definitions in his
development of the principal varieties of argument. Most of his material comes from his study
and work in the area of argumentation. He does
admit, however, that he was influenced by Whately,
and it is evident that his views closely parallel
those of the English Archbishop.106
Forms of Argument
Broadus next discussed five forms of argument.
These included argument a fortiori, progressive
approach, dilemma, reductio ad absurdum, and ex
concesso.

His treatment of the forms is brief, and in

105James L. Golden and Edward P. J. Corbett, The
Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell, and Whately (New York:~
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 274.
106paul Huber, "A Study of the Rhetorical Theories of
John A. Broadus" (doctoral dissertation, University of
Michigan, 1956), p. 23.
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each case conforms to standard definitions.

The progres-

sive approach will be discussed here, since it is this
form only which reflects Whately's influence.
The argument from progressive approach involves
proof based upon a progressive tendency toward substantiation of the point in question.

Broadus attributed this

idea to Whately, who described it as involving the collective force of several arguments which individually considered would have little weight.

By presenting a series

of such arguments in optimum order, he said, one can
establish a progressive tendency toward a certain
conclusion.107
Broadus illustrated the form with an argument regarding the development of religious tolerance.

He borrowed

the example from Whately and abbreviated it as follows:
In every age and country, as a general rule,
tolerant principles have (however imperfectly)
gained ground wherever scriptural knowledge has
gained ground. And a presumption is thus afforded
that a still further advance of the one would lead
to a corresponding advance in the other.108
Refutation
Broadus recognized that often the assertion of
counter propositions is not sufficient to prevail in
establishing one's viewpoint.

The arguments of an oppo-

107whately, p. 82.
108Broadus, pp. 205, 206;

cf. Whately, pp. 84, 85.
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nent must be met, and objections to one's own arguments
must be addressed.

Although the preacher may not have an

actual antagonist, he must be aware of contrary arguments
which he must refute if he would convince his audience
that his proposition is correct.109

So that his readers

might be more skillful, Broadus included eight principles
which govern refutation of arguments.

These will be dis-

cussed below.
First, Broadus noted that proving the opposite truth
is a sufficient refutation of error.110

In this view he

agreed with Whately, who had observed that a proposition
may be refuted either by proving its opposite or by overthrowing the arguments in its favor.111
Second, in moral reasoning, one cannot always fully
refute all arguments.

This is due, in part, to the fact

that moral reasoning deals in probablilities rather than
in empirirical data.
weak to refute.

Furthermore, some arguments are too

If one cannot see their absurdity, he

will probably not be persuaded by the best refutation.112
An inability to refute an argument will not necessarily weaken one's own position.
109Ibid., p. 201.
llOibid.
lllwhately, p. 148.
112Broadus, pp. 208, 209.

Broadus stated that the
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reason for believing any moral truth consists in considering the arguments in favor of it, minus the objections refuted as far as possible.113

In support of this

notion he quoted Whately, who had asserted that an
unanswerable objection may be allowed if weightier objections can be presented against every other supposition. 1 14
Included also is Whately's illustration concerning evidences of religion, which suggested that rather than
answering every objection to Christianity, one should pose
the possibility of human origin of the Christian faith and
then determine which proposition bears the fewer
difficulties.115
Broadus's third principle is that when objections
are discussed, they should be stated in full force.116

In

other words, one should state his opponent's objection as
accurately and strongly as possible rather than making a
straw man of the objection.

Although the straw man may be

more easily destroyed, such refutation is hardly persuasive to those who understand the force of the objection.
Although Broadus did not quote Whately as his source for
this idea,

it parallels Whately's statement very closely.

113 Ibid., p. 209.
114whately, p. 156.
115aroadus, p. 209;
116Ibid., p. 210.

cf. Whately, pp. 156, 157.

-----
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The Archbishop encouraged the statement of objections in
full force lest the audience conclude that they are

unanswerable. 117
Fourth, Broadus identified four aspects of an argument to which refutation may be directed.

The four are

named in his following statement:
Refutation, whether of an erroneous proposition,
or of an objection to the truth, will be accomplished by showing either that the terms are ambiguous, the premises false, thr geasoning unsound,
or the conclusion irrelevant. 1
Broadus developed his idea with quotations from Potter and
Vinet, who were contemporary writers on the subject of
homiletics.

His thoughts, however, were not unlike those

of Whately, who had noted that refutation may consist
either in the denial of one of the premises of the argument or in objection to the conclusiveness of the
reasoning.119
Fifth, Broadus suggested that refutation is
strengthened if the origin of an error can be shown.

To

illustrate the principle, he referred to infant baptism.
His argument was that after one deals with any New Testament passages offered in support of the practice, one can
further refute it by tracing its origin to the second or
117whately, pp. 159, 160.
118Broadus, p. 210.
119whately, p. 149.

l
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third century.120

Whately also asserted that even if an

argument has been decisively refuted on other grounds, the
case against it will have a longer lasting effect if the
error is traced to its origin.121

Perhaps Broadus borrowed

the idea from Whately, but he certainly did not find his
illustration in the Archbishop's work!l22
Sixth, Broadus urged the use of indirect refutation,
the principal variety of which is reductio ad absurdum.
This argument form is used to reduce an opponent's argument to absurdity.

For example, it might be proposed that

a particular tragic story be censored from the newspaper
because it might create emotional distress for readers.
Following that line of reasoning, one could argue in
refutation that no bad news should be published because
it might promote distress.

Broadus developed relatively

extensively the notion of indirect refutation with an
extensive and unmistakable dependence upon Whately.123
One kind of indirect refutation is to show that an
opponent's premise proves too much, i. e., that besides
the conclusion drawn, it proves one that is inadmissable.124
120Broadus, p. 211.
121Whately, p. 167.
122Anglicans practice infant baptism.
123Three footnotes cite Whately.
124Broadus, p. 212;

cf. Whately, p. 151.
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Another type is irony, with which one makes an opponent or
an error appear to be ridiculous.125

Because some will

complain that irony is irreverent, Broadus counseled that
it be used sparingly in sermons.126

The third kind is the

sophistical method which consists in counter-objections
urged against something taken to be, although it is not,
the only alternative.

Broadus included one of Whately's

examples, in which a man replies to the censure he
receives regarding a vice to which he is addicted that
there are other vices which are worse.127
Broadus's seventh principle is that refutation
should not be too elaborate or vehement.

His reasons

clearly reflect his dependence upon Whately for this
notion, for he said that excessive strength of refutation
125 Broadus illustrated the notion from the Biblical
story of the prophet Elijah who confronted the prophets of
Baal on Mt. Carmel. After his opponents had unsuccessfully called upon their god, Elijah taunted them, saying,
"Call out with a loud voice, for he is a god; either he is
occupied or gone aside, or is on a journey, or perhaps he
is asleep and needs to be awakened." Broadus, p. 212.
Whately illustrated this idea by referring to his published Historic Doubts, which with irony attacked the
scepticism of David Hume. Whately, p. 152-155.
1 26 Broadus, p. 213.
1 2 7rbid.;
cf. Whately, p. 157.
Specifically,
Whately said that if he is blamed for being a sot, he
dilates on the greater enormity of being a thief, as if it
were necessary that he be either.
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will arouse deep-seated prejudices and may prompt one to
cling to the refuted argument as a matter of pride.128
Eighth, Broadus observed that successful refutation
gains the sympathy of the hearers, often to their detriment, for they overestimate the extent of the refutation.
The fact that all arguments offered in favor of a proposition have been refuted does not necessarily prove that
the proposition is false.

It may be that the proposition

could be supported by arguments not yet advanced.129

These

ideas regarding the overestimation of refutation parallel
those of Whately.130
Finally, Broadus addressed the placement of refutation of objections.

Following Ripley's Sacred

Rhetoric, he first asserted that a point should be made
and objections to it disposed of before the preacher
advances his next point.131

If objections lie against the

general sentiment of the discourse, and if they can be
addressed briefly and independently, they should be
refuted before proposing the argument.

If refutation

depends upon the prior advancement of argument, then it
must be postponed until the conclusion.
128Ibid.;

If one chooses

cf. Whately, pp. 162, 165.

129Ibid., p. 214.
130whately, pp. 155-159.
131Broadus, p. 219.
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to delay refutation, knowing that objections are in the
hearers' minds, he is advised to intimate at the outset
that he will notice objections before concluding.13 2
Regarding principles of refutation, there is evidence of Whately's influence, as described above.

It is

also evident that Broadus borrowed ideas from other theorists as well.

In some cases, the sources of ideas are

difficult to identify, probably because the notions are
so common that they are now considered to be selfevident.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the
personal background of John Albert Broadus, and to
explain his theory of argument.

Of particular interest

was the influence of Richard Whately's theory.

Although

the influence of other classical and more recent theorists is evident, Broadus's confession that Whately's
work was freely employed is confirmed in the analysis.
Matters in which Broadus differed from Whately have
been included in this chapter, upon the assumption that
not only similarities, but also differences should be
noted.

Broadus followed Whately closely in the matters

132Ibid. Concerning the choice of delay, the
influence--or-whately is apparent, although the idea
itself is Aristotelian. Compare the Archbishop's statement in this regard on p. 147 of his Elements.
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of argument from testimony, analogy, and progressive
approach.

He also clearly adopted the Englishman's ideas

regarding refutation.

In the very important matters of

presumption and burden of proof, however, Broadus pointedly disagreed with Whately.
The analysis of Broadus's addresses and written
discourses in the following chapter will undoubtedly
disclose the influence of the Archbishop.

It will also

reveal the differences between the two theorists.

CHAPTER IV
A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF SELECT DISCOURSES
OF JOHN A. BROADUS
In the two preceding chapters the writer has
described the theories of argument of Richard Whately and
John A. Broadus.

It has been demonstrated that the former

individual exerted considerable influence upon the latter,
although Broadus also incorporated ideas from other
writers into his Treatise.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how
and to what extent Broadus applied Whately's theories in
three of his own addresses and written discourses.

The

addresses and discourses will be examined to discover both
the application of Whately's ideas and the deviations from
his

theory.
Before proceeding with analysis, a model for criti-

cal discourse will be presented.

That model will serve as

a methodological basis for the rhetorical analysis to
follow.
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A Model for Critical Discourse
In an essay entitled "The Anatomy of Critical
Discourse,"l Lawrence Rosenfield proposed a model for the
practice of rhetorical criticism.

Rosenfield contended

that criticism is most sensibly conceived of as a special
form of reason-giving discourse.2

More specifically, a

critic makes evaluative assertions about the way things
are and offers reasons to justify his assessments.3
approach is likened unto a forensic argument,

This

in which a

claim is based upon an interpretation of a set of facts in
light of a legal code.

Applied to rhetoric, this means

that the facts of a specific rhetorical event are interpreted, and the interpretation is compared to a norm.
Judgments are based upon the degree to which the event
conforms to or deviates from the

n~rm. 4

If one would engage in rhetorical criticism, he must
decide what

~he

relevant data will be.

Rosenfield sug-

gested four variables which may be considered in this
regard.

They are the source or creator of the message

!Lawrence Rosenfield, "The Anatomy of Critical
Discourse," in Methods of Rhetorical Criticism:
A
Twentieth Century Perspective, second ed., revised, eds.
Bernard L. Brock and Robert L. Scott (Detroit:
Wayne
State University Press, 1980), pp. 148-174.
2Ibid., p. 148.
3Ibid., pp. 153, 154.
4 Ibid., pp. 155, 156.
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(S),

the message (M), the environment,

including matters

of historical background and context _in which the message
is received (E), and the critic, who is a unique receiver
(C)

.s

A total interpretation of a communicative event

would require analysis of all four variables.

Such analy-

sis is, however, rare if not impossible for one critic.6
Therefore, various combinations of these variables may be
considered.

For the rhetorical critic, the indispensible

variable is the message (M). 7
After determining what will constitute relevant
data, the critic must formulate a basis or standard for
comparison.

Rosenfield suggested two types.

One he

called "analog modality," in which an actual speech or
address is selected to serve as a standard of comparison
for another.

The other type he called "model modality,"

in which the critic generates his own paradigm of an ideal
to serve as a standard of comparison.a

The search for an

explanation for the extent and character of deviation from
the model constitutes the invention of critical reasons. 9
In the model modality,

the critic's norm is generated from

5Ibid., p. 159.
6 Ibid.

--

7Ibid.

--

8 Ibid., pp. 170, 171.
9rbid., p. 171.

-1
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a theoretical base.

The comparison of a discourse to the

model serves to confirm or to qualify the theory represented by the model.

Comparison also is used to assess

the discourse.10
This writer will use Rosenfield's approach to analyze and assess three of Broadus's discourses.

Of the

four variables which Rosenfield suggested, the source (S)
and the message (M) will provide the relevant data.
Rosenfield's description of the interaction of these two
variables follows:
The S-M focus concentrates on understanding discourse as an expression of its creator. Most
often the critic attempts to trace out the creative process by which the speaker externalized and
structured the feelings, thoughts, and experiences
contained within himself. The relation of source
to message has prompted two general schools of
criticism. One (which actually concentrates on
the S ---> M relationship) seeks to account for
the rhetor's behavior as a function of the factors
which influenced him: his education, the books hi
read, the persons who inspired him, and the like. 1
These two variables were chosen because they naturally and
adequately accomplish the stated purpose of this study.
The notions of argument stated in previous chapters constitute the influences, particularly that of Whately,
which determined the viewpoint of a rhetor, Broadus.
can be expected that his messages will reflect those
l01bid., p. 172.
ll1bid., p. 161.

It

124
influences.

Analysis will disclose the form and substance

of Broadus's approach to the argumentive materials in the
discourses.
Following Rosenfield's "model modality," the standard of assessment will be a paradigm based upon Whately's
theory of argument.

It is expected that both conformity

and intentional deviation will be discovered, since in his
Treatise, Broadus stated that he employed Whately's
notions, but with additions and corrections.12
A Paradigm Based Upon Whately's Theory
Whately's theory was discussed in chapter two, and
therefore will not be reviewed here in detail.

Selected

portions of that theory will be included in a paradigm to
be used in analyzing and assessing Broadus's discourses.
The criteria for choosing the selected portions are named
and developed below.
Criteria for the Paradigm
First, it must be remembered that Whately's theory
en toto was not incorporated into Broadus's Treatise.
In other words, some ideas of Whately's were omitted.

The

reasons for omissions are not known, but possibilities
12John A. Broadus, Treatise on the Preparation and
Delivery of Sermons (New York:
Hodder and Stoughton,
1898), p. xi.

125
might be suggested.

It is possible, for instance, that

Broadus expected his readers to examine Whately's work for
themselves, making duplication in his Treatise unnecessary.

This possibility is strengthened by the fact that

in his section on relevant literature he urged the reading
of several authors,

including Whately.

Another possible

reason is that to include most or all of Whatley's ideas
would make the Treatise too long.

The fact that Broadus

treated several notions only briefly could indicate that
he recognized the need to limit the scope of his work.

It

is also possible that he chose those ideas which he considered most important.

This final possibility seems most

likely, and does not exclude the other two as concurrent
explanations.

In any case, the criterion which will be

inferred from the above is that only those elements of
Whately's theory which appear in Broadus's Treatise will
be included in the paradigm.
Second, it must be remembered that not all of
Whately's ideas were original.

He borrowed many of his

ideas from the classic rhetoricians.

That which gave the

ideas he borrowed distinction was his extensive development and modification of some, and the ecclesiastical
application he made of most, if not all.

The second

criterion, then, which an element must meet to be included
is that it must be, in the opinion of experts, among
Whately's original or otherwise significant contributions.
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Third, in the very important matters of presumption
and burden of proof, for example, Whately and Broadus did
not agree.

Broadus's discussion of the disagreement was

developed in chapter three, in which the differences
between the two men were carefully noted.

As a criterion

concerning matters in which the two disagreed, Whately's
notions are included in the paradigm.

Deviation from the

standard can be expected in the discourses, however, insofar as such ideas are concerned.
Fourth, Broadus adopted ideas from other sources.
Such ideas will not be included since the fourth criterion
is that only Whately's ideas will constitute the paradigm.
It is likely that ideas from other theorists are reflected
in the addresses.

These ideas may be noted in passing,

but they will not receive primary analysis or emphasis.
Elements of the Paradigm
Based upon the criteria stated above, the elements
included in this paradigm must appear in Whately's
Rhetoric,

they must also appear in Broadus's Treatise

(either confirmed or disputed), and they must be judged by
experts to be original and/or significant contributions
made by the Archbishop in the field of rhetoric.

Based

upon the discussion and analysis of chapters two and
three, the following elements meet the criteria:

presump-

tion, burden of proof, argument from testimony, argument
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from analogy, and refutation.

According to nature and

function, these elements can be placed in three groupings:

1) presumption and burden of proof, 2) forms of argument
(including those from testimony and analogy}, and 3) refuta ti on.
It is significant that the list of elements Broadus
included in his Treatise and those which are considered
by expert opinion as Whately's contribution to the field
of rhetoric are almost identical.

Broadus's list was

longer, adding some of Whately's principles governing
order of arguments and also including two varieties of
argument, a priori and argument from induction.

Other-

wise, the two are remarkably alike.
Because Whately's ideas were discussed in chapter
two, they will not be repeated here.

They will be briefly

reviewed below, however, when appropriate and helpful in
the discussion of Broadus's discourses •

.

Before proceeding with the analysis, it should be
observed that this paradigm does not provide an exhaustive
model for studying argument.

Many forms of argument and

principles of argumentation are not included, even though
they appear both in Whately's Rhetoric and in Broadus's
Treatise.

The paradigm has been designed to allow an

examination and assessment of Whately's most significant
contributions, as recognized and applied by Broadus.
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It must be further observed that Broadus did not
employ every element of the paradigm.in every discourse
studied.

Presumption and burden of proof will be examined

in each case, but the nature of the subject matter and the
situation involved will bear heavily upon the varieties of
argument employed and the amount and form of refutation
required.

Explanations will be suggested to account for

omissions, but the mere fact of such omissions must not be
construed as a weakness in Broadus's addresses.
An Analysis and Assessment of Three Discourses
of John Broadus
The three discourses to be analyzed and assessed are
"Duty of Baptists to Teach Their Distinctive Views,"
"Should Women Speak in the Public Assemblies?" and "Immersion Essential to Christian Baptism."

The addresses will

be examined in the order listed above, which corresponds
to their chronological sequence.
"Duties of Baptists to Teach
Their Distinctive Beliefs"
Background of the Address
This particular address was delivered in 1881 at the
fifty-seventh annual meeting of the American Baptist Pub-
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lication Society.13

It is evident, therefore, that the

audience to which this address was originally given was
primarily, if not exclusively, Baptist.
In addition to the external evidence cited above,
this conclusion is supported by internal evidence.

For

example, Broadus introduced his proposition using a first
person, plural pronoun to refer to himself and to his
audience.

He said,

"Hence, the text lays upon us the

duty of which I have been requested to speak--the duty of
Baptists to teach their distinctive views."14

First per-

son, plural pronouns were also regularly employed in the
reasons offered in support of the proposition.

The fol-

lowing sentences are a few of many which identify the
Baptist character of the audience through the use of the
first person.
1. It is a duty we owe ourselves. We must
teach these views in order to be consistent in
holding them. Because of these we stand apart
from other Christians, in separate organizations-from Christians whom we warmly love and delight to
work with. We have no right thus to stand apart
unless the matters of difference have real importance; and if they are really important, we certainly ought to teach them.15
l3Edward C. Starr, ed., A Baptist Bibliography, 25
vols.
(Chester:
American Baptist Historical Society,
1953) 3:150.
14John A. Broadus, "The Duty of Baptists to Teach
Their Distinctive Views" (Philadelphia:
American Baptist
Publication Society, n.d.), p. 6.
15Ibid., pp. 11, 12.
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It is also significant that Broadus had been
assigned the topic for this address, as indicated in his
statement of the proposition, quoted above.

Not only was

he speaking to an audience likely to be sympathetic with
his views; he was also addressing a topic concerning which
they desired to hear his opinions.
An Overview of the Address
The Biblical text for this address was Matthew
28:20,

in which Jesus charged his disciples,

saying,

"Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have
commanded you."

Broadus began his address with a brief

exposition of his text, from which he inferred that "all
things" included not only matters of personal piety, but
also rules governing Christian societies,

or churches.

From the exposition of his text, he inferred his proposition, which was this:

"Hence, the text lays upon us the

duty of which I have been requested to speak--the duty of
Baptists to teach their distinctive views.nl6
Following the statement of the proposition, Broadus
listed and described briefly the distinctive views of
which he spoke.

He named four:

is a religious authority;

1) that the Bible alone

2) that a Christian Church

ought to consist only of persons who make a credible
profession of conversion;
16rbid., p. 6.

3) that officers, government,
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and ceremonies of a church ought to be such, and only
such, as the New Testament directs;

and 4) that churches

ought to be independent, free from the control of other
churches and separate from the State.17
His first distinctive view he simply stated.

The

second he elaborated, arguing that this one precluded
infants from church membership and implying that one whose
life did not provide credible evidence of conversion
should not be retained in membership.18

The third notion

he developed relatively extensively, referring to the
significance of the ceremonial ordinances of baptism and
communion.

He amplified the fourth distinctive, stating

that independence does not preclude cooperation with other
churches and that separation of church and state does not
allow the church to violate moralities essential to public
welfare.19
After stating those principles which he believed to
be the distinctive views of Baptists, he offered four
reasons for teaching them.

First, he said, it is a duty

to ourselves, because teaching these views justifies
separation from other religious groups and also corrects
the excesses of some who claim to be Baptists.
17rbid., pp. 6-10.
18rbid., pp. 6, 7.
19rbid., p.

10.

Second, he
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said, it is a duty to fellow Christians who need to understand Baptist views.

Third, it is a duty to the unbe-

lieving world in that through asserting these views the
assaults of infidels might be met.

Fourth, it is a duty

owed to Christ, who charged his disciples to teach all
things that he had commanded them.20
The final section of the address was devoted to six
suggested means and methods for performing the duty urged
by the proposition.

Those six included 1) thorough

instruction of Baptists themselves, 2) improvement of the
character and influence of the churches, 3) understanding
the audience to be taught, 4) skillful treatment of controverted topics, 5) cooperation with other denominations
without sacrificing convictions, and 6) cultivation of
unity among Baptists.21
An Analysis and Assessment of the Arguments
Having surveyed the contents of Broadus's address,
the writer will now analyze and assess those contents
according to the paradigm described above.

All elements

of the paradigm may not appear in this address, but an
attempt will be made to deal with those which do occur.
20rbid., pp. 11-20.
2lrbid., pp. 20--35.
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Presumption and Burden of Proof
The first elements of Whately's paradigm which serve
as a standard of analysis and assessment are the notions
of presumption and burden of proof.

As noted elsewhere,

Whately identified presumption with preoccupation of
ground.

The burden of proof rests upon the one who chal-

lenges presumption.
Whately noted that presumption can vary from situation to situation, depending upon the biases of the audience.

This fact is significant in analyzing this address.

It is evident from the use of first person, plural pronouns that Broadus was addressing a Baptist gathering.
Although all present may not have been predisposed to the
propagation of Baptist views, as called for by the
proposition, most could reasonably .be expected to accept
the distinctive views Broadus listed and described.

At

least to a certain extent, then, he could claim presumption in his favor upon the occasion of this address.
A second aspect of Whately's description of presumption is important in this address.

The Archbishop

spoke of authority as a matter of "habitual presumption."
Such presumption may favor the decisions or opinions of
"an individual,

a body,

or a book. 11 2 2

Broadus' s views

2 2 Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed.
Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale:
Un1vers1ty of Southern
Illinois Press, 1963), p. 118.
Emphasis mine.
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regarding the authority of the Bible, expressed not only
in his Treatise, but also as the first distinctive view
of Baptists stated above, indicate that for himself and
for other Baptists any proposition taught by the Bible has
presumption in its favor.
It appears that Broadus recognized presumption to be
in his favor, for the address consists primarily of
appeals and assertions rather than extensive arguments.
Knowing that his audience was a Baptist audience, he did
little to defend the distinctive views he asserted,
although he undoubtedly knew that individuals of other
theological persuasions would dispute his convictions.

It

is also evident from his introductory exposition of his
text, Matthew 28:20, and the implied reference to it in
his fourth reason, that Broadus understood the New Testament to support his proposition.

For him and his audience

the weight of habitual presumption conclusively favored
his

assertion.
Because in this situation, presumption favored

Broadus, Whately would argue that the burden of proof
rested upon those who would dispute the proposition.
Broadus would be required only to refute the objections to
the proposition in order that it might stand.

According

to his own theory, however, Broadus would place the burden
of proof upon himself despite the benefit of presumption,
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for he stated that he who alleges bears the burden of
proof.
A review of the address indicates that Broadus
followed his own viewpoint rather than that of Whately,

in

that he offered four reasons in support of the proposition.

However, it should be noted that his reasons were

not strongly argumentative in nature.

He addressed a few

objections raised against them, as will be demonstrated
below, but his primary development of reasons consisted of
little argument.

For example, as a portion of the

development of his first reason, i. e.,

that the teaching

of distinctive views is a duty owed to ourselves, he gave
an explanation, as he wrote:
And this teaching is the only way of correcting
excesses among ourselves. Do some of our Baptist
brethren seem to you ultra in their denominationalism, violent, bitter? And do you expect to
correct such a tendency by going to the opposite
extreme? You are so pained, shocked, disgusted,
at what you consider an unlovely treatment of
controverted matters that you shrink from treating
them at all. Well, the persons you have in view,
if there be such persons, would defend and fortify
themselves by pointing at you. They would say, "I
am complained of as extreme and bigoted.
Look at
those people yonder, who scarcely ever make the
slightest allusion to characteristic Baptist principles, who are weak-kneed, afraid of offending
Paedobaptists, or dreadfully anxious to court
their favor by smooth silence: do you want me to
be such a Baptist as that?" Thus one extreme
fosters another .23
23Broadus, "Duty • • • ," pp. 12, 13.
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Forms of Argument
At this point the writer will analyze forms of
argument in Broadus's address.

The paradigm allows the

study of arguments from testimony and from analogy.

To

analyze only for these three forms is not to suggest that
other forms of argument are not used in the address, nor
is it to suggest that all three forms necessarily should
be employed.

Indeed, other forms of argument appear, and

only one of these two appears in this address.
An argument from analogy, as previously defined, is
one in which an instance adduced is somewhat remote from
that to which it is applied.

The resemblance between the

two instances is one of ratios.

The likeness is not one

of essence, but is rather a likeness of relationship.
Errors arise if one assumes that likeness of relationship
implies likeness of essence or if one presses the comparison further than it was intended to be pressed.

The

genius of understanding this variety of argument is in
determining which points of comparison make the argument.
Twice in this discourse Broadus employed the argument from analogy.

In both instances he used the same

analogy to make essentially the same point, although the
second instance is slightly different from the first and
is used to support a separate proposition.
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Broadus first used this argument in the development
of his third distinctive view, which stated, in part, that
the only ceremonies of a church should be those which the
New Testament requires.
baptism and communion.

He named two such ceremonies,
The argument from analogy was used

to support his contention that to be baptized is tantamount to taking an oath of allegiance to Jesus Christ.

He

noted that the early Roman Christians had called baptism a
sacramentum, which in common Latin usage was used of a
military oath.

From this common use he framed his

analogy, as follows:
The early Roman Christians had a good word for
this idea if only the word could have remained
unchanged in use: they called it a sacramentum,
a military oath. As the Roman soldier in his oath
bound himself to obey his general absolutely so !n
baptism we solemnly vow devotion and obedience. 2
The point of analogy is clearly in a relationship.
The comparison is not between a Christian and a soldier,
nor is it between Christ and a general.

The analogy is

that as a soldier with a sacramenturn vows absolute
obedience to his superior officer, the Christian by the
"sacrament" of baptism vows devotion and obedience to
24 Ibid. , p.

8.
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Christ.25

The analogy is in the relationship between two

individuals as mediated by an oath.

The second use of this form of argument is in the
support of Broadus's fourth reason that Baptists should
teach their distinctive views, namely, that it is a duty
to Christ.

The Professor again used the analogy of the

Roman soldier under oath, but with an imaginative twist:
••• what shall hinder us, what could excuse us,
from observing them ourselves and teaching them to
others? The Roman soldier who had taken the
sacramentum did not then go to picking and
choosing among the orders of his general: shall
the baptized believer pick and choose which commands of Christ he will obey and which neglect and
which alter? 2 6
The point argued in this analogy is that the Baptist
listener was not at liberty to excuse himself from the
duty imposed by the proposition of the discourse.
the previous use of this argument,

As in

the comparison is in

the relationship of an individual to another to whom he
had vowed allegiance.

In the first occurrence, the empha-

sis was upon that which the oath affirmed, namely
obedience.

In the second the emphasis is upon that which

the oath precludes, namely selective obedience.

Both,

however, argue from the ratio or relationship of ideas
2 5Because the Roman Catholic use of the term "sacrament" denotes a means of mediating divine grace, Baptists,
including Broadus use instead the word "ordinance" to
refer to baptism.
2 6Broadus, "Duty • • • ," pp.19,

20.
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rather than from a comparison of the essence of the individuals

involved.

In this discourse, then, Broadus employed to a
limited extent the argument forms for which Whately is
best known.

Although the argument was limited in its

extent, it was sufficient for the occasion upon which the
address was delivered.

With an audience primarily in

agreement with his propositions, it was not as necessary
to establish a proposition through argument as it would
have been with one unconvinced.

His conformity to the

paradigm should not be judged by the number of arguments
he employed from it, nor should he be expected to use all
three forms in the address.

Rather, he should be judged

according to the degree to which he conformed to Whately's
notions when, in the address, the

~rgument

form would be

useful.
The fact that only two instances of argument are
cited above does not imply that other varieties of argument were not employed.

There are several instances of

induction, for example.

The primary burden of the address

was to urge a course of action which was probably acknowledged by his audience to be at least mildly desirable.
Therefore, he offered reasons to justify his proposition
but did not need elaborate argument to establish it.
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Refutation
Whately believed that refutation is a specialized
use of regular forms of argument.

Therefore, most of his

notions regarding the subject relate to arrangement and
other considerations which make refutation most effective,
rather than to forms.

In the following analysis, parti-

cular principles will be noted as applicable to Broadus's
discourse.
Because he was addressing an audience which could be
expected to be mostly in sympathy with his views, Broadus
treated few objections.

Had he been presenting the same

material to a broader religious audience,

it would have

been necessary not only to support the distinctive views
he asserted with affirmative argument, but also to refute
the objections that individuals of other theological viewpoints would raise.
Although he presented little argument in the
development of his distinctives, it is in regard to the
second of these that the first instance of refutation
occurs.

Whately had urged that refutation be placed in

the midst of argument, and this Broadus did.

Immediately

after asserting his position, he raised the opposing viewpoint and then attempted to refute the opponent.
Having asserted that Baptists require a credible
profession of conversion as a condition of church membership, he noted that such a statement precludes infants

~
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from membership.

Recognizing that such a conviction is

contrary to the view of many Protestants, Broadus chose to
address the opposing viewpoint.

He said:

The notion that infants may be church-members
because their parents are seems to us utterly
alien to the genius of Christianity, not only
unsupported by the New Testament, but in conflict
with its essential principles; and we are not
surprised to observe that our Christian brethren
among whom that theory obtains are unable to carry
it out consistently--unable to decide in what
sense the so-called "children of the church" are
really members of the church and subject to its
discipline. The other notion, that infants may be
church-members because so-called "sponsors" make
professions and promises for them, seems to us a
mere legal fiction, devised to give some basis for
a practice which rose on quite other grounds.27
The preceding subjoins three refutational statements
to the implied proposition that infants could be members
of churches because their parents are.

First, he said,

the practice is unsupported by the New Testament and, in
fact, conflicts with its teaching.
cannot be carried out consistently.

Second, the practice
Third, the notion of

sponsorship is groundless.
The order of these is significant, in that Broadus
began with his strongest argument.

Given his views of the

authority of the Bible, the conflict of infant membership
with Bible teaching was, for him, a sufficient refutation
of the proposition.

To strengthen the case, however, he

offered the other two arguments, an act consistent with
27rbid., pp. 6,

7.
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his own belief that sometimes individuals will give
greater consideration to arguments from sources other than
the Bible.
The brevity of these arguments lessens their effect.
His first argument could have been strengthened by treatment of the specific theological arguments offered by the
opponents.

His second one would have been helped by

explanation.

The third one is difficult to understand,

and appears to be an arbitrary dismissal of the opponent's
practice.

The generalized way in which these refutations

addressed the issue may have been sufficient for an
audience already convinced of Broadus's proposition (i.e.,
that the need for credible profession of conversion as a
condition for church membership precludes infants).
However, it is unlikely that a pedobaptist would be persuaded to change his belief based upon this refutation.
A second instance of refutation is addressed to an
implied objection Broadus raised after he stated the
distinctive views of Baptists as he understood them.
Following are his remarks from which the implication is
inferred.

.

Now, I repeat that we do not consider these externals to be intrinsically so important as the
spiritual, or even the ethical, elements of Christianity. But they are important, because they
express the spiritual and react upon it healthily
or hurtfully, and because the Author of Christianity, in person or through his inspired
apostles, appointed and commanded them. And we
think it a matter of great importance that they
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should be practised in accordance with, and not
contrary to, his appointment--that, in the language of his text, his disciples should observe
and conserve (for the word includes both ~deas)
all things whatsoever he commanded them. 2
The implied objection is that Baptist distinctive views
are really inconsequential, particularly when compared
with the spiritual or ethical elements of Christianity.
Broadus conceded that the spiritual and ethical are of
greater importance.

However, he countered that the exter-

nals are important, because they cannot be separated from
the spiritual and because Jesus commanded that they be
taught.

The refutation in this case consists of argument

to establish a counter proposition which, as Whately said,
in effect refutes its contrary.

Again, one of his primary

appeals was to the authority of the Bible, as specifically
expressed in his chosen text.
Conjoined with his second reason that Baptists
should teach their distinctive views, namely, that it is a
duty owed to fellow Christians,
refutation.

is a third instance of

Applying Whately's dictum that objections

should be handled nearer the beginning than the end,
Broadus immediately raised the common objection that
denominational differences should be minimized in the
greater interest of Protestantism.
tion and his refutation as follows:
2Brbid., pp. 10, 11.

He stated the objec-
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~

We are often told very earnestly that Baptists
must make common cause with other Protestants
against the aggressions of Romanism.
It is urged,
especially in some localities, that we ought to
push all our denominational differences into the
background and stand shoulder to shoulder against
Popery. Very well; but all the time it seems to
us that the best way to meet and withstand
Romanism is to take Baptist ground; 9nd if, in
making common cause against it, we abandon or
slight our Baptist principles, have a care lest we
do harm in both directions. Besides, ours is the
best position, we think, for winning Romanists to
evangelical truth • • • • If well-meaning Roman
Catholics become dissatisfied with resting everything on the authority of the church and begin to
look toward the Bible as authority, they are not
likely, if thoughtful and earnest, to stop at any
halfway-house, but to go forward to the position
of those who really build on the Bible alone.29
Whately urged that one state an opponent's objections with
full force,

lest he appear to evade the issue.

Broadus in

this instance gave a stronger statement of the contrary
viewpoint than he had in previous cases, in which the
objections were implied rather than explicitly stated.

In

this matter, then, the Professor conformed to the Archbi shop's theo.ry.
The refutation offered was a conjectural counter
proposition, namely, that the better way to withstand the
encroachments of Roman Catholicism was to stand firmly for
Baptist convictions.

In form, this approach comports

nicely with Whately's theory, but the substance of the
argument in this case is not compelling.

The basis of his

proposition was that "it seems to us" to be the better
29Ibid., pp. 13, 14.
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alternative.30

Perhaps his testimony carried great weight

with that audience, but several examples of success based
upon his proposed approach would have been more convincing.

He explained his proposal with a hypothetical case,

which could very easily be challenged.
A fourth instance of refutation was also a part of
the development of the second reason for teaching Baptist
distinctives.

In this case, Broadus had suggested that

such teaching was a duty owed to other Christians so that
they might consider Baptist views and adopt them if they
were found convincing.

Again with full force, he stated

the objection that other Christians need not be proselytized as follows:
But why should we wish to make Baptists of our
Protestant brethren? Are not many of them noble
Christians--not a few of them among the excellent
of the earth? If with their opinions they are so
devout an~ useful, why wish them to adopt other
opinions? 1
Whately, with his penchant for satire, had suggested
that an indirect means of refutation is to prove an absurdity using the opponent's own premises as the basis of
reasoning.32

It was this element of Whately's theory that

30Ibid., p. 13.
31Ibid., pp. 16, 17.
3 2 This notion comports well with the reductio ad
absurdum form of argument.

146

Broadus applied to refute the objection at hand.

He

wrote:
Yes, there are among them many who command our
high admiration for their beautiful Christian
character and life; but have a care about your
inferences from this fact. The same is true even
of many Roman Catholics, in the past and in the
present;
yet who doubts that the Romanist system
as a whole is unfavorable to the production of the
best types of piety?33
The point of the argument is that desirable Christian
character is not the measure of a system of doctrinal
belief.

If it were, Roman Catholic doctrine would have to

be deemed acceptable based upon the noble character of
many Catholics.

His audience, of course, would not con-

cede that Roman Catholic doctrine could be accepted and
therefore could not assert that noble character can be the
measure of belief.
Summary
Although in his own Treatise Broadus discounted
the importance of presumption and burden of proof, he
relied heavily upon presumption in his favor, as Whately
defined the notion.

His approach to his subject assumed

that his audience was predisposed to agree with his assertions.

He also, as expected, employed Whately's notion of

"habitual presumption" concerning the Bible.

This is

evident in the number of times that he used his text from
33Broadus, "Duty • • • ," p. 17.
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Matthew 28:20 to support his major proposition,

that Bap-

tists are duty-bound to teach their distinctive views.
Following his own dictum that if possible, the strongest
argument should be presented last, his fourth argument was
that this teaching was a duty owed to Christ, in keeping
with his command recorded in the Bible.

He would consider

this to be his strongest argument based upon his view of
the supreme and final authority of the Bible.
Regarding the matter of burden of proof according to
Whately, Broadus would have been required only to answer
objections against his proposition.
answer objections, however.

He did more than

Consistent with his own view

that he who alleges must prove, he deviated from the
paradigm and assumed the burden of proving his proposition
that Baptists are duty-bound to teach their distinctive
views.
It was noted above that this discourse involves
surprisingly little argument.

Rather,

it consists largely

of affirmations, explanations, illustrations, suggested
ways and means, and appeals.

This fact was probably due

to the predisposition of the audience in favor of
Broadus's ideas.

Because the paradigm permits the study

of only three argument forms, only two cases of argument
from analogy were examined.

In both cases, Broadus cor-

rectly applied Whately's ideas.
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Several instances of refutation were discovered in

....

the discourse, and these regularly conformed to various
principles which Whately had articulated for governing the
process.

The substance of the refutative arguments was

not convincing in every case, but in form, they followed
the paradigm.
"Should Women Speak in Mixed
Public Assemblies?"
Background of the Discourse
The subject of the second discourse to be studied is
evident from its title.

Historically, it was presented at

a time when women's issues such as suffrage were prominent
in society.

It was probably inevitable that the question

of the role of women in the churches would arise.
Whereas the previous discourse was oral,
was written.

It was published in booklet form in 1890 by

Baptist Book Concern.34
tists,

this one

It was disseminated among Bap-

including Dr. W. C. Wilkinson, who in a letter to

Dr. Broadus, wrote:
Thank you heartily for your leaflet, "Should Women
Speak in Mixed Assemblies?" I had been wishing I
could see it and wondering just how to get it. It
shows you the same consummate master of persuasive
presentation that I have always felt you to be.35
34starr, 3:153.
3SA. T. Robertson, Life and Letters of John Albert
Broadus (Philadelphia:
American Baptist Publ1cat1on
Society, 1901), p. 390.
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Wilkinson's statement includes at least one promient
individual's opinion of the merits of the discourse as
well.
Internal evidence indicates that this discourse was
addressed to a Baptist audience.

Broadus pointed out, for

example, that one specific objection he addressed had been
raised by a Baptist lady.

Toward the end of the document,

he traced the origin of the practice in question among
non-Baptist denominations.

He then contrasted the doc-

trinal assumptions of these groups with Baptists, arguing
that Baptist doctrines would support his view.

In his

final remarks, he made an appeal through a rhetorical
question which clearly identified his audience:
Is it too much to hope that our excellent Baptist
ladies who have fallen in with the movement in
some parts of the country will stop while they
can, will exclude men from their women's meetings,
will decline to join in temperance address~g to
assemblies composed of both men and women?
Internal evidence also indicates that Broadus was
aware that all members of his intended audience did not
agree with his proposition.

In addition to the Baptist

lady who raised an objection, referred to above, Broadus
acknowledged the contrary opinion of other Baptists.

He

referred to one such individual as follows:
36John A. Broadus, "Shouid Women Speak in Mixed
Public Assemblies?" (Louisville: Baptist Book Concern,
1890), p. 16.
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A justly honored Baptist pastor was not long ago
reported as saying (in substance) that he did not
want to hear so much about texts on this subject;
the thing does good, and that was enough for him.37
At the same time, he asserted that the great majority of
Baptist women were distinctly opposed to the practice in
question.38
An Overview of the Discourse
This discourse began with a direct reference to a
controversial issue:

the appropriateness of women

speaking in mixed public assemblies.

After commenting

briefly upon the contemporary issue, Broadus defined the
limits he intended to place upon his subject.

First, he

would confine his treatment to the issue raised in the
title rather than discussing the broader issue of women's
rights.

Second, he would be

prima~ily

occupied with an

attempt to explain the passages of Scripture which appear
to forbid women to speak in mixed public assemblies.39

His

explanation included arguments involving the interpretive
judgments he made.
Following these introductory comments, Broadus cited
two Biblical texts as translated in the Revised English
Version.

He quoted I Corinthians 14:34£, which reads:

37rbid., p. 14.
38rbid., p. 15.
39rbid., p.

2.
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Let the women keep silence in the churches;
for
it is not permitted unto them to speak; but let
them be in subjection, as also saith the law. And
if they would learn anything, let them ask their
own husbands at home; for it is shameful for a
woman to speak in the church.40
He then referred to I Timothy 2:11-15, broadly paraphrasing and commenting upon the preceding context, which
addresses the subject of order in public worship.

The

verses which pertained to his discourse read as follows:
Let a woman learn in quietness with all subjection. But I permit not a woman to teach, nor to
have dominion over a man, but to be in quietness.
For Adam was first formed, then Eve; and Adam was
not beguiled, but the woman being beguiled, hath
fallen into transgression;
but she shall be saved
through the child-bearing, if they continue in
faith and love and sanctification with sobriety.41
Following a few comments regarding the suitability
of the translation from which he quoted, Broadus set forth
his proposition that the texts in question forbid women to
speak in mixed public assemblies.

He stated his position

as follows:
Now it does not need to be urged that these two
passages from the Apostle Paul do definitely and
strongly forbid that women shall speak in mixed
public assemblies.
No one can afford to question
that such is the mos~ obvious meaning of the
apostle's commands. 4
Subjoined to the proposition is a series of six
objections, each of which Broadus refuted in turn.
40r Cor. 14:34, 35 (RV).
41 1 Tim. 2: 11-15 (RV) •
42aroadus, "Should Women Speak • • • ," p.

4.

The
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objections were:

1) that "speak" in I Corinthians 14:34

means "chatter;"

2) that "church" in the same verse

refers to the formal public meeting;

3) that prophetesses

mentioned I Corinthians 11:5 spoke in mixed public assemblies;

4) that the prohibition was culturally condi-

tioned, and not applicable beyond the immediate audience;
5) that Broadus's proposition would permit women without
husbands to speak; and 6) that the documents of these
texts were corrupt.
To conclude, he summarized his understanding of the
texts, satisfied that he had adequately refuted the objections.

He also suggested what he considered to be impli-

cations and applications of the proposition that he had
maintained.
The leaflet which the author examined includes an
addendum written after the address had been published.

In

this addendum, Broadus answered three more objections
which apparently he had not foreseen.

Those are:

1) that

the Apostle Paul was biased and contradicted the teaching
of Jesus;

2) that women had been speaking in mixed assem-

blies with good results; and 3) that Baptists would lose
the beneficial effects of a growing movement by forbidding
the practice.
The conclusion of the addendum involves an appeal to
adopt the proposition in practice.

Claiming that the

majority of Baptist women concurred with his viewpoint, he
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called upon those who did not to consider and apply his
message.
An Analysis and Assessment of the Discourse
Again the three categories of the Whately paradigm
will be applied as the standard of analysis and assessment.

The pattern of discussion, however, will differ

somewhat from that of the first address.
tion and burden of proof will be examined.

First presumpThen each

issue named in the overview above will be analyzed.

Ele-

ments of refutation will receive primary attention,
because each issue was presented as an objection to his
major proposition.

Forms of argument, as outlined in the

paradigm, will be discussed as they arise.
Presumption and Burden of Proof
Whately's notions concerning presumption and burden
of proof have been stated elsewhere, so a complete statement of his ideas is not necessary at this point.

How-

ever, a review of those conceptions pertinent to the
address at hand may be helpful.

First, presumption is the

preoccupation of ground rather than preponderance of probability in favor of a particular proposition.

Second,

presumption stands against the paradoxical, or that which
is contrary to prevailing opinion.

Therefore, the biases

of an audience may determine upon which side of a question
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presumption falls.

Third, habitual presumption, or autho-

rity, may favor the decisions or opinions of an individual, a body, or a book.

Fourth, the burden of proof

rests upon the one who disputes the position favored by
presumption.

Fifth,

if presumption favors one's proposi-

tion, he needs only to answer objections in order to
sustain his proposition.
In this address, Broadus assumed that presumption
favored his view.

This is evident in two ways.

First, he

supposed that the majority of prevailing opinion among
Baptists was opposed to the practice in question.

This

belief he stated as follows:
It is a comfort to know that the great majority of
Baptist women in our country as a whole are still
distinctly opposed to this practice. Such is the
case almost universally in New England (if I am
correctly informed), quite generally in the Middle
States, and with very few exceptions throughout
the South and Southwest.43
Because the audience he hoped to persuade was a Baptist
audience, and the prevailing opinion and audience bias
were in his favor, he could enjoy the "comfort" of presumption, as indicated in his statement above.
The second element which placed presumption in his
favor was the habitual presumption among Baptists that the
judgments of the Bible are authoritative.

That he

employed this notion is evident in several ways.
43Ibid., pp. 15, 16.

First,
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after introducing the question, he suggested to his audience an appropriate answer must be consistent with the
Bible.

He wrote:

No thoughtful person would like to profess that in
our country at the present moment he can make this
investigation in a completely impartial and dispassionate manner; but it is obviously very
desirable that writer and readers in such a case
should earnestly strive to deal fairl1 with their
own minds and with the truth of God.4
Second, immediately following this statement he quoted the
two Biblical passages from which he inferred his proposition.

Third, the concluding statement of the discourse

proper cites Biblical authority as the conclusive reason
establishing the assertion.

Following is that conclusion:

As to crying out against the Bible for teaching
"the subjection of women," leave that to Ingersoll. The precise nature and proper limits of
this subjection may not be generally understood,
and would be an appropriate subject for earnest
inquiry.
But that the Bible does teach subjection, and that the apostle makes that his special
reason for the prohibition before us, would seem
to be quite beyond question.45
According to Whately, since presumption was in
Broadus's favor, the burden of proof rested with one who
would challenge his assertion.

Broadus, on the other

hand, had said that the burden of proof rests with the one
who alleges.

Broadus may have believed that in this

instance he proved his proposition.
44 Ibid.,
.
p. 2 •
45Ibid., p. 10.

h
. mine.
.
Empasis

However, his only
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line of proof was to assert that the obvious sense of the
two texts he quoted established his viewpoint.
It is the opinion of this writer that in this discourse Broadus followed Whately's approach to burden of
proof rather than his own.

If he had seriously assumed

the burden of proof, he would have been obligated to prove
not that the Bible was to be accepted as authoritative,
but that the "obvious" sense of his texts was the actual
sense.

Furthermore, the argumentative substance of the

discourse, following the statement of the proposition, is
entirely the refutation of objections.
adopted Whately's dictum:

He had,

therefore,

if presumption favors one's

proposition, he needs only to refute objections to confirm
the assertion.

His own statement, following the six refu-

tations in the discourse proper, expressed his belief that
he had refuted the objections and thus confirmed the
proposition.

He observed, "So the apostle's clear and

consistent prohibitions stand unshaken, in their obvious
sense. n46
Refutation
As stated in the overview above, Broadus refuted
nine objections to his proposition.
the discourse proper.

Six of these were in

The remaining three were presented

in an addendum written subsequent to publication.
46Ibid., p.

9.
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The first objection Broadus addressed was that the
term "speak" in I Corinthians 14:34 ~eans "to chatter."47

The implication of this objection is that the prohibition
applied only to disorderly speech, but would not exclude
intelligent speaking.

Broadus stated the objection with

full force, as Whately urged, acknowledging that in classical Greek the term was sometimes used not only for
chattering, but also to refer to animal sounds.
To refute this argument, Broadus observed that there
are no clear examples of these classical uses in Biblical
Greek.

Instead, he asserted, the New Testament uses the

term to refer to intelligent speaking or talking, applying
the word to apostles, prophets, the Savior, and God.
Implied is the unlikelihood that these would engage in
"chatter."

This approach conforms to Whately's notion

that one may refute an objection by proving its opposite.
Whately also said, as noted elsewhere, that refutation involves the specialized use of ordinary argument
forms.

In this refutation Broadus used an argument from

testimony, which is one of the three forms included in the
paradigm.

The testimony he cited was that of the well-

known and widely-accepted Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon
47Ibid., p. 5.
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of the New Testament.48

Whately asserted that in matters

of opinion, the strength of the testimony of a witness
depends upon expertise or the ability of the witness to
form a judgment.

In this case, Broadus selected a highly

credible witness to support his definition and thus to
refute the objection.

Thayer was the Bussey Professor of

New Testament Criticism and Interpretation at the Harvard
Divinity Schooi.49
The second objection Broadus addressed was that the
word "church" in I Corinthians 14:34 referred to a formal
public meeting rather than informal gatherings.SO

The

implication of the objection is that women could speak in
smaller, informal gatherings.

To refute this argument

Broadus challenged the objector's premise, arguing that
the distinction between formal and informal gatherings is
a modern one which cannot be imposed upon the historical
situation here involved.

He argued that,

in fact, the

48Joseph H. Thayer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the
New Testament, corrected ed. (New York:
Harper &
Brothers, Franklin Square, 1889), s.v. laleo. Thayer
included five nuances of the term, including 1) to utter a
voice, emit a sound, 2) to speak, i.e., to use the tong.ue
or the faculty of speech, to utter articulate sounds, 3) to
talk, 4) to utter, tell, and 5) to use words in order to
declare one's mind and disclose orie's thoughts.
Thayer
noted that the term is used of animal noises and of human
chatting and prattling.
I Cor. 14:34, however, is listed
as an example of the fifth use, signifying that in
Thayer's opinion, the reference is to intelligent speech.
49rbid., title page.
50 Ibid.

159
kind of abuse addressed by the text was one which could
arise only in an informal meeting, because early church
gatherings were held in private houses and lacked the
formality of contemporary worship services.
said,

Therefore, he

the distinction required by this objection failed.
The third objection Broadus addressed was that in

I Corinthians 11:5ff the apostle had spoken approvingly of
women "praying and prophesying" in the public assemblies.51
From this fact it could be inferred that women are not
forbidden to speak in the assembly, at least not absolutely.

In this case, Broadus conceded the accuracy of

the premise, but challenged the conclusiveness of the
opponent's reasoning with a mildly complicated counter
argument.
Broadus argued that the Apostle had made two
apparently contradictory statements which must be reconciled, since actually contradictory statements in such
immediate proximity to one another would be unlikely.
Assuming that the Apostle did not contradict himself, the
two passages may be reconciled by understanding the act of
prophesying as an exception to the general directive
stated in chapter fourteen.

Prophesying, then, by women

was allowed, but because prophesying was "inspired
speaking" and because there is no inspired speaking in the
51 Ibid. , p. 6 •
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present day, the permission granted by I Corinthians 11 is
moot.
Both of the assertions by which he determined
I Corinthians 11 to be moot could be challenged.

He

anticipated one which argued from I Corinthians 14:3 that
prophecy edifies; therefore, if a woman speaks to edify,
whether speaking with "inspired speech" or not, she is
exempt from the apostle's prohibition.

This challenge he

refuted by attacking the conclusiveness of the reasoning
on grounds of a logical fallacy committed. He described
the fallacy and illustrated it with an analogy as follows:
The author of this argument had forgotten the
first elements of his logic, which certainly
taught him that he must beware of assuming a
proposition to be convertible. All prophesying
was edifying speech; but how in the world can it
be inferred that all edifying speech is prophecy?
Yellow fever is a malarial disease;
shall we
infer t~at all malarial diseases are yellow
f ever? 5
In matters of form, Broadus followed Whately's paradigm closely in refuting the third objection to his proposition.

In so doing, perhaps he adequately refuted the

contemporary claim to prophesying and other forms of edifying speech.

Several of the propositions of his refuta-

tion were not supported, however, which weakened their
52 Ibid • p.

7•
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force.S3

One obvious weakness of substance is that he

failed to address the other primary provision of I Corin-

thians ll:S, namely, that women could pray in the
assembly.
The fourth objection to the proposition was that the
prohibition applied only in its historical and cultural
setting at Corinth, where the generally loose behavior of
the women in society required a particular strictness of
Christian women in public places.S4

If the prohibition was

thus culturally bound, then it would have no binding
effect upon Broadus's contemporary audience.
This objection Broadus stated with full force, conceding that it was more plausible than those which had
preceded it.SS

Again, his method of refutation was to deny

the premise with two contrary assertions.

First, he

observed that the same prohibition was made through
Timothy to the churches in the region of Ephesus.

Thus

the command was not restricted to the women of Corinth.
Second, he argued that the basis for the prohibition as
stated in I Timothy 2 was the facts connected with the
S3several of Broadus's interpretive assertions are
not heavily supported.
This is not to say that they are
without basis, however, for evidence in their favor
exists. His failure to present the evidence makes the
arguments less satisfying.
S 4 sroadus, "Should Women Speak • • • ," pp. 7, 8.
ssrbid., p. 7.
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creation and the fall of Adam and Eve.

Based upon the

second of these statements, he asked rhetorically,

"Does

not this absolutely forbid restricting his prohibition to
Corinth and Ephesus, or to that particular age?"56
His refutation of the cultural argument was based
upon the accepted principles of reformed hermeneutics,57
namely, the consideration of the cultural and grammatical
contexts of a proposition.

Broadus would not deny that

certain Biblical propositions are culturally conditioned
and therefore are limited in their scope of application.
His argument in this case was that the grammatical context, and its logic, established the proposition on transcultural grounds, and therefore made it universal in its
scope.
The fifth and sixth objections, that the prohibition
did not apply to women who have no husbands and that the
documents of these two passages are corrupt, Broadus
barely mentioned before dismissing them as desperate
attempts to dislodge his proposition.SB
56 rbid.

I

Both objections he

P• 8.

5 7 Reformed hermeneutics refers to the governing principles of Biblical interpretation followed by the Christian Reformers of the sixteenth century. Among these
individuals were John Calvin and Martin Luther. Essentially, reformed hermeneutics rejects the fanciful interpretations of allegory in favor of a literal understanding
of the Bible.
58Broadus, "Should Women Speak • • • ," p. 9.
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considered to be absurd, the former because it posed a
ridiculous policy and the latter because no documentary
evidence could be offered to substantiate the claim.

In

his dismissal of these objections, he applied Whately's
dictum that in refutation one should not pay great heed to
inconsequential arguments, because to do so elevates their
importance.
The seventh objection, found in the addendum, was
that the Apostle Paul contradicted Jesus, who held women
in high regard.

Paul's statements, then, must have been

biased and non-authoritative and therefore, non-binding
for the contemporary audience.59

As Whately had urged,

Broadus stated this objection full force, quoting extensively from a letter in which the objection was raised and
acknowledging that the conclusion follows logically from
the premise.GO
Broadus chose to refute this argument by showing the
origin of the error, as Whately had urged.

He pointed out

that the practice of women speaking in mixed assemblies
had originated among the Methodists, and had been practiced by Quakers.

Also Universalists and Unitarians, who

did not acknowledge the authority of the New Testament,
encouraged women to speak.
59rbid., pp. 11, 12.
60rbid., p. 12.

The force of the argument was
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that the practice had not originated with Baptists, and
was embraced by those who did not share in the Baptist
loyalty to the authority of the Bible.
Although he employed a principle of form drawn from
Whately, this refutation was weak.

Correctly he framed

the objection as being that the Apostle Paul's opinion was
biased and non-authoritative.

However, he failed to deal

with that objection directly, which he could have done.
For example, he could have challenged the line of reasoning which inferred that because women were important in
the 1 if e of Jesus they should be permitted to speak in the
mixed assembly.

The conclusion does not follow the pre-

mises and is, therefore,

fallacious.

Had he established

this point, he would have eliminated the objection that
Paul contradicted Jesus.

He also could have challenged

the premise that Paul was not "inspired" when he wrote the
texts involved from the well-developed theological doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture.

Why he did not

present these arguments is not clear, but their absence
clearly weakened his refutation of this objection.
The eighth and ninth objections were both based upon
expedience.

Respectively,

they assert that the questioned

practice should be allowed because it does much good,

and

that to reject the growing movement favoring the practice
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would be to concede its benefits to others.61

The fol-

lowing statement expresses the former objection well:
A justly honored Baptist pastor was not long ago
reported as saying (in substance) that he did not
want to hear so much about texts on this subject;
the thing does good, and that was enough for him.62
Broadus replied to this objection using indirect
means, which Whately had described as using the opponent's
own premises to prove an absurdity.

His argument, quoted

below, assumed the premise that a good outcome justifies
the means by which it is obtained, and then ex tended the
premise to an objectionable conclusion.
The Paedobaptists do much good. Many devout
Romanists gain good and do good by holding up a
crucifix to dying eyes; does that make the practice scriptural and justifiable for Baptists? Why
will not Baptist people see the gross inconsistency of vehemently asserting the necessity of
conforming to the New Testament in regard to
church membership and the ordinances, while they
coolly disregard ex~ress prohibitions in respect
to another matter?6
To the objection that other groups would benefit
from the growing movement if Baptists did not accommodate
the practice in question, Broadus employed an argument
similar to that used to refute the previous objection.
Again, he assumed the premise and extended it to an
undesirable conclusion.
6lrbid., pp. 14, 15.
62Ibid. p. 14.
63rbid., pp. 14, 15.
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"Ah, but," some will say, "this is a great movement; and it is going to grow. Shall we let the
Methodists get all the benefit of it?" Grant for
the sake of argument that it seems expedient, and
will give denominational power. We let the Methodists get all the benefit of infant baptism, of
Arminian theology, of centralized organization,
because we think these things are contrary to the
New Testament. If Baptists are going to abandon
New Testament teachings for the sake of falling in
with what they regard as a popular movementt the
very reason for their existence has ceased. 4
In both cases he conformed to the Whately paradigm.

He

also developed materially convincing arguments by
appealing to the highest of distinctive Baptist
principles.
Summary
In this discourse, Broadus conformed consistently to
the paradigm of Whately.

He was aware that presumption

favored his proposition, and he confessed that he appreciated that advantage in addressing a controversial subject.

Although it was contrary to his own view regarding

burden of proof, he apparently did not feel obligated to
prove his proposition, confining his argumentation to
refuting objections.
In every one of his refutations, specific dicta from
Whately's notions of refutation are followed.

Thus,

in

matters of form, his arguments conformed to the paradigm.
The third and the seventh objections were not refuted as
64 Ibid., p.

15.
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well as they could have been.

The absence of certain

available arguments weakened his case at those two points.
Often in this discourse Broadus made assertions
concerning interpretive matters with little support.

For

example, concerning the definition of the word "speak" in
the first objection he developed an argument from testimony, citing an authoritative opinion on the interpretive
matter.

However, only in that instance did he quote such

an authority.

In his refutation of the third objection,

his assertion that "to prophesy" referred to inspired
speech seemed arbitrary, because no support was presented.
It must be acknowledged that some and perhaps many of his
statements were not proven as they might have been.

It

must also be acknowledged that Broadus himself was a
scholar both of the New Testament and the Greek language,
in which it was originally written.

At the age of 63, he

had earned the respect of both scholars and laymen for his
opinions.

Thus, the entire address bore the imprint of

his expert testimony.
In substance, then, the arguments in this discourse
are somewhat uneven in quality.

Some of the objections

were handled reasonably well, but others were not convincingly refuted.
It is significant that Btoadus apparently followed
Whately's approach to presumption and burden of proof
rather than his own in this discourse.

Rather than
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proving his proposition, as his own view of burden of
proof would require, he asserted it as the teaching of the
New Testament on the subject, and then proceeded to refute
objections.

In this he followed Whately's notion that if

presumption favors one's proposition, he need only refute
objections for the statement to stand.

He also implicitly

claimed presumption in his favor, both from the authority
of the Bible and from the bias of his intended audience.
In the refutation of arguments, he consistently
followed several of Whately's ideas, as demonstrated
above.

The major weakness of his refutations was that

they were not thoroughly supported.
"Immersion Essential to Christian Baptism"
Background of the Discourse
In the first address examined in this chapter,
Broadus urged that Baptists should teach their distinctive
views, because they owed as much to Christians of other
denominations.

Dr. Broadus followed his own admonition in

this discourse,

in which he argued that the correct mode

of baptism is immersion.
Like the second discourse studied, this one was
written rather than oral.
form in 1892.65

It was published in pamphlet

As in the present day, most Christian

65starr, 3: 151.
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denominations in 1892 practiced baptism either by sprinkling or by pouring.

Broadus chose

~o

speak to this issue

from the Baptist perspective, urging the practice of
immersion.
Unlike the other two, this discourse was written for
a non-Baptist audience.
cates as much.

Internal evidence clearly indi-

This evidence will be presented and dis-

cussed below, with regard to presumption and burden of
proof.

Although the audience was not Baptist, it was

assumed to be Christian, as the overview below indicates.
An Overview of the Discourse
This discourse is almost entirely argumentation
centered on the proposition that immersion in water is
essential to Christian baptism.

Of the three addresses

examined in this study, this one is the most thoroughly
developed from the standpoint of argument.

It is also the

longest of the three.
The proposition is stated in the first sentence of
the document and is followed by some qualifying development.

Particularly important in this regard was Broadus's

immediate appeal to the authority of the Bible.

He also

asserted that the discussion was not simply an inconsequential matter of form, but rather an issue of the nature
of the practice.
Having established the preceding suppositions,
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Broadus proceeded to prove his proposition.
was threefold:

His argument

1) the obvious sense of the Bible, as

conveyed in its descriptive accounts of the practice,
favors immersion;

2) the lexical definition of the term

baptizo favors immersion;

and 3) the practice of the

Greek church favors immersion.

Two objections are

addressed in this section of the discourse.
Satisfied that he had adequately established his
proposition, Broadus next undertook the refutation of five
primary objections.

These were the following:

1) the

church has authorized a change from the New Testament mode
of baptism;

2) Christian liberty permits one to choose

the outward mode as long as the significance is unchanged;
3) practical constraints often make immersion undesirable
if not impossible;

4) the Biblical use of baptizo permits

other understandings than immersion;

and 5) the term

bapto involves immersion, but baptizo means "to put
within."
Broadus ended his discourse with a plea for crossdenominational Christian unity, both in spirit and in
organization.

He insisted, however, that such unity

required that Christians take the Bible as their sole
authority and understand it in its plain sense.

And,

if

this understanding of the Bible were adopted, differences
regarding the subject of baptism would be eliminated.
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An Analysis and Assessment of the Discourse
Once again, the Whately paradigm will be used as the
standard of analysis and assessment of this discourse.
Presumption and burden of proof will be discussed first.
Then the arguments identified in the overview will be
individually examined.

The writer will discuss forms of

argument and refutation together so that the order of
Broadus's discourse may be preserved.
Presumption and Burden of Proof
Unlike the other two discourses, which were
addressed to Baptist audiences, this discourse was
addressed to a broad Christian audience.
dence makes this fact obvious.

Internal evi-

In the introductory com-

ments affirming the sole authority of the Bible, Broadus
probably had in mind Christians from other denominational
traditions in his audience when he said:
We cannot acknowledge any other authority. The
opinions and practices of eminent Christians in
past ages, yea of our own best friends, our pastors, our parents must not be regarded, except so
far as they may help us to determine what is
taught on the subject in the Scriptures.66
More clearly, in his concluding remarks it is evident that
he was thinking of many non-Baptists.

He said:

I have spoken long and earnestly of a controverted
question, one of those which divide Christians.
66John A. Broadus, "Immersion Essential to Christian
Baptism" (Philadelphia:
The Bible and Publication
Society, n. d.}, p. 4.
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But I am a rejoicing believer in Christian Union •
• • • All who are truly his are one in him. Not
only those belonging to what we call evangelical
denominations, but many Romanists, for there are
doubtless lovers of Christ among them, as there
have been in past ages; and many of the Greek
Church;
and perhaps some Universalists, and Unitarians, possibly even Mormons; and Quakers who
reject all water baptism • • • • 67
Although members of other denominational groups are not
directly addressed, the conciliatory tone clearly implies
that his aim was to persuade those of other denominations
to adopt his viewpoint.

His final appeal, which followed

the statement above, clearly indicated his intent.

He

said:
All Christians, except the Quakers, make baptism a
condition of church membership. And for the sake
of a more complete and efficient Christian union,
we urge upon our fellow Christians, as the plain
teaching of God's word, that there is no baptism
where there is not an immersion.68
Concerning presumption, Whately had said that the
biases of an audience may determine the side of a question
upon which presumption falls, and conversely, that presumption is against that which is
to prevailing opinion.

paradoxical or contrary

It was determined above that

Broadus's audience included Christians of all denominations.

It follows,

therefore, that presumption was not in

his favor, for the groups other than his own practiced
either sprinkling or pouring as the mode of baptism.
67Ibid., pp. 64, 65.
68Ibid

o I

P• 66.

In
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terms of the paradigm, Broadus's proposition was contrary
to the prevailing opinion of his intended audience.
One aspect of presumption, as Whately defined it,
Broadus did apply.

In his introductory comments, he

applied the notion of the habitual presumption in favor of
the judgments of the Bible.69

As the following statement

indicates, he believed that his claim to presumption for
the authority of the Bible would be upheld by his
audience.
To insist on the scriptural act of baptism is a
necessary consequence of a great fundamental principle, which was once held by Baptists almost
alone, but which many of our brethren of other
connections are now coming to share--the exclusive
authority of Scripture. We do not say simply the
authority, nor the paramount authority, but the
exclusive authority of Scripture. Baptism is
performed at all, simply because the Scriptures
direct us to perform it;
therefore we feel bound
to in~8ire what it is that they direct, and to do
that.
It is also clear from the final sentence of the statement
above that this presumption was foundational to the argument to follow.
On one hand, then, regarding the authority of the
Bible, presumption may have favored Broadus.

On the other

hand, prevailing opinion concerning the specific issue in
69This element of presumption has been explained
previously.
70Broadus, "Immersion Essential.
Emphasis mine.

•

•I

" pp. 3, 4.
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question opposed the Professor's proposition.

Because the

habitual presumption in this case is less directly and
specifically related to the issue than the presumption of
prevailing opinion,
Therefore,

the latter is probably the stronger.

the writer concludes that presumption was not

in Broadus's favor

in this case.

According to Whately,

the burden of proof rests with

the one who disputes presumption.

If the conclusion

stated above concerning presumption is correct, the burden
of proof in this discourse rested with Broadus.

Broadus

did, in fact, assume this burden, developing three lines
of argument in support of his proposition and refuting
objections to it.

It cannot be determined, however, that

Broadus assumed the burden in keeping with Whately's
views.

It must be remembered that.Broadus's own belief

was that he who alleges must prove.

Because he alleged

that immersion is essential to Christian baptism, he
placed upon himself the burden of proof apart from any
consideration of presumption.
Analysis of Arguments
As indicated in the overview above, Broadus offered
three lines of argument to establish his proposition, and
then addressed five objections to his proposition.

First

the affirmative arguments will be examined, followed by
consideration of the refutation of objections.
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Affirmative Arguments.

Broadus's first affirmative

argument was that the obvious sense of the New Testament
references to the practice is that of immersion.

Given as

examples are the baptisms of Jesus and the Ethiopian
eunuch, both of whom are said to have come up out of the
water after being baptized.

Also cited is Romans 6, in

which baptism is likened to burial.

The Professor's point

was that the descriptive narrative accounts and the
imagery of burial all indicate that the New Testament
practice was to immerse.
Broadus anticipated an objection to his interpretation of the baptism of Jesus, for the literal translation
of Matthew's account of the event states that Jesus came
up from the water.

From this premise, one could infer

that he had not been in or under the water.

Conforming to

Whately's standard, Broadus challenged the validity of the
premise, noting that Mark's account of the event said that
Jesus came up out of the water.

He also appealed to the

expert testimony of the translators of the Tyndale,
Cranmer, Geneva, and King James versions of the Bible, all
of whom translated Matthew's term "out of."

In addition,

he demonstrated from other uses of the term "from" the
similarity of the two ideas.

For example, he observed

that to take a mote fro_!!! the eye of another is to take it
out of that one's eye.
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To summarize and reinforce his first argument,
Broadus related two personal incidents which illustrated
his point that the obvious meaning of the New Testament
narratives supports the notion of baptism by immersion.
This first line of argument clearly conforms to the
elements of Whately's theory included in the paradigm.
First, insofar as he perceived a presumption of the authority of the Bible to be in his favor, he pressed it to his
advantage.

Only upon such presumption would the narrative

accounts cited be considered as normative for contemporary
practice.

Second,

the objection that Jesus came "from"

the water was raised immediately after it was asserted
that he came "out of" the water.

The objection was

refuted, in fact, before the other two affirmative examples were presented.

Thus, in his placement of the objec-

tion, Broadus was consistent with Whately's dictum that
refutation should be done near the beginning rather than
at the end of an argument.
In substance, the refutation conformed to three of
Whately's ideas regarding argument from testimony.

The

reference to several translations may be considered a form
of argument from testimony in that these expert linguists
and interpreters expressed an interpretive judgment in
their translation of Matthew's account of Jesus' baptism.
Whately would agree that their witness in a matter of
opinion is credible because they have the recognized
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ability to form an intelligent judgment concerning the
question.

Such an argument is further strengthened,

according to Whately, if it counters the witness's prejudice.

Broadus explicitly pointed out the bias of his

witnesses, writing:
Does some one think our friend's translation has
misled him on this subject? That would be
strange, for the translation certainly was not
made by Baptists • • • • The translation he reads,
our cherished Bible, was made by Episcopalians,
members of the Church of England.7
Third, Whately asserted that the argument from testimony
is made stronger by increasing the number of witnesses.
This Broadus accomplished by quoting four translations
rather than one.
The second affirmative argument was that the New
Testament term baptize, which is translated "baptize,"
requires immersion.

In establishing this assertion,

Broadus again employed heavily the argument from testimony
in a manner quite consistent with Whately's theory.
Before introducing the testimony he would use, Broadus
articulated the principles by which testimony must be
judged.

His statements are remarkably like those of

Whately:
It is a question of scholarship. Therefore we
ought to ask those who are unquestionably able and
leading scholars. And they ought to be as nearly
as possible disinterested as to the matter in
71Ibid., p. 11.
Episcopalians and Anglicans practice
sprinkling as their mode of baptism.
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hand. Such are the conditions required when we
refer an~ matter whatever to the decision of
others.7
Before he presented the evidence, Broadus carefully stated
the credentials of each of the scholars whose writings
would testify to his viewpoint.73

After he presented his

arguments, he again emphasized that the sources he had
employed met the criteria of acceptable testimony.

He

said:
Such is the rendering of this word by the three
most recent lexicons of acknowledged scientific
value; the three which any competent scholar, if
asked to recommend lexicons to a student of New
Testament Greek, would be sure to name. I might
add that the two German commentators on the New
Testament, who are the foremost of the century as
to full and accurate scholarship, Fritzsche and
Meyer, furfish like testimony as to the meaning of
the word. 7
Broadus anticipated an objection to this argument,
namely, that some lexicons also define the term to mean
"pour" or "drench."

From such definitions one could infer

that modes other than immersion are permitted by the word
72Ibid., p. 12.
73It is particularly significant that in stating the
credentials of Liddell and Scott, whose lexicon he would
quote, he noted that they were scholars of the Church of
England.
74Broadus, "Immersion Essential ••• ," p. 14. In the
argument itself, Broadus quoted three lexicons:
1) Liddell and Scott's Lexicon of the Greek Language;
2) Grimm's edition of Wilke's Lexicon of New Testament
Greek;
and 3) Cremer's Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New
Testament Greek. All of these concurred that the sense of
baptizo is "to immerse."
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baptize.

Broadus conceded the premise that such def ini-

tions are included in some lexicons.

Conforming to

Whately's dictum that one may deny the conclusiveness of
another's reasoning in refutation, he argued that in the
cases in which the term is used of pouring or drenching it
is used in a figurative sense.

He also asserted a prin-

ciple of interpretation, which requires that the primary
sense of a term75 be used unless the context requires a
remote or secondary sense.

These two counter-assertions

decrease the probable validity of the opponents' contention that baptizo means "pour."
Whately suggested concerning refutation that sometimes one will prefer to establish his own position before
refuting objections.

Should this be the case, one should

make clear his intention to return to objections raised.
Broadus, in concluding his treatment of the second aff irmati ve argument, acknowledged that further objections to
his conclusions drawn from lexical studies existed.
he promised to answer later in his discourse.

These

This pro-

mise he fulfilled in treating the fourth objection, which
will be discussed at an appropriate point below.
The third affirmative line of argument was that the
Greek Church practices immersion, because they understand
75rn this case, immersion is the primary sense of the
term.
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the Greek term baptizo in that sense.

As before, Broadus

cited the testimony of individuals versed in the Greek
language, who testified that the term in question involves
immersion.

He quoted one Greek scholar, who said:

The Church of the West commits an abuse of words
and of ideas in practicing baptism by aspersion,
the mere statement of which is in itself a ridiculous contradiction.76
Having presented the three lines of argument described above, Broadus was satisfied that he had adequately
proven his proposition.

He expressed this belief through

the words of the imaginary inquirer whom he had led
through his arguments:
Such, then, is the evidence which may be given our
unlearned friend from scholars, the lexicons, and
the living Greeks, concerning their own word.
Much more might be added in the way of conf irmat ion; but he would probably say, "Well, it is
plain that I can trust my English Bible. What
these great scholars say--none of them Baptists-and what the living Greeks say and do, accord
exactly with the impression I got from my own
Bible;
and so the evidence is enough;
I care for
no more. 11 7 7
Refutation of Objections.

Believing that he had met

his obligation to bear the burden of proof, Broadus next
raised and refuted five objections to his proposition.

He

did not call them objections, but instead referred to them
as grounds upon which Christian people defend the practice
76Broadus, "Immersion Essential • •
771bid., p.

19.

., "

p.

18.
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of sprinkling for baptism.78

Regardless of what they are

called, the propositions he refuted

objections.

~ere

functionally

These will be treated briefly.

The first objection Broadus addressed was that
although the New Testament required immersion, the church
authorized a change.

This notion he refuted by tracing

the origin of the error, according to the dictum of
Whately.

The practice was begun in the third century to

be applied in cases of sick and dying individuals.

It was

not until the thirteenth century that sprinkling was used
in all cases.

Broadus argued that the earliest use of

this "clinic" baptism arose from an exaggerated sense of
the importance of the practice, for people were afraid to
die without having been baptized.
He further refuted the notion using argument from
testimony.

He cited the Reformers, Luther and Calvin, who

had called for a return to the practice of immersion.7 9
Again, he selected witnesses who, in matters of opinion,
were considered capable of forming a credible judgment.
The second objection was that the significance of
baptism is that which should be maintained, and the mode
should be left as a matter of liberty, or individual
preference.

In this case, Broadus challenged the premise

78Ibid., p. 20.
79Ibid., pp. 22, 23.
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that the significance of the practice is all that matters.
Using the indirect approach described by Whately, he
extended the premise to support the Quaker assertion that
baptism is unnecessary altogether, because the spiritual
significance exists quite apart from the act.

Such an

extension is unacceptable to one who practices baptism in
any form.

Broadus had expressed this line of argument in

conversation with an Episcopalian, which he related in the
discourse as follows:
They say Christians may choose for themselves
about mere outward forms;
these make no difference if you have the essence of the thing.
Yes, and so says the Quaker, more strongly still.
What would you say to the Quaker? I asked this
question of an esteemed friend, who is an Episcopal clergyman. The Quaker tells us the mere
outward form of baptism is unnecessary; the
essential thing is to have the baptism of the
Spirit, and water baptism need not be observed at
all. What would you say to him? "I would tell
him the Scripture teaches us to baptize in water."
Very well, I replied, and so it teaches us to
baptize in water.
If you have an outward ceremony
at all, you have a form, and can you say that the
form of a ceremony is of no importance? How will
such an one answer the Quaker, except upon the
Baptist principle?BO
The third objection Broadus answered was actually a
series of five practical difficulties attendant to baptism
by immersion.

Among these were that it can be dangerous

to the ill or feeble,

it can result in indecent exposure,

it may be impracticable, and that many good people have
80Ibid., pp. 26, 27.
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believed in and been blessed by the practice of sprinkling.

In each of these cases the Professor challenged

the premise of the argument as insufficient to merit
justification for an alternate mode of baptism, using
various forms of argument.

For example, to refute the

notion that immersion can result in indecent exposure,
Broadus used an argument from analogy.

He observed that

when a lady alights from her carriage, there is danger of
indecent exposure, unless proper care is exercised.

Just

as indecency in that circumstance can be avoided by taking
proper precautions, so also can indecency in the act of
immersion be avoided by careful planning and management.
To refute the notion that sprinkling has been used and
defended by good people, he again employed the indirect
approach of extending the premise to an unacceptable conclusion.

He did this by selecting various denominational

groups and asking rhetorically why they rejected certain
doctrines of other denominations.

The doctrines they

rejected, he reasoned, have been held and defended by some
of the greatest Christians and intellects of the human
race.
Like the third objection, the fourth was actually a
series of five challenges to Broadus's claim that the New
Testament meaning of baptizo is "immerse."

Earlier in

the discourse he had promised to address further his
assertion that the New Testament word cannot be used to
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justify modes other than immersion.

His treatment of this

objection fulfilled that promise.
Primarily, the objection concerned various passages
of Scripture which some understood to describe pouring or
sprinkling.

To refute the interpretations which countered

his proposition, he used the techniques of argument which
have been described earlier in this study.Bl

Two represen-

tative examples will be suffice to demonstrate Broadus's
dependence upon Whately in this rather lengthy section of
the discourse.
First, there was the notion proposed by Dr. Edward
Beecher that, according to John 3:22-25, baptism is synonymous with purification.

Such an idea is based upon the

textual statement that a discussion of purification arose,
based upon several acts of baptism.

The text reads:

After these things Jesus and His disciples came
into the land of Judea; and there He was spending
time with them, and baptizing. And John also was
baptizing in Aenon near Salim, because there was
much water there; and they were coming and were
being baptized. For John had not yet been thrown
into prison.
There arose therefore a discussion
on the part oa John's disciples with a Jew about
purification. 2
81All of the arguments offered cannot be treated
here, due to limits upon the scope of this study and
length of the discourse. Two examples have been given to
demonstrate Broadus's use of Whately's elements.
The
reader interested in further analysis may examine pp. 3555 of the discourse.
82John 3:22-25 (NASB).
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Broadus conceded that baptism was understood to be a rite
of purification, and that the passage in question clearly

teaches that a discussion of purification very naturally
was precipitated by acts of baptism.

However, he argued,

one cannot infer that baptism is therefore synonymous with
purification.

He said:

The fact that baptism was going on might very
naturally lead to a discussion between some of
John's disciples and a Jew about the general subject of purification, and the relation of this to
other purifications. Being a peculiar, remarkable, and novel purification, it was perfectly
natural that baptism should lead to discussion of
the general subject. But why in the world are we
to say that the terms baptism and purification are
synonymous, that baptism means nothing more def ini te than purification, and that an~ form of purification might be called a baptism? 3
Broadus's argument is obviously that the inference is far
broader than that which is warranted by the particular
from which it is drawn.

To support his contention, he set

forth an argument from analogy:
Suppose a murder has occurred, and leads some
persons into a discussion concerning death;
are
we to conclude that the terms murder and death are
synonymous, and that any form of death may be
called a murder? Yet because the occurrence of
baptism led to a discussion concerning purification, we are told that these terms are synonymo~i'
and that any form of purification is a baptism.
In the Professor's argument, Whately's contention that an
analogy rests upon the relationship of ratios is obviously

83 Broadus, "Immersion Essential • • • ," pp. 37, 38.
84 Ibid., p. 3 8.
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applied.

No comparison is intended between murder and

baptism or death and purification.

Rather, his point was

that just as an act of murder might lead to a broader
discussion of death, so also an act of baptism might lead
to a broader discussion of purification.

However, just as

all deaths are not murders, neither are all purifications
baptisms.

That the analogy emphasized the relationship is

unmistakable because the entities compared, i. e., murder
and baptism, are quite unlike each other.
A second example involves the objections based upon
testimony regarding the Jordan River.

On one hand,

Broadus cited testimony that the river is too shallow to
permit immersion.

On the other hand, he reported testi-

mony that the bank is so steep and the current so swift
that immersion would be impracticable.
Whately had said that regarding matters of fact, the
witness's honesty, accuracy, and means of obtaining information must be considered in evaluating testimony.
Further, he urged that a witness's prejudice must be
considered.

Broadus employed both of these elements in

his refutation.

The view that the bank was too steep and

the current too swift had been asserted by one who had
visited the traditional place of Jesus' baptism.

There-

fore, Broadus implied, this individual could testify concerning the matter based upon first-hand observation.
Such a means of obtaining information should be reasonably
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accurate.

Although he disclaimed intent to impugn the

character of this witness, the Professor pointedly challenged the accuracy of the testimony.

He charged:

Now this gentleman perfectly knew that every
Spring, when the river is high as he saw it, in
the week preceding Easter, there come four or five
or seven or eight thousand pilgrims from all parts
of the East to this very place, • • • and there
• • • do actually immerse themselves and one
another in the river--not as a baptism (for they
have received that in infancy), but as a sacred
bath at that holy spot. He knew as well as I do
that this happens every Spring at that very place,
and yet it never occurred to him to connect that
fact in his mind with his own timid notion that
immersion would there be impracticable. I am
satisfied he was a good man, and have no idea he
meant to deceive, but how strangely g~gd men can
sometimes manipulate their own minds.
The statement not only alleges inaccuracy in the testimony, but also attributes that inaccuracy to prejudice
which, in Broadus's opinion, prevented the witness from
drawing an accurate conclusion.
The fifth and final objection to his proposition was
a novel view proposed by a Presbyterian clergyman.

This

view involved a distinction of terminology, namely, that
bapto means "dip," but baptizo means "put within."

The

former word would require that an object (or person) be
put in water and quickly taken out again, whereas the
latter would leave the object or person there.
85Ibid., pp. 39, 40.
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Broadus's first line of refutation was to employ
Whately's indirect approach, drawing a ridiculous conclusion from the premises.

This form of reductio ad absurdum

rather humorously points out the foolishness of the
notion:
Suppose it were granted that this was true;
then
we should have Christ commanding us to put men
within or under the water, as a religious ceremony, and, because he does not expressly add that
we are to take them out again, we should be bound,
forsooth, to let them remain there. If any of my
esteemed brethren of other denominations should
take this view of the matter, and request me to
"intuspose" them, to put them within the water, in
the name of our Redeemer, it may be assumed that
my common sense and humanity will cause me to take
them out again, as their own common sense and
prudence w i 11 then lead them to go off and change
their garments, without needing an express command
in either respect.86
He further refuted the opponent's view by denying the
accuracy of his premise, namely, that a distinction of
meaning is to be made between bapto and baptizo.

He

accomplished this denial with the counter-assertion that
commonly in language a strengthened form of a word
gradually replaces a weaker form without a substantial
change of meaning.

Although the two words did not become

identical in meaning, he said, the stronger came to be
frequently employed in the same sense as the weaker.87
86rbid., pp. 57, 58.
87rbid., p. 61.
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The argument at this point is rather complex and
seems to be more involved than the novel approach he
attempted to refute merited.

Broadus noted that the view

was gaining a following, which probably explains why he
devoted such attention to it.

Perhaps, however, he vio-

lated Whately's dictum, which urged that one pay little
heed to insignificant arguments, lest undue attention
elevate their importance.
Summary
Of the three discourses studied, this one was not
only the longest, it was also the finest specimen of
argumentation, according to Whately's paradigm.

Con-

cerning presumption and burden of proof, Broadus did not
enjoy the former and, therefore, bore the latter.

A

significant portion of the discourse involved proof of his
proposition.

He probably assumed the burden of proof upon

his own premise that he who alleges must prove rather than
following Whately's dictum that the burden rests upon the
one who challenges presumption.

However, his arguments to

establish his proposition are far more carefully framed in
this discourse than in the other two.

If, by his prin-

ciple, he believed that he had assumed the burden of proof
in the other two discourses, one might ask why in this one
his arguments were so much more extensive.
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His refutations regularly followed Whately's principles.

All of those included were too numerous to dis-

cuss above.

Those presented, however, are a fair repre-

sentation of Broadus's approach.
It is significant to note a similarity and a difference between this discourse and the first one studied.
In both discourses, the proper mode of Christian baptism
is an issue.

In the first,

tion whereas,

in this one, it is the central issue.

the first,

it was a subordinate proposiIn

very little argument was offered to establish

the proposition.

This may be because baptism was not the

central issue, but the more likely reason is that the
first audience agreed with Broadus concerning the subject
at the outset.

In this third discourse, the arguments are

far more thorough, probably because Dr. Broadus did not
expect the third audience to concur with his view.
Clearly this pamphlet was intended to persuade a broader
Christian audience of another point of view.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate
how and to what extent John Broadus applied Richard
Whately's theories in three of his own addresses.
Employing a model for critical discourse proposed by
Lawrence Rosenfield, the author constructed a paradigm
which includes elements of Whately's theory.

Criteria

191

developed required that elements of the paradigm, first,
must be found both in Whately's Elements of Rhetoric and
in Broadus's Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of
Sermons and, second, must be in the opinion of contemporary experts, Whately's most significant contributions.
The paradigm included the following elements:

presumption

and burden of proof, arguments from testimony and from
analogy, and refutation of objections.
Three of Broadus's discourses were analyzed according to the provisions of the paradigm.

They were studied

in chronological order, which happened to coincide with a
progressive order, namely, that both the quantity and
quality of argument presented increased with each subsequent discourse.

This dual increase may be explained in

terms of Whately's ideas.
The first address was presented to a Baptist audience and concerned a subject to which there could be
little objection.

The speech emphasized Baptist tradi-

tions, both in belief and practice.

In terms of Whately's

conceptions, presumption was clearly in Broadus's favor
and there were few objections to be raised and refuted
with that audience.

The greater need of the audience was

motivation rather than persuasion, and so there is greater
emphasis upon appeal than upon· argument.

Because the

paradigm is limited to only a few aspects of argument,
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much of the development of this speech cannot be judged by
it.

The second discourse was also intended for a Baptist
audience, but involved a more controversial subject.
sumption favored Broadus,

Pre-

in that the majority of his

audience shared his opinion.

However, he admitted several

objections to his proposition, so that the greater part of
the discourse was given to refutation of them.

The number

of objections, properly admitted and refuted, account for
the increase in quantity and quality of argument, as
compared to the first address studied.
Concerning burden of proof, it seems to this writer
that Broadus did not follow his own notion that he who
alleges must prove.

To establish the proposition, he

merely asserted that the obvious sense of the two New
Testament passages which he quoted clearly prohibited
women from speaking in mixed assemblies.

The only argu-

ment following the proposition was the refutation of
objections.

Thus, his practice conformed to the dictum of

Whately, namely, that if presumption favors one's proposition, he need only to refute objections to it in order to
maintain it.

It could be argued that he assumed the

burden of proof and offered, in his opinion, sufficient
support for the proposition to satisfy his audience.
he did assume the burden, then he may be faulted for

If
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failing to build a convincing case to establish his
assertion.
The third address was longest and contained the most
involved argumentation.

This almost certainly was due to

the fact that Broadus's audience was not primarily Baptist, and therefore would not grant presumption in favor
of his proposition.

Although he claimed habitual pre-

sumption for the authority of the Bible, it is apparent
that he conceded presumption concerning the specific issue
addressed.

He therefore offered relatively extensive

arguments to establish his assertion.

Rather than simply

asserting his interpretive views as he had tended to do in
the other discourses studied, he carefully argued support
for them.

He also went to great lengths to refute objec-

t ions, particularly those involving interpretation of the
Biblical data.
In the previous chapter, the writer discussed the
unmistakable influence of Whately upon the theory of
John Broadus.

In this chapter he has examined that

influence upon Dr. Broadus's practice.

This examination

has disclosed clear evidence that Broadus applied elements
of Whately's theory in his speeches and discourses.
Generalizations must be drawn cautiously from such a
limited number of specific examples, but at least in these
three discourses, Whately's influence cannot be denied.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Summary
An understanding of argument is essential to an
understanding of rhetoric.

It is through argument, among

other forms of proof, that one convinces an audience that
a given proposition is valid.

At least since the time of

Aristotle, who wrote extensively concerning proof by means
of argument in his Rhetoric, theorists have discussed the
subject.
Argument is important not only to rhetoric in
general, but to preaching in particular.

Therefore,

various homileticians have discussed the application of
argument theory to preaching.

Two of these theorists,

both from the nineteenth century, have been the subjects
of this study:

Richard Whately, the Anglican Archbishop

whose Elements of Rhetoric was published in 1828 and John
Broadus, the Southern Baptist educator and preacher whose
Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons was
published in 1870.
The purpose of the study has been to trace the
influence of Whately's theory of argument upon the theory
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and practice of Broadus.

This purpose was accomplished as

described below.
The study began with a brief background study of
Richard Whately and a selective description of his theory
of argument.

Elements were chosen for discussion, either

because they were original with Whately or because they
represented, in the opinion of experts, a significant
development of ideas previously created.
Included in the discussion were the elements of
presumption and burden of proof.

These notions, known in

Roman and English law, were introduced into the field of
rhetoric by Whately.

He defined presumption as a preoccu-

pation of ground rather than as a preponderance of probability in favor of a given proposition.

He believed it to

be essential at the outset of an address to determine
where the presumption lies, for the burden of proof, he
said, rests with the side disputing the view favored by
presumption.

Presumption, in his view, favors existing

institutions, the innocence of those accused of wrongdoing, tradition, and individuals, bodies, or books which
command deference.

Presumption is also determined, he

noted, by audience prejudice concerning a proposition.
A second major contribution discussed was the
Archbishop's theory of refutation.

Following the classic

theorists, Whately noted that there is not a distinct
class of refutatory argument.

Rather, he said that regu-
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lar argument forms may be employed in refutation.

He

explained several ways one can refute propositions and
objections.
Also discussed in the second chapter were Whately's
notions of argument from analogy and argument from testimony.

An argument from analogy is based not upon simi-

larity of the essence of the analogues, but rather upon
their relationships to some other thing or things.

An

argument from testimony is based upon a witness's statement of a fact or an opinion.

Such an argument, according

to Whately, does not conclusively prove anything since it
can be falsified.

However, its relative weight may be

determined by considering several conditions related to
the testimony.

Among these conditions are the witness's

ability to know the facts or form an opinion concerning a
matter, his own bias concerning that to which he testifies, and the number of witnesses who concur in their
testimonies.
The third chapter included a background study of
John Broadus and a selective presentation of his theory of
argument.

The ideas treated are among those influenced by

Whately.
Comparison of the two theories disclosed that Dr.
Broadus closely followed Archbishop Whately's notions
regarding refutation of arguments and argument from
analogy.

Broadus approached argument from testimony in a
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slightly different fashion, however, distinguishing
between testimony and authority.
applies to matters of fact,
matters of opinion.

The former, he said,

whereas the latter applies to

Concerning the use of argument from

testimony in matters of fact,
Whately quite closely.

the Professor followed

In his discussion of authority and

matters of opinion, he employed the notions of other
theorists.

It was in his development of the concept of

authority that Broadus discussed his view of the authority
of the Bible.

Although Whately had not made the distinc-

tion Broadus followed, his ideas concerning the authority
of the Bible were similar to those of Broadus and have
been cited as the reason for his emphasis on testimony in
the Elements of Rhetoric.
In the matters of presumption and burden of proof,
Broadus disagreed pointedly with Whately.

Broadus pre-

ferred to distinguish between legal and rhetorical def initions of presumption.

Believing that only the latter

sense was relevant for his purposes, Broadus defined presumption as predisposition concerning a given proposition.
A related difference of opinion between the two men
involved the relationship of presumption to burden of
proof.

Broadus argued that it is useful for a speaker to

know the predisposition of his ·audience, but that in
rhetoric, presumption has no bearing on placing of the
burden of proof.

Whately had stated that presumption
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determines the placement of the burden of proof.

Unlike

the Archbishop, Broadus believed that he who alleges bears
the burden of proof, regardless of presumption.
In Chapter Four, a paradigm for rhetorical analysis
was developed.

The paradigm included the elements of

Whately's theory for which he is best known and with which
Broadus interacted.

Included in the paradigm were pre-

sumption and burden of proof, arguments from analogy and
testimony, and refutation.
The paradigm was applied to three of Broadus's discourses, namely, "Duty of Baptists to Teach Their Distinctive Views," "Should Women Speak in Mixed Public Assemblies?" and "Immersion Essential to Christian Baptism."
The addresses were studied in chronological sequence,
which happened to coincide with a progressive sequence.
One progression was from a strong presumption in favor of
Broadus's proposition in the first address to a presumption against his proposition in the third.

A correspon-

dent progression was from limited argumentation in the
first address to extensive argumentation in the third.
As one might expect, uses of Whately's elements were
discovered in all three discourses.

Broadus closely

followed the Archbishop in matters of refutation, argument
from analogy, and argument from testimony.

Concerning

presumption and burden of proof, only in the third discourse did Broadus offer substantial argument to establish
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his proposition.

In so doing, he conformed to Whately's

dictum that if presumption favors one's proposition, the
burden of proof rests upon the other side.

Satisfactory

refutation of objections is all that is required to allow
the proposition to stand.

Particularly in the second

discourse there is little evidence that Broadus followed
his own notion that he who alleges bears the burden of
proof.
Conclusions
One aim of this study was to determine the contemporary usefulness of Whately's and Broadus's theories of
argument for public speaking in general and preaching in
particular.

Conclusions pertaining to this aim will be

discussed below.
Before conclusions are suggested, some limitations
which condition the conclusions of the study must be
stated.

First, the paradigm used for analysis is limited

in its scope, for it included only selected elements of
Richard Whately's theory of argument.

Therefore,

it can-

not account for all argumentative materials in a discourse
compared to it.
Second, only the variables of the message the source
of the message were considered in the paradigm and the
analysis based upon it.

Rosenfield noted that the

environment and the critic are two other variables opera-
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tive in any rhetorical event.

The practical validity of

the theory could have been better judged if the effects of
the discourses, when they were delivered, had been
studied.
Third, the nature of the study is, in part, descriptive.

It is difficult to draw prescriptive conclusions

from descriptive studies with any degree of certainty.
The fact that a particular rhetorical theory has been
created and practiced in the past does not prove that it
is either valid or effective in the present.
Fourth, only three discourses were studied.

Upon

such a limited sample, it is unwise to draw conclusive
generalizations concerning either the general usefulness
of the theory of argument involved or Broadus's application of it.
The limitations noted restrict one from drawing
independent conclusions.

Conclusions may, however, con-

firm or modify the opinions of others who have examined
the theories and drawn conclusions concerning them.
Conclusions have been suggested previously concerning the extent to which Broadus was influenced both in
theory and in practice by Whately's theory of argument.
The findings reported in chapters three and four suggest
that Broadus considered Whately's notions to be useful for
preaching, particularly when controversial subjects are
involved.

201

Expert opinion, cited elsewhere, noted the lasting
contributions of Whately.

He recognized the need to

establish the truth of a proposition by the governing
rules of logic, which he knew well.

He also realized that

a good argument must convince an audience.

Combining

these two notions, Whately produced a practical, psychological, audience-oriented rhetoric.

His extensive dis-

cussion of refutation and arrangement of arguments
reflect his audience awareness.
Whately's work has also been applauded for its
ecclesiastical usefulness.

He assumed that principles of

argument may be used to establish and support doctrines of
the Christian faith.
use.

In his Elements he demonstrated this

Certainly this study has confirmed this usefulness,

for the three discourses studied here were directed toward
religious audiences.

Broadus's use of argument from tes-

timony and deference to Biblical authority particularly
tends to confirm this opinion.
Concerning the matters of presumption and burden of
proof, Broadus pointedly disputed Whately's ideas.

For

rhetorical purposes, Broadus adopted the better view, in
the opinion of this writer.

In each situation the deter-

minant of presumption must be the audience.

To claim

presumption based upon tradition, for example, while
addressing a group which holds no respect for tradition is
folly.

It is axiomatic in speech theory that a speaker
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must analyze the audience and prepare and present a speech
accordingly.
As for burden of proof, Broadus also held the
better view, rhetorically speaking.

Following Whately,

one might fail to assume the burden based upon an an
inaccurate estimate of presumption.

Consequently, the

speaker would fail to prove a proposition to the satisfaction of an audience.

This difficulty was illustrated

previously by a hypothetical sermon on the subject of
infant baptism.

Because tradition favors the practice of

infant baptism, one whose propositions favors the custom
might assume that he enjoyed presumption and fail to prove
his propositions in his speech.

If he were addressing a

group of Baptists, he would fail to satisfy his audience
because he had mistakenly placed the burden of proof, as
far as that audience was concerned.
Following Broadus's notion that he who alleges must
prove, one will always argue to support his viewpoint.

An

audience's predisposition in favor of one's viewpoint may
remove the necessity of extensive proof.

But following

Broadus's dictum, a proposition would not fail for lack of
any proof.

In the hypothetical example cited above, the

speaker would assume that all of his statements should be
proven.

His arguments might not prove these propositions

conclusively, but they would be more likely to convince a
skeptical audience than mere assertions would be.
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Suggestions for Further Study
The limitations identified above suggest several
types of studies which could be done to expand the present
work.

Following are a few suggestions.
First, Rosenfield's model for critical discourse

includes four variables:

the message, the source of the

message, the environment, and the critic.

The message,

according to Rosenfield must be included in all analyses,
but other combinations of variables are also possible.
For example, a study of the same discourses could be
undertaken examining a combination of message and
environment.

Such a study would cover the information

necessary to examine outcomes of the discourses, providing
an additional basis for evaluating the usefulness of the
theory.
Another study could use the same critical model, but
would employ different elements of argument in the paradigm.
The same discourses could be compared to any number of
elements of argument, drawn from Whately's theories or
from the theories of others.
A third type of further study could apply the paradigm developed for this analysis to other sermons and
addresses delivered by Broadus.

Those chosen for this

study were chosen for their controversial subject matter,
among other things.

It would be informative to analyze
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some of the Professor's typical Sunday sermons to discover
how and to what extent he applied Whately's ideas in them.
A fourth type of study would be more empirical in
nature.

The contemporary usefulness of the theory could

be tested by developing a series of sermons and addresses
applying Whately's notions,

and evaluating the persuasive

effects upon a contemporary audience.
It is this writer's hope that his work will help
public speakers in general and preachers in particular to
understand and apply elements of argument.

Concerning the

importance of argument, especially in preaching, the final
word belongs to Broadus:
Every preacher, then, ought to develop and discipline his powers in respect to argument. If averse
to reasoning, he should constrain himself to practise it;
if by nature strongly inclined that way,
he must remember the serious danger of deceiving
himself and others by false arguments.
One who
has not carefully studied some good treatise on
Logic should take the earliest opportunity to do
so. It will render his mind sharper to detect
fallacy, in others or in himself, and will help to
establish him in the habit of reasoning soundly.
The fact that, as so often sneeringly remarked,
"preachers are never replied to," should make it a
point of honor with preachers not to mislead their
hearers by bad logic, and should render them
exceedingly solicitous to avoid those self-deceptions, which they have no keen opponent to reveal •
• • • The delicate perception of truth, and the
enthusiastic love for it, will inevitably be
impaired by a contrary course.l
lJohn A. Broadus, Treatise On the Preparation and
Delivery of Sermons, ed. E. C. Dargan (New York:
Hodder
and Stoughton, 1898), p. 170.
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